| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-pci1xxxx: quiesce DMA engines on transfer timeout
If a DMA-mapped transfer times out waiting for DMA_TERM and neither DMA
abort interrupt arrived, pci1xxxx_spi_transfer_with_dma() returns
through the error label while both DMA engines are still enabled, the
done/abort interrupt status is still armed and the transfer state
(p->xfer, p->tx_sgl, p->rx_sgl) is still registered.
The ISRs keep firing afterwards: they reprogram the DMA engines from
p->tx_sgl / p->rx_sgl and signal completion through p->xfer and
p->spi_xfer_done, all of which the SPI core is free to unmap or reuse
once transfer_one() has returned, which is a use-after-free. A late
done interrupt can also start the next transfer queued behind the
failed one.
Stop both DMA engines, drain the pending done/abort interrupt status
and synchronize the DMA IRQs before dropping the in-progress state and
the transfer pointers, and re-enable the engines afterwards so that
subsequent transfers keep working. The engines are only turned back on
once both were confirmed to have stopped: re-enabling an engine that
failed to stop would cancel the pending stop request and let it keep
running into buffers the SPI core is about to unmap or free, which is
exactly the window this patch closes. An engine that failed to stop is
left disabled, as the abort paths already do.
The DMA interrupt status and mask registers are shared between the two
SPI instances, so the cleanup drains only this instance's done/abort
status bits instead of masking the interrupt lines, which would also
suppress the peer instance's completion interrupts.
Also make the DMA ISRs ignore interrupts while no transfer is in
progress so that a stray MSI after the cleanup can no longer act on
the cleared state.
No PCI1XXXX hardware was available for testing and QEMU has no model
of this PCIe part, so the timeout path was exercised with a userspace
replica of the timeout branch and the DMA ISRs, with the register and
interrupt accesses mocked: on the unfixed code both a wedged engine
that clears after the timeout and a late done interrupt touch the
freed transfer state, while with this fix applied neither does and an
engine that failed to stop is left disabled. The module was also
loaded and unloaded in a QEMU x86_64 guest running a kernel with this
fix applied. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: fix refcount underflow in gadgetfs_bind() error path
gadgetfs_bind() calls get_dev() only on the success path, but
gadgetfs_unbind() called from the enomem error label unconditionally
calls put_dev(). When bind fails (e.g. ENOMEM), put_dev() fires
without a matching get_dev(), leaving the refcount unbalanced.
A subsequent close of the ep0 file descriptor calls dev_release() ->
put_dev() which hits zero and frees the object; then gadgetfs_kill_sb()
calls put_dev(the_device) again on the already-freed pointer, triggering
a refcount underflow and use-after-free.
Fix by calling get_dev() at the start of gadgetfs_bind(), before any
error path that invokes gadgetfs_unbind(), so the reference is always
balanced regardless of whether bind succeeds or fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/nvgrace-gpu: Use a core-only open_device in fallback mode
When the ACPI memory properties are missing or the C2C link is down, the
device is exposed through nvgrace_gpu_pci_core_ops. That table opens
through nvgrace_gpu_open_device() but closes through
vfio_pci_core_close_device(), so open and close are not symmetric.
nvgrace_gpu_open_device() registers nvdev->usemem for poison handling
unconditionally. In fallback mode usemem.memlength is zero, and
register_pfn_address_space() inserts a node covering [0, ULONG_MAX].
Nothing removes it: a second open fails with -EBUSY, and once the device
is unbound the node outlives the nvdev that contains it. The next open
after a rebind reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800894aa30 by task nvgrace_repro/203
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
print_report+0x153/0x4c6
kasan_report+0xe4/0x1a0
interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310
register_pfn_address_space+0x97/0x100
nvgrace_gpu_open_device+0x21c/0x730
vfio_df_open+0x213/0x520
vfio_df_ioctl_bind_iommufd+0x3e8/0x6e0
vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x782/0x1570
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x13c/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x106/0x630
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Allocated by task 188:
...
_vfio_alloc_device+0x3a/0x500
nvgrace_gpu_probe+0xcb/0x660
local_pci_probe+0xcf/0x170
...
Freed by task 188:
...
kfree+0x20d/0x600
device_release+0xcf/0x250
kobject_put+0x152/0x2f0
pci_device_remove+0xb0/0x1c0
device_release_driver_internal+0x38d/0x540
unbind_store+0xde/0x100
...
Give the fallback table its own open_device that only calls
vfio_pci_core_enable() and vfio_pci_core_finish_enable(), the
counterpart of vfio_pci_core_close_device(). Fallback mode then never
touches the nvgrace memory regions, as Alex suggested.
This should be safe because the fallback table uses the vfio-pci core
read, write and mmap handlers, so nothing there uses the state
nvgrace_gpu_open_device() sets up. The one visible difference is that a
fallback open no longer fails when BAR0 cannot be mapped, which matches
vfio-pci. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath9k: delete channel-context timers on deinit
ath9k_deinit_channel_context() cancels chanctx_work but does not delete
the offchannel and sched timers set up by ath9k_init_channel_context().
If either timer fires after deinit (e.g. during driver unload or
suspend), it accesses sc->sc_ah which may already be freed by
ath9k_hw_deinit(), causing a use-after-free.
Delete both timers with timer_shutdown_sync() before cancelling the work
item. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen-blkfront: unbind irq before tearing down ring and shadow requests
In blkif_free_ring(), the driver tears down the ring's persistent grants,
shadow request arrays, and shared ring structure (xenbus_teardown_ring),
and only calls unbind_from_irqhandler() at the very end.
While blkif_free_ring() is freeing persistent grants and clearing the
shadow array, the event channel interrupt (blkif_interrupt) is still
registered and active. If an interrupt arrives from the backend during
this teardown window, blkif_interrupt() reads rinfo->ring.sring and,
via blkif_completion(), accesses rinfo->shadow[id].grants_used and
rinfo->shadow[id].sg. blkif_free_ring() tears these structures down
without holding rinfo->ring_lock, and the handler only checks
info->connected at entry, so this is a real race resulting in a
use-after-free or NULL pointer dereference.
Fix this by moving unbind_from_irqhandler() to the beginning of
blkif_free_ring(). Calling unbind_from_irqhandler() first frees the
IRQ and synchronizes with any in-flight interrupt handlers on other CPUs
before ring memory and shadow request structures are deallocated,
matching the teardown order in drivers/net/xen-netfront.c. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vma: write lock source VMA before duplicating it in __split_vma()
__split_vma() duplicates the source VMA before taking its VMA write lock,
and until the VMA is write-locked, a concurrent thread might set
VMA_MAYBE_GUARD_BIT, resulting in the duplication missing the flag.
If this happens, then fork may fail to duplicate guard markers and, if a
file-backed mapping, THP collapse may also discard the markers.
Resolve this by taking the VMA write lock before vm_area_dup() and, since
all callers of vm_area_dup() now hold the VMA write lock, assert that this
is the case there, and add a comment to explain why it's needed.
[ljs@kernel.org: add VMA write assert in vm_area_dup(), commit message touchup] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page-writeback: avoid 32-bit overflow in dirty threshold shares
The ratios used by __wb_calc_thresh() are scaled to parts per million, but
the threshold and ratio operands are unsigned long. On 32-bit kernels,
their multiplication can wrap before the result is assigned to u64.
For example, with a threshold of 25600 pages and the default maximum ratio
of 1000000, wb_max_thresh becomes 4125 pages instead of 25600. The shared
threshold and minimum share calculations can overflow in the same way,
producing incorrect per-writeback dirty limits.
Use a u64 threshold for the three ratio multiplications and div_u64() to
retain the existing division order and rounding. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: memory: fix truncation removing mapped folios
Ayush reported an issue that shmem/tmpfs folios are still mapped when
truncating them on production:
"
BUG: Bad page cache in process ... pfn:...
page dumped because: still mapped when deleted
"
I reproduced the issue with Ayush's reproducer [1] with the latest
mm-unstable branch, and I got the following crash info. From the dump
message, we can see that truncate_inode_folio() is really trying to remove
mapped folios, which is incorrect.
"
[ 189.171977] page: refcount:3 mapcount:1 mapping:00000000fe168ee1
index:0x3880 pfn:0x191647
[ 189.171995] memcg:ffff0000cc073d40
[ 189.171997] aops:shmem_aops ino:3c01 dentry name(?):"memfd:runsc-memory"
[ 189.172006] flags: 0x17fffef0002022d(locked|referenced|uptodate|lru|
workingset|swapbacked|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3ffff)
.......
[ 189.172017] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_mapped(folio))
[ 189.172026] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 189.172027] kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:155!
[ 189.172057] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
.......
[ 189.177721] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 5521 Comm: repro Kdump: loaded Tainted:
7.3.0-rc4+ #277 PREEMPT(lazy)
.......
[ 189.183986] Call trace:
[ 189.184124] filemap_unaccount_folio+0xf0/0x1e8 (P)
[ 189.184391] __filemap_remove_folio+0x34/0x160
[ 189.184633] filemap_remove_folio+0x4c/0xb0
[ 189.184859] truncate_inode_folio+0x34/0x58
[ 189.185087] shmem_undo_range+0x220/0x658
[ 189.185308] shmem_fallocate+0x2f0/0x470
[ 189.185527] vfs_fallocate+0x128/0x328
......
[ 189.187078] el0t_64_sync+0x184/0x188
"
After analysis, I believe the race exists between truncation and
MADV_DONTNEED, and shmem's ->map_pages() merely makes the issue easier to
reproduce. Since MADV_DONTNEED synchronously releases the pagetable page
before calling tlb_flush_rmaps(), this could cause another thread's
truncation to skip zap_pte_range() (due to pmd is none) but still observe
the folio's mapcount as non-zero. A possible race scenario is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
shmem_fallocate madvise_dontneed_single_vma
unmap_mapping_range .......
......
(filemap_map_pages() remap folios)
zap_pte_range
truncate_inode_folio zap_empty_pte_table(pmd clear)
unmap_mapping_folio
......
zap_pmd_range (saw pmd none, skip)
filemap_remove_folio
BUG_ON(folio_mapped)
tlb_flush_rmaps(remove rmaps)
To fix this issue, we should move the pmd clear operation (via
zap_empty_pte_table()) to after tlb_flush_rmaps() and use
sync_with_folio_pmd_zap() to sync with concurrent zapping, so that when we
find a pmd_none() while unmapping a folio without holding the PTL, the
folio's mappings are guaranteed to have been removed via
tlb_flush_rmaps().
Meanwhile move the second pmd_none() check to where it belongs: if
splitting zapped the PMD. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: fix address wraparound when scanning large folio PTEs
numa_rebuild_large_mapping() and do_swap_page() can be tricked into
generating an address wraparound, crashing the kernel. All that's required
is to map a tail page of a large folio close enough to the start/end of
the address space to e.g., make
unsigned long addr_start = addr - (nr << PAGE_SHIFT);
to wrap around.
Let's fix it by providing a better helper, folio_scan_range(), that
takes care of staying within VMA and page table boundaries while
handling possible wraparounds.
There are some nasty details, like not being able to use pmd_addr_end()
in this context. Add some helpful comments for these cases. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/khugepaged: flush deferred unmaps before dropping a failed folio
collapse_file() can fail its reference-count or dirty-folio check after
unmapping with TTU_BATCH_FLUSH. Both paths put back the isolated folio,
then unlock it and drop the lookup reference before reaching the common
try_to_unmap_flush().
The page-cache reference does not keep the folio stable once the lock is
released. Another collapse can replace and free it. With its PTEs
already gone, that collapse cannot flush the first task's per-task TLB
batch, and retract_page_tables() skips short or unaligned VMAs. A CPU can
therefore retain a user translation to the freed folio. This has been
reproduced with unprivileged MADV_COLLAPSE on a memfd.
Flush at out_unlock while the lookup reference and folio lock are still
held. The common flush continues to cover the accumulated pagelist on
both success and rollback, preserving batching on successful collapses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Conditionally resched when restarting REP string emulation
When restarting emulation, e.g. of a REP-prefixed string instruction,
conditionally reschedule as emulating guest writes can be deceptively slow
and expensive, e.g. when shadow paging is in use and each write can trigger
write tracking.
In a perfect world, restarting emulation (or not) would be less arbitrary,
e.g. would honor not only host events (NEED_RESCHED, signals, etc.) but
also guest events (e.g. by checking kvm_vcpu_has_events()). Unfortunately,
as pointed out by Sashiko, pio_in_emulated()'s read-ahead logic is baked
into the restart logic, as KVM relies on restarting emulation to drain the
cache and avoid duplicate reads from the I/O port. I.e. re-entering the
guest on kvm_vcpu_has_events() or __xfer_to_guest_mode_work_pending() would
introduce architecturally-incorrect, guest-visible changes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Conditionally resched when retrying gPTE walk on A/D update failure
Conditionally reschedule when retrying a guest PTE walk because the CMPXCHG
to update A/D bits failed, e.g. because a different task/vCPU modified the
relevant gPTEs. On kernels without involuntary preemption of some kind, a
misbehaving guest can "capture" a pCPU effectively indefinitely and trigger
soft lockups by continuously modifying its gPTEs such that the result of
the walk is remains valid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path
The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a
malicious AP in two ways:
1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to
hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer. All of
rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute
length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len;
and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes
datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8;
for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len).
A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows
these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in
aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le()
length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from
the rx skb. Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;
this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the
unconditional iv[3] access within the frame.
2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through
the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking
whether decryptor() returned NULL. On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast
protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path
always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a
use-after-free read/write, and the caller's error path frees the frame
a second time, drifting free_recvframe_cnt. Bail out immediately when
decryptor() fails, freeing the temporary mgmt_DATA buffer first.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: core: shut down initialized port on removal
When a serial port configured as a console is opened and subsequently
closed, tty_port_shutdown() skips invoking port->ops->shutdown() because
port->console is true. As a result, tty_port_initialized() remains true
and the port's interrupt handler stays registered in the irq subsystem.
If the underlying device is later unbound or removed (e.g. via sysfs
driver unbind or device hot-unplug), serial_core_remove_one_port()
unregisters the console, frees uport->name via kfree(), and tears down
the port without shutting it down or freeing its IRQ. Consequently, the
irqaction descriptor remains registered in genirq with action->name
pointing to freed memory.
This triggers a use-after-free read whenever genirq accesses action->name,
such as when reading /proc/interrupts:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x476/0x570
Call Trace:
string+0x476/0x570
vsnprintf+0x422/0x1300
seq_printf+0x...
show_interrupts+...
Fix this by acquiring port->mutex in serial_core_remove_one_port() after
console unregistration, clearing port->console under the mutex to prevent
data races with concurrent tty_port_shutdown(), and invoking
uart_shutdown(NULL, state) if the port remains initialized. This ensures
that port->ops->shutdown() is called and the IRQ is freed before
kfree(uport->name). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: dc395x: sync the waiting_timer before freeing the host
The waiting_timer callback re-arms itself and takes the host lock.
adapter_uninit() currently stops it with timer_delete(), which does not
wait for a callback already running on another CPU. The final
scsi_host_put() that frees the host (and the host lock the callback
dereferences) runs right after adapter_uninit(), so a concurrent or just
re-armed callback can fire after the free, leaving a potential
use-after-free window.
Replace timer_delete() with timer_shutdown_sync() at the top of
adapter_uninit(), before the host-lock section: the timer is dequeued,
a running callback is waited for and rearming is blocked before the chip
is halted, so it cannot fire at all once the adapter has ceased to
function. Waiting outside the lock avoids the self-deadlock that would
result from syncing a callback blocked on the lock we still hold.
No shutdown is needed for selto_timer because it has no reachable armer
or callback.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: virt-concat: unlink discarded items before freeing
mtd_virt_concat_destroy_items() frees each item without removing it
from concat_node_list. list_for_each_entry_safe() protects the
current traversal, but concat_node_list still points to the freed
items afterward.
The function also unwinds errors from mtd_virt_concat_node_create().
A later initialization can traverse a freed item in
mtd_is_part_concat(), causing a use-after-free.
Unlink each item before freeing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mshv_vtl: detach poll waiter on POLLFREE
MSHV_SET_POLL_FILE keeps a poll wait entry after the ioctl returns. A
file reference does not always pin the registered waitqueue:
signalfd_poll() uses current->sighand->signalfd_wqh, whose lifetime is
tied to the task.
signalfd_cleanup() sends POLLFREE before the sighand is freed. The MSHV
callback currently leaves its entry linked, so __wake_up_pollfree()
warns and a later replacement calls remove_wait_queue() through a stale
wqh pointer. A source-equivalent KASAN run reproduced:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave
remove_wait_queue
harness_ioctl [mshv_pollfree_harness]
The object belonged to sighand_cache and had been released through
slab_free_after_rcu_debug() after __cleanup_sighand().
On POLLFREE, unlink the entry under the provider waitqueue lock. Preserve
the existing CPU cancellation before publishing a NULL wqh, since a NULL
load lets a racing replacement reuse the persistent poll state. Use a
matching acquire load under RCU when removing a normal registration.
The callback takes no mutex and does not sleep, so the existing
mutex-to-waitqueue-lock order is unchanged.
An LLM assisted the source audit, fix development, and validation of this
issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio_pfn()
Patch series "mm: khugepaged: fix tracepoint UAF", v5.
The khugepaged tracepoints take a folio pointer and call folio_pfn(), but
by then the folio may no longer be valid: freed after folio_put(),
folio_unlock() or pte_unmap_unlock(), or not a folio at all but an
xarray-encoded swap entry. On classic SPARSEMEM, dereferencing it oopses
khugepaged as soon as the trace event is enabled; on other memory models
it merely prints a bogus pfn.
Pass the pfn to the tracepoints directly, captured while the folio is
still pinned, closing the use-after-free windows in
mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), mm_khugepaged_scan_pmd() and
mm_khugepaged_collapse_file().
This patch (of 3):
When the swap entries found exceed max_ptes_swap, the loop is left via
break with folio still holding the xarray value that encodes the swap
entry, not valid folio pointer.
That value is passed to trace_mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), which feeds it to
folio_pfn(). On FLATMEM and SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, the page_to_pfn() is plain
pointer arithmetic, so the trace event merely prints bogus scan_pfn. On
classic SPARSEMEM, the page_to_pfn() reads page->flags, dereferencing the
tiny encoded integer and oopsing khugepaged whenever the trace event is
enabled.
So when folio is the swap entry value, simply set pfn to -1, just like
exhausted scan naturally.
And the folio_put() has maybe dropped the last reference of folio. The
trace_mm_khugepaged_scan_file() is left with a dangling folio pointer. so
using the folio_pfn() before dropping the reference, closing
use-after-free window. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/rmap: don't discard lazyfree THPs at PMD level
__discard_anon_folio_pmd_locked() clears a lazyfree THP's PMD before it
determines whether the folio can be discarded, and restores it if the
folio is dirty or has extra references. It is done under only the PMD
lock and the anon_vma read lock inside try_to_unmap_one() and no mmap lock
is held. The temporarily none PMD causes UAF.
A parallel munmap() or mremap() is supposed to serialize with it on the
PMD lock, but zap_pmd_range() (called by munmap()) and move_page_tables()
(called by mremap()) do not take the lock when they see the temporarily
none PMD and skip the PMD. There is no more page table walk after the
none PMD is restored:
- munmap(): free_pgtables() waits in unlink_anon_vmas() for the anon_vma
lock, then free_pmd_range() drops the restored PMD as bad without
removing the rmap, so the folio keeps a stale mapcount.
- whole-VMA MREMAP_DONTUNMAP: dontunmap_complete() unlinks the source VMA
from its anon_vma while the restored PMD still maps the folio.
- plain mremap(): the THP is not moved but unmapped, so the THP's data is
lost.
In the first two cases, the folio stays mapped, but no VMA that maps it is
linked to its anon_vma. When the anon_vma is freed, it is still reachable
when one rmap walks the folio. Racing lazyfree reclaim against
MREMAP_DONTUNMAP as an unprivileged user reproduces a KASAN use-after-free
in folio_lock_anon_vma_read() as reported in the Closes link.
One solution is to use an invalidated PMD instead of a cleared one until
the discard is committed, but it needs arch fixes first.
1. GUP-fast still follows an invalidated PMD on riscv, LoongArch and s390.
2. sparc64 miscounts thp_pte_count when an invalidated PMD is set again or
cleared.
To keep the fix simple for backport, stop discarding lazyfree THPs at PMD
level instead. try_to_unmap_one() splits the PMD and discards the folio at
PTE level.
unmap_huge_pmd_locked() and __discard_anon_folio_pmd_locked() are left in
place, unused, to minimize this fix for backport and the invalidated PMD
approach is planned as a follow-up series to use them again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: redrat3: fix UAF in probe error path leaving rc device registered
redrat3 stores its device name and phys path inside the main rr3
structure, and the rc device's device_name and input_phys point into
rr3. When the RC device is registered, it keeps those pointers.
KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:648
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888051fda758 by task udevd/7464
Call Trace:
string_nocheck lib/vsprintf.c:648 [inline]
string+0x216/0x2d0 lib/vsprintf.c:730
vsnprintf+0x74a/0xef0 lib/vsprintf.c:2945
vscnprintf+0x41/0x90 lib/vsprintf.c:3014
sysfs_emit+0x10e/0x180 fs/sysfs/file.c:761
input_dev_show_name+0x58/0x70 drivers/input/input.c:1282
Allocated by task 10:
redrat3_dev_probe+0x477/0x2570 drivers/media/rc/redrat3.c:1023
Freed by task 10:
redrat3_delete drivers/media/rc/redrat3.c:466 [inline]
redrat3_dev_probe+0x1bf4/0x2570 drivers/media/rc/redrat3.c:1124
Syzkaller triggers this via usb probing. It probes the RedRat3 USB
interface, which calls redrat3_dev_probe() in redrat3.c. That function
allocates rr3, then builds an rc device whose name points into rr3 via
redrat3_init_rc_dev() in redrat3.c, and registers it with
rc_register_device().
When the detector enable fails after the RC device is registered, the
probe jumps to the led_free path. That path unregisters the LED but does
not unregister the RC device before freeing rr3 via redrat3_delete() in
redrat3.c. The RC device still holds device_name = rr3->name which is now
freed.
Later udevd reads /sys/.../input device name via sysfs_emit() in file.c,
which calls input_dev_show_name() in input.c, which emits dev->name which
is the freed rr3->name.
When the detector enable fails after the RC device is registered, the
error path must not leave the RC device registered. Make the probe error
path clean up the same way redrat3_dev_disconnect() does.
This change should be safe because the RC device is fully registered at
this point and its teardown via rc_unregister_device() is protected by
the input device mutex, and rr3 is still alive during unregister so
device_name remains valid until after unregister. The URBs are killed
before rc_free, so no completion can run after rc is freed. No new lock
ordering is introduced. |