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Wed, 05 Aug 2026 20:45:00 +0000
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| First Time appeared |
Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai |
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| Vendors & Products |
Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai |
Wed, 05 Aug 2026 19:15:00 +0000
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| Description | PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40. | |
| Title | PraisonAI: GitHub Actions Claude workflow command injection via unquoted PR branch name | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-862 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-05T19:24:05.128Z
Reserved: 2026-05-20T23:12:43.032Z
Link: CVE-2026-48168
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OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-05T20:30:06Z
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CWE-862
Missing Authorization