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Search Results (3 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-119193 | 1 Sebastianbergmann | 1 Phpunit | 2026-10-29 | N/A |
| PHPUnit is a testing framework for PHP. From 13.4.0 until 13.4.4, the TestCase::coverageFilesDirectory() logic in src/Runner/Phpt/TestCase.php creates temporary files for PHPT code coverage in a predictable phpunit-phpt directory under sys_get_temp_dir() and reuses that directory without verifying its ownership or permissions. On multi-user systems with a shared temporary path, a local attacker who creates the directory before the developer runs PHPT tests with code coverage can replace the generated job file before the child process executes it with require, allowing arbitrary code execution with the developer's privileges while the test and coverage report appear successful. PHPUnit 12.5 and earlier, default macOS and Windows configurations with per-user temporary directories, and single-user environments where another user cannot create files in the temporary path are not affected. This issue is fixed in 13.4.4. | ||||
| CVE-2026-41570 | 2 Phpunit Project, Sebastianbergmann | 2 Phpunit, Phpunit | 2026-05-08 | 7.8 High |
| PHPUnit is a testing framework for PHP. In versions 12.5.21 and 13.1.5, PHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as -d name=value command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP's INI parser interprets " as a string delimiter, ; as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as multiple INI directives. An attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child's configuration, including auto_prepend_file, extension, disable_functions, open_basedir, and others. Setting auto_prepend_file to an attacker-controlled path yields remote code execution in the child process. This issue has been patched in versions 12.5.22 and 13.1.6. | ||||
| CVE-2026-24765 | 3 Debian, Phpunit Project, Sebastianbergmann | 3 Debian Linux, Phpunit, Phpunit | 2026-04-18 | 7.8 High |
| PHPUnit is a testing framework for PHP. A vulnerability has been discovered in versions prior to 12.5.8, 11.5.50, 10.5.62, 9.6.33, and 8.5.52 involving unsafe deserialization of code coverage data in PHPT test execution. The vulnerability exists in the `cleanupForCoverage()` method, which deserializes code coverage files without validation, potentially allowing remote code execution if malicious `.coverage` files are present prior to the execution of the PHPT test. The vulnerability occurs when a `.coverage` file, which should not exist before test execution, is deserialized without the `allowed_classes` parameter restriction. An attacker with local file write access can place a malicious serialized object with a `__wakeup()` method into the file system, leading to arbitrary code execution during test runs with code coverage instrumentation enabled. This vulnerability requires local file write access to the location where PHPUnit stores or expects code coverage files for PHPT tests. This can occur through CI/CD pipeline attacks, the local development environment, and/or compromised dependencies. Rather than just silently sanitizing the input via `['allowed_classes' => false]`, the maintainer has chosen to make the anomalous state explicit by treating pre-existing `.coverage` files for PHPT tests as an error condition. Starting in versions in versions 12.5.8, 11.5.50, 10.5.62, 9.6.33, when a `.coverage` file is detected for a PHPT test prior to execution, PHPUnit will emit a clear error message identifying the anomalous state. Organizations can reduce the effective risk of this vulnerability through proper CI/CD configuration, including ephemeral runners, code review enforcement, branch protection, artifact isolation, and access control. | ||||
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