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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-99775 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: interface: validate the IP header on xmit Packets injected into an xfrm interface (e.g. AF_PACKET on an xfrmi device) reach the xfrm output path without IP header validation, but xfrm4_transport_output() uses iph->ihl for __skb_pull() and memmove() and expects the header to be valid. vti_tunnel_xmit() already calls pskb_inet_may_pull() before handing packets to the xfrm output path. Do the same in xfrmi_xmit() and perform the header checks ip_rcv_core()/ip6_rcv_core() do on entry to the IP stack: reject wrong IP versions and malformed IPv4 header lengths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99790 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: stop registering with rpcbind after a failure in listener_set nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() calls svc_xprt_create_from_sa() once for each requested listener and passes flags of 0, so every listener registers with rpcbind on its own. A rpcbind that accepts the connection and never replies therefore costs one timeout for each entry. With the cap of 1024 entries the request can hold nfsd_mutex for about 34 minutes, which is roughly 17 times the hung-task threshold. One failure is enough to know that the next call will not fare better. Read svc_rpcb_failure_count() before the create loop, and pass SVC_SOCK_ANONYMOUS for the rest of the request once the count moves. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99791 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: improve dirent bounds checking in scrub and repair LOLLM complains that we don't do enough bounds checking of the directory entries in directory blocks when we're looking for errors or trying to salvage entries. Let's improve that with more detailed checks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99743 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 6.8 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: grant a POSIX ACL group entry only to the group's members When no ACE of the DACL matches the caller, Everyone or Authenticated Users, smb_check_perm_dacl() falls back to the file's POSIX ACL. It takes the first ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entry whose id equals the caller's uid. For ACL_GROUP, this compares a gid with the caller's uid. A numerical match grants the group's permissions even when the caller is not a member. Match a group entry only when the caller is also in the group. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99320 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: raw: fix use-after-free in rawv6_send_hdrinc() rawv6_send_hdrinc() caches the route before handing the skb to l3mdev_ip6_out(). The VRF output path may replace skb->dst and release the original route, leaving the cached pointer stale. The function later dereferences that pointer for statistics accounting and as the output device passed to NF_HOOK(). Its RCU read-side critical section starts after l3mdev_ip6_out(), so it cannot prevent the old route from being reclaimed in between. Reload the route from the current skb destination after l3mdev_ip6_out() returns. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in rawv6_sendmsg(), with the route allocated by ip6_dst_alloc(), freed by dst_destroy() from rcu_core(), and the related RCU callback queued from vrf_l3_out(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-99703 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/hugetlb: fix mremap deadlock when PMD sharing is possible move_hugetlb_page_tables() holds the mapping's i_mmap_rwsem for write while moving hugetlb PTEs. This prevents races with truncation and protects huge_pmd_unshare(), but the move loop must not call helpers that can acquire the same rwsem for read. huge_pte_alloc() can do that when the destination can use PMD sharing: it may call huge_pmd_share(), which takes i_mmap_rwsem for read while searching for a shareable PMD table. Calling it while the move path already holds i_mmap_rwsem for write can deadlock. Avoid that path for PMD-sized hugetlb mappings that can use PMD sharing. Instead of allocating or sharing the destination page table while moving, zap the source range and let the destination fault path populate or share the PMD lazily. Reuse the hugetlb unmap logic for the source-side zap by splitting the core loop out of __unmap_hugepage_range(). The wrapper keeps the existing tlb_start_vma(), tlb_end_vma() and huge_pmd_unshare_flush() behavior, while move_hugetlb_page_tables() can reuse the unmap loop with its existing mmu_gather. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99711 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 3.2 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nVMX: Process each host MSR entry at most once when unwinding failed VM-Entry Add a missing "break" in the inner for-loop of the open coded mess that unwinds MSRs back to the pre-VM-Enter state when VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME VM-Fails due to a consistency check that is caught by hardware but missed by KVM. I.e. move on to the next MSR in the VM-Entry load list after performing a write using a value found in the VM-Exit load list. Processing *every* matching entry in the VM-Exit load list makes the processing quadratic, which is problematic if the load lists are full of MSRs that are expensive to emulate. E.g. writing APIC_BASE triggers kvm_recalculate_apic_map() and a whole pile of unnecessary work. Functionally, arbitrarily restoring the value of the first matching entry is "fine", because none of this is architecturally correct: the load lists are never supposed to have been used in the first place. In practice, it's likely a moot point as no well-behaved VMM will have multiple, diverging entries in the load lists. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99729 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/rmap: handle device-exclusive entries in folio_referenced_one() page_vma_mapped_walk() can return non-present device-exclusive entries, but folio_referenced_one() passes them to PTE young-bit accessors that require present PTEs. We must neither call clear_flush_young_ptes_notify() nor folio_pte_batch() with non-present entries. For example, clearing the young bit on non-present PTEs can corrupt the entry: on arm64 PTE_AF overlaps the swap type, so clearing it turns a device-exclusive entry into an ordinary swap entry. folio_pte_batch() will VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO. Apply the same approach as the previous fixes to e.g., damon_ptep_mkold(): treat these entries as old from the CPU's perspective and obtain their young state through the MMU notifier. Skip PTE batching and MGLRU look-around for non-present entries, and don't modify non-present PTEs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99776 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/9p/usbg: clear stale client pointer on close p9_usbg_close() tears down the client transport, but usb9pfs keeps using usb9pfs->client from asynchronous TX and RX completion handlers. A late completion can therefore dereference a client that has already been freed during mount teardown. Clear usb9pfs->client under usb9pfs->lock when closing the transport, detach any pending TX request from in_req->context, and make the TX/RX completion handlers bail out once the transport has been detached. This keeps late completions from touching a freed or rebound p9_client. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99779 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 2.4 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/9p/usbg: call disable_usb9pfs() from usb9pfs_disable() usb9pfs_disable() is the usb_function ->disable callback, invoked by the composite gadget core whenever the host resets or unconfigures the gadget. The gadget function API requires this callback to disable its endpoints; every other in-tree function driver does so from its ->disable hook. usb9pfs_disable() never called disable_usb9pfs(), so the IN/OUT endpoints and their usb_request objects were left active and allocated across a host-driven disable. When the host later reconfigures the device, enable_usb9pfs() calls alloc_requests() again and unconditionally overwrites usb9pfs->in_req/out_req, permanently leaking the previous allocations, while the endpoints themselves are left enabled underneath the function's own idea of being disabled. Call disable_usb9pfs() before reinit_completion(&usb9pfs->send), mirroring the same sequence already used in p9_usbg_close(). Placing it before the reinit_completion() also ensures usb_ep_disable() has synchronously flushed any requests still queued in hardware before the completion is reset, closing the same race that motivated resetting the completion here in the first place. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99781 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/9p/usbg: set client to Disconnected on usb9pfs_disable This patch is setting the client status to Disconnected, when the client is still in use. Otherwise a disconnected usb cable would run any use of the mount to faults. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99786 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.8 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: retry inexact policy lookup after node reinsertion An inexact policy lookup first records pointers to candidate hlist heads and then traverses the lists. A concurrent policy insertion can merge inexact tree nodes between those operations: lookup policy insertion ------ ---------------- find inexact candidates save obsolete hlist head write_seqcount_begin(&bin->count) merge inexact tree nodes hlist_del_rcu(&policy->bydst) reinsert policy->bydst in survivor write_seqcount_end(&bin->count) evaluate saved candidate list miss the moved policy The merge immediately reinserts the same hlist node into the surviving tree node. RCU keeps the policy alive, but it does not provide a consistent view while its list node is moved. A lookup that selected the obsolete list can observe it empty. A lookup already traversing a moved policy can instead follow the next pointer rewritten by the reinsertion. Either case can return an incorrect IPsec policy result. The per-bin sequence counter already brackets calls to xfrm_policy_inexact_insert_node(), including node merges. The read side, however, currently validates the counter only while searching an individual rb-tree. A successful search returns without validation, and the later candidate-list traversal is outside that read-side section. Snapshot the per-bin sequence before discovering candidate heads and validate it after evaluating all candidate lists. Retry the lookup if the inexact policy tree changes while it is being searched. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99787 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpufreq: CPPC: Select the frequency-invariance callback per CPU cppc_cpufreq_cpu_fie_init() initializes deferred work only for CPUs whose feedback counters use PCC. However, if any CPU in a shared policy uses PCC, it installs the PCC tick callback for the entire policy. With FIE enabled, a non-PCC CPU then queues an uninitialized irq_work and can call a NULL function pointer when that work runs. Choose the frequency-invariance callback separately for each CPU using the recorded work-initialization state. Processor removal can unpublish the CPC descriptor before callback registration, so querying its counter transport again can incorrectly select direct reads for a PCC CPU. Register the callbacks after all counter initialization has completed, so a failed initial read for an online CPU cannot leave a partially registered policy. PCC CPUs use their initialized deferred work, while non-PCC CPUs read their own counters directly from the tick. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99732 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/filemap: read mapping->a_ops->free_folio under i_lock memory_failure() -> ... -> filemap_remove_folio() can read mapping->a_ops after the inode has been freed. Once the folio is deleted from the pagecache it no longer pins the mapping, so after i_lock is dropped e.g., a concurrent final iput() can evict and free the inode before filemap_free_folio() looks up mapping->a_ops->free_folio. Most callers hold a reference on the inode, but not all. Documentation/filesystems/vfs.rst explicitly states that ->free_folio() must not assume the original address_space mapping still exists. Fix it by loading ->free_folio while i_lock is still held, similar to what folio_unmap_invalidate() does. Inline filemap_free_folio() into its remaining caller such that delete_from_page_cache_batch() also just loads the callback before dropping the i_lock. The bug was found by code inspection and has not been reproduced. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private. [ david: get rid of filemap_free_folio() entirely; improve patch description ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99733 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/truncate: look again if a folio left the mapping invalidate_inode_pages2_range() skips a folio which no longer belongs to the mapping by the time it has got the folio lock, on the assumption that somebody else has removed it from the page cache. But the folio may have been replaced, and then there is a new folio with the same data at that index. For most cases, like folio migration, that is impossible. However, collapse_file() only checks the refcount of the old folios, under the i_pages lock, and relies on their folio locks from there on. That works for users which repeat the lookup when they find folio->mapping changed. The following scenario is, however, possible: CPU0 pwrite(O_DIRECT) CPU1 collapse_file() kiocb_invalidate_pages() read the folio (old data), lock it refcount check the write completes copy to new_folio kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write() find_get_entries() -> old folio xas_store(new_folio) folio->mapping = NULL folio_unlock(folio) folio_lock() folio->mapping != mapping -> continue In that scenario, the collapsed folio with the data from before the write stays in the page cache after the write has returned. This used to be impossible, as khugepaged only collapsed files that nobody had open for writing. Restart the lookup at that index, like shmem_undo_range() does. The same problem seems to exist in truncate_inode_pages_range() as well when truncate_inode_folio() fails, so handle it there as well, but slightly differently: simply check once more through find_get_entries(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-99734 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file's inode shmem_file() only checks if file->f_mapping is a shmem mapping. This mapping can belong to another file, however, as with a Coda file backed by a tmpfs container after mmap(). So it does not guarantee that the file inode is an actual shmem inode. Seal handling and memfd preservation use this check before accessing shmem inode state, so they can access an inode of the wrong type. Let's make shmem_file() check the inode's file operations instead, to identify shmem inodes reliably. This will identify regular shmem inodes, including memfds and ordinary tmpfs files, independently of wrapper file operations. Use shmem_mapping() in collapse_file() instead to not change the behavior of collapse_file(): it operates on the page cache and uses mapping->host for shmem inode operations. Focusing on the file does not seem relevant. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99739 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: fix truncate hang in large swap entry Truncating a tmpfs file or memfd to a page-aligned size inside a large swap entry can loop indefinitely in shmem_undo_range(). The task holds the inode lock and cannot be killed. A large swap entry represents a whole swapped-out folio. For example, truncate a file whose pages 0-7 share one swap entry to four pages: [ 0 1 2 3 | 4 5 6 7 ] keep | discard ^ new EOF, start = 4 i_size has already been updated when boundary handling asks shmem_get_partial_folio() for page 4. Since it is swapped out, the helper calls shmem_get_folio() with SGP_READ. That rejects page 4 with -EINVAL because its starting offset equals i_size. Nothing is read back. The final scan cannot free the entry without losing pages 0-3. It skips it, restarts from start = 4, and finds it again indefinitely. An unaligned truncate avoids this particular failure because the requested page starts below i_size. Folios already in the page-cache cannot trigger it as the direct lookup will return them beyond EOF. Fix it by letting shmem_get_partial_folio() call shmem_swapin_folio() directly for swap entries. This bypasses the read path's i_size check, allowing the existing boundary handling to zero and split the folio. If swap-in returns a smaller folio, it also splits the swap entry so the final scan can free the entries beyond EOF. Retry the lookup if the entry changes during swap-in. Handling swap-in allocation failures remains broken and is unchanged by this commit. Even when shmem_swapin_folio() correctly returns -ENOMEM instead of -EEXIST, shmem_get_partial_folio() returns NULL and shmem_undo_range() skips boundary handling. If the large swap entry remains intact, truncation can still loop in the final scan, while hole punching can return without zeroing the boundary. This may read an entire large folio back from swap while holding i_rwsem, only to discard part of it. Avoiding that I/O would require splitting both the swap entry and any large folio still in the swap cache. That, however, is much bigger work. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99741 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 3.3 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tmpfs: keep the quota soft limits of an unused id When the last reference to a dquot goes away, shmem_release_dquot() stores its limits in the rb tree of the mount, unless shmem_is_empty_dquot() says that there is nothing worth storing. That function looks at the usage and at the two hard limits only. So if the administrator sets nothing but soft limits for an id that owns no file yet, the entry is thrown away as soon as the dquot that Q_SETQUOTA used is released, and the id never gets to see a limit. To fix it, compare the soft limits as well: an entry can be empty only if both soft limits are zero as well, which is exactly what shmem_acquire_dquot() sets for a new entry. Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private. [ david: slightly adjusted description ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99742 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mempolicy: charge shared policy nodes Any local user can bypass memory.max with mbind() on a tmpfs file, and allocate unbounded kernel memory. mbind() sets a NUMA memory policy for a range of a mapping. If the mapping is of a shmem and friends, the kernel also stores the policy on the inode, in a tree with one entry per range of the file. Each mbind() on a single page of a mapping can add one shared policy node (struct sp_node) and one struct mempolicy to that tree. They outlive the mapping and stay around until the inode is destroyed. The tree is not bounded by the file size, so the file can be empty. Memory that user space can allocate must be charged to a memory cgroup. A slab cache does that for all of its objects if it is created with SLAB_ACCOUNT. numa_policy_init() creates the slab caches for both structs without SLAB_ACCOUNT, so they are not charged to any cgroup. Reproduced with mbind() on single pages of an empty tmpfs file, from a cgroup with memory.max=8M: the global OOM killer killed tasks owned by root, and the machine panicked. Fix this by creating both caches with SLAB_ACCOUNT. This change implies that mbind() can now fail when running into memcg limits. Further, the policy_cache also serves task and VMA policies, so they are similarly accounted now. Note that per-file limits are not really helpful, as the user could simply use many files; having limits per user is tricky as well. Fix generated by an LLM and submitted by Chris Mason in private. [ david: smaller description tweaks ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-99757 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-11-20 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: sysfs: restore NOFS context on early return in btrfs_sysfs_add_block_group_type() btrfs_sysfs_add_block_group_type() sets up a NOFS context with memalloc_nofs_save() because kobject_add() performs GFP_KERNEL allocations deep in its call chain, and the function may be called while holding a transaction handle or a lock required for a transaction commit, where reclaim could deadlock. Every other return path of this function calls memalloc_nofs_restore() except the early return taken when another thread has already created the kobject for the same raid index (this can happen when restriping). Taking that path leaves PF_MEMALLOC_NOFS set on the calling task, so all subsequent memory allocations performed by that task remain restricted to the NOFS scope, which may lead to unexpected allocation failures or deadlocks later on. Restore the NOFS context before returning from that path. | ||||