_verify_encrypted_assertion decrypts the EncryptedAssertion and returns it as verified when it carries no signature, via "return $xml unless $xpath->exists('dsig:Signature', $assert);". The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP's encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service.
Any caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected.
Analysis
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TIMLEGGE | Net::SAML2 | unaffected |
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| Vendor | Product | Confidence | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Timlegge | Net::saml2 | 100% |
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Vendor Solution
Upgrade to Net::SAML2 0.86 or later, which refuses to extract assertion content unless a signature covering the assertion chains to the configured trust anchor.
Vendor Workaround
For deployments that cannot upgrade to 0.86, do not configure a decryption key_file, so EncryptedAssertions are never decrypted and consumed.
Tracking
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Mon, 03 Aug 2026 16:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Timlegge
Timlegge net::saml2 |
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| Vendors & Products |
Timlegge
Timlegge net::saml2 |
Mon, 03 Aug 2026 13:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature. _verify_encrypted_assertion decrypts the EncryptedAssertion and returns it as verified when it carries no signature, via "return $xml unless $xpath->exists('dsig:Signature', $assert);". The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP's encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service. Any caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected. | |
| Title | Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-347 | |
| References |
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CPANSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-03T13:00:23.347Z
Reserved: 2026-07-28T17:55:20.903Z
Link: CVE-2026-18108
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
No data.
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-03T15:51:33Z
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CWE-347
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature