Description
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty's HAProxy encoder ( HAProxyMessageEncoder ) writes AF_UNIX source and destination socket addresses into the HAProxy V1 text protocol without validating them for CRLF characters, so an attacker who controls an AF_UNIX address can inject \r\n sequences and split the single PROXY header into multiple lines. This is possible because the V1 protocol uses CRLF as its line terminator and, unlike IPv4/IPv6 addresses whose format checks implicitly reject CRLF, AF_UNIX addresses are only validated for length (up to 108 bytes), allowing a forged second PROXY header line that spoofs the client source/destination IP to a downstream server or load balancer. The issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.
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Remediation
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
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Tracking
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Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-wh89-7897-x99h | Netty: HAProxy V1 Protocol CRLF Injection via AF_UNIX Address |
References
History
Wed, 29 Jul 2026 18:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A flaw was found in the netty-codec-haproxy component, part of the Netty network application framework. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to perform protocol-level injection attacks by crafting malformed HAProxy protocol frames that contain embedded carriage return (CR) and line feed (LF) sequences. This can lead to the injection of arbitrary content, potentially disrupting network communication or enabling further attacks. | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, Netty's HAProxy encoder ( HAProxyMessageEncoder ) writes AF_UNIX source and destination socket addresses into the HAProxy V1 text protocol without validating them for CRLF characters, so an attacker who controls an AF_UNIX address can inject \r\n sequences and split the single PROXY header into multiple lines. This is possible because the V1 protocol uses CRLF as its line terminator and, unlike IPv4/IPv6 addresses whose format checks implicitly reject CRLF, AF_UNIX addresses are only validated for length (up to 108 bytes), allowing a forged second PROXY header line that spoofs the client source/destination IP to a downstream server or load balancer. The issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| Title | io.netty/netty-codec-haproxy: Netty: Improper CR/LF neutralization in netty-codec-haproxy | Netty: HAProxy V1 Protocol CRLF Injection via AF_UNIX Address |
| References |
|
Tue, 28 Jul 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A flaw was found in the netty-codec-haproxy component, part of the Netty network application framework. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to perform protocol-level injection attacks by crafting malformed HAProxy protocol frames that contain embedded carriage return (CR) and line feed (LF) sequences. This can lead to the injection of arbitrary content, potentially disrupting network communication or enabling further attacks. | |
| Title | io.netty/netty-codec-haproxy: Netty: Improper CR/LF neutralization in netty-codec-haproxy | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-93 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
threat_severity
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cvssV3_1
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Subscriptions
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-29T18:06:11.495Z
Reserved: 2026-07-07T18:20:06.125Z
Link: CVE-2026-59919
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OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
Github GHSA