{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-54020", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-06-11T16:34:11.637Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-04T20:38:27.215Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-04T20:38:27.215Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "Open WebUI: DNS Rebinding SSRF Bypass", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-367", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition", "type": "CWE"}]}, {"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-918", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"attackComplexity": "HIGH", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 6.3, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N", "version": "3.1"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-h6x2-583h-x99r", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-h6x2-583h-x99r"}, {"name": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.11.0", "tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.11.0"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "open-webui", "product": "open-webui", "versions": [{"version": "< 0.11.0", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-04T20:38:27.215Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.11.0, Open WebUI resolved a hostname during URL validation and rejected private, loopback, and link-local addresses, but the HTTP clients resolved the hostname again at connection time. An authenticated attacker who controlled authoritative DNS for a submitted hostname could answer with a public address during validation and an internal one during connection, reaching cloud metadata, loopback admin APIs, or internal services through URL ingest, chat image_url fetches, image editing, or OAuth profile-picture fetches, with most paths returning the response to the attacker and the OAuth path forwarding the OAuth access token. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-h6x2-583h-x99r", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

{}

{}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[0,0.11.0)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 100.0, "confidence_source": "matching", "scores": [{"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "open-webui", "source": "cna", "vendor": "open-webui"}, "product": "open-webui", "vendor": "open-webui"}], "created": "2026-08-04T21:30:12.411304+00:00", "updated": "2026-08-04T21:30:12.498987+00:00", "vendors": ["open-webui", "open-webui$PRODUCT$open-webui"]}