Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler()

joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to
struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a
12-byte length check:

if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */
joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data);

struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a
union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report()
-> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48),
so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes
the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The
over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and
forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking
driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a
malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller.

Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an
over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded
bytes still reach userspace.

The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the
same cast correctly:

if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) ||
data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY)
break;

Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.
Published: 2026-09-04
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
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History

Fri, 04 Sep 2026 15:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check: if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data); struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller. Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace. The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly: if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) || data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY) break; Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.
Title HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler()
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-04T15:12:44.445Z

Reserved: 2026-08-26T14:34:25.792Z

Link: CVE-2026-80772

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-04T16:18:02.743

Modified: 2026-09-04T16:18:02.743

Link: CVE-2026-80772

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-04T18:30:04Z

Weaknesses

No weakness.