Description
A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key.

### Evidence
**pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names**
```go
func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
result := []fs.FileInfo{}
for _, im := range f.images {
result = append(result, im)
}
return result, nil
}

func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) {
f.log.Info("Open", "path", name)
if name == "/" {
return f, nil
}
...
```

**cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS**
```go
http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem()))

go func() {
server := &http.Server{
Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default ":8084"
ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
}
err := server.ListenAndServe()
```

**pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image**
```go
func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File {
source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret)
return ignition_config_types_32.File{
Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"},
...
```

### Attack Pattern
Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.
Published: 2026-11-03
Score: 7.1 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.

Remediation

Vendor Workaround

There is no way to disable the directory listing or add authentication without a code change. As a workaround, administrators can apply network-level controls to restrict access to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod to only the BMC/provisioning network hosts that require it. Use NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to block access from workload pods. Additionally, rotate any pull secrets and SSH keys that may have been exposed if unauthorized access to the provisioning network is suspected.

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories yet.

History

Tue, 03 Nov 2026 18:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key. ### Evidence **pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names** ```go func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() result := []fs.FileInfo{} for _, im := range f.images { result = append(result, im) } return result, nil } func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) { f.log.Info("Open", "path", name) if name == "/" { return f, nil } ... ``` **cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS** ```go http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem())) go func() { server := &http.Server{ Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default ":8084" ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, } err := server.ListenAndServe() ``` **pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image** ```go func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File { source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret) return ignition_config_types_32.File{ Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"}, ... ``` ### Attack Pattern Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.
Title Image-customization-controller: unauthenticated plaintext image server with directory listing exposes ignition images containing cluster pull secret
First Time appeared Redhat
Redhat openshift
Weaknesses CWE-548
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:5
Vendors & Products Redhat
Redhat openshift
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N'}

Subscriptions

Redhat Openshift
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: redhat

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-03T18:36:24.334Z

Reserved: 2026-08-31T14:59:35.045Z

Link: CVE-2026-82976

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

No data.

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses
  • CWE-548

    Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing