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Search Results (2 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64365 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-26 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: letsketch: fix UAF on inrange_timer at driver unbind letsketch_driver does not provide a .remove callback, but letsketch_probe() arms a per-device timer: timer_setup(&data->inrange_timer, letsketch_inrange_timeout, 0); The timer is re-armed from letsketch_raw_event() with a 100 ms timeout on every pen-in-range report, and its callback dereferences data->input_tablet to deliver a synthetic BTN_TOOL_PEN release. letsketch_data is allocated with devm_kzalloc(), and its input_dev fields are devm-allocated via letsketch_setup_input_tablet(). On device unbind (USB unplug or rmmod), the HID core runs its default teardown and devm cleanup frees both letsketch_data and the input devices. Because no .remove callback exists, nothing drains the timer first: if raw_event armed it within ~100 ms of the unbind, the pending timer fires on freed memory. This is a UAF read of data and of data->input_tablet, followed by input_report_key() / input_sync() into the freed input_dev. The same problem can occur on the probe error path: if hid_hw_start() enabled I/O on an always-poll-quirk device and then failed, raw_event may have armed the timer before devm releases data. Fix by adding a .remove callback that calls hid_hw_stop() first. hid_hw_stop() synchronously kills the URBs that deliver raw_event(), so once it returns no path can re-arm the timer. timer_shutdown_sync() then drains any in-flight callback and permanently disables further mod_timer() calls. Apply the same timer_shutdown_sync() in the probe error path so the timer is guaranteed not to outlive data. | ||||
| CVE-2024-52298 | 2 Xwiki, Xwikisas | 2 Pdf Viewer Macro, Macro Pdfviewer | 2024-11-18 | 7.5 High |
| macro-pdfviewer is a PDF Viewer Macro for XWiki using Mozilla pdf.js. The PDF Viewer macro allows an attacker to view any attachment using the "Delegate my view right" feature as long as the attacker can view a page whose last author has access to the attachment. For this, the attacker only needs to provide the reference to a PDF file to the macro. To obtain the reference of the desired attachment, the attacker can access the Page Index, Attachments tab. Even if the UI shows N/A, the user can inspect the page and check the HTTP request that fetches the live data entries. The attachment URL is available in the returned JSON for all attachments, including protected ones and allows getting the necessary values. This vulnerability is fixed in version 2.5.6. | ||||
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