| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: gl620a: fix out-of-bounds read in genelink_rx_fixup()
genelink_rx_fixup() splits an aggregated RX frame into its individual
packets, using a per-packet length taken from device-supplied data. That
length is only bounded by GL_MAX_PACKET_LEN (1514); it is never compared
against how many bytes were actually received.
A malicious GeneLink (GL620A) device can therefore send a short URB whose
header claims packet_count > 1 and a first packet of up to 1514 bytes.
skb_put_data(gl_skb, packet->packet_data, size);
then copies past the end of the receive buffer and hands the adjacent slab
contents up the network stack, an out-of-bounds read that leaks kernel heap.
No privilege is required: the path runs in the usbnet RX softirq as soon as
the interface is up.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in genelink_rx_fixup (drivers/net/usb/gl620a.c:112)
Read of size 1514 at addr ffff888011309708 by task ksoftirqd/0/14
Call Trace:
...
__asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105)
genelink_rx_fixup (include/linux/skbuff.h:2814 drivers/net/usb/gl620a.c:112)
usbnet_bh (drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:572 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1589)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)
bh_worker (kernel/workqueue.c:3405)
tasklet_action (kernel/softirq.c:965)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622)
run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:1076)
...
skb_pull() already verifies that the requested length fits the buffer and
returns NULL otherwise. Move it ahead of the copy and check its result, so
a packet that overruns the received data is rejected before it is read.
Well-formed frames, whose packets are fully present, are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix UAF in smc_cdc_rx_handler() by pinning the socket
smc_cdc_rx_handler() looks up the connection by token under the link
group's conns_lock, drops the lock, and then dereferences conn and the
smc_sock derived from it, ending in sock_hold(&smc->sk) inside
smc_cdc_msg_recv(). No reference is held across the lock release.
The only reference pinning the socket while the connection is
discoverable in the link group is taken in smc_lgr_register_conn()
(sock_hold) and dropped in __smc_lgr_unregister_conn() (sock_put), both
under conns_lock. Once the handler drops conns_lock, a concurrent
close() -> smc_release() -> smc_conn_free() -> smc_lgr_unregister_conn()
can drop that reference and free the smc_sock, so the handler's later
sock_hold() runs on freed memory:
WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate
Workqueue: rxe_wq do_work
refcount_warn_saturate (lib/refcount.c:25)
smc_cdc_msg_recv (net/smc/smc_cdc.c:430)
smc_cdc_rx_handler (net/smc/smc_cdc.c:502)
smc_wr_rx_tasklet_fn (net/smc/smc_wr.c:445)
tasklet_action_common (kernel/softirq.c:938)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622)
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set
Only SMC-R is affected. The SMC-D receive tasklet is stopped by
tasklet_kill(&conn->rx_tsklet) in smc_conn_free() before the connection
is unregistered, so it cannot run concurrently with the free.
Take the socket reference while still holding conns_lock, so the
registration reference can no longer be the last one, and drop it once
the handler is done. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: net1080: validate packet_len before pad-byte access in rx_fixup
For an even packet_len, net1080_rx_fixup() reads the pad byte at
skb->data[packet_len] before the skb->len != packet_len check further
down, and packet_len is only bounded against NC_MAX_PACKET. A malicious
NetChip 1080 device can send a short frame advertising a large even
packet_len (e.g. 0x4000), so the pad-byte read lands past the end of the
skb:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in net1080_rx_fixup
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880106c83c6 by task ksoftirqd/0/14
...
net1080_rx_fixup (drivers/net/usb/net1080.c:384)
usbnet_bh (drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1589)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)
bh_worker (kernel/workqueue.c:3708)
tasklet_action (kernel/softirq.c:965)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622)
...
Reject the frame when packet_len >= skb->len before reading. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness
When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the
COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure
of Staleness that follows the cause header:
err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data);
stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));
err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that
caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is
present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the
4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs
past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value
is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT,
leaking uninitialized memory.
sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so
check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which
reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too
short to hold the staleness field is discarded.
The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into
COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket
in a user and network namespace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big()
receive_big() bounds the device-announced length by
(big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE. That is still too loose:
add_recvbuf_big() sets sg[1] to start at offset
sizeof(struct padded_vnet_hdr) into the first page, so the chain
actually carries hdr_len + (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(padded_vnet_hdr)) +
big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE bytes -- 20 bytes less than the
check allows for the common hdr_len == 12 case.
A malicious virtio backend can announce a len in that gap. page_to_skb()
then walks one frag past the page chain, storing a NULL page->private
into skb_shinfo()->frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS], which is both an out-of-bounds
write past the static frag array and a NULL frag handed up the rx path.
Bound len by the size add_recvbuf_big() actually advertised. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bridge: fix stale prevhdr pointer in br_ip6_fragment()
br_ip6_fragment() gets prevhdr, a pointer into the skb head, from
ip6_find_1stfragopt(), then calls skb_checksum_help(). For a cloned skb
skb_checksum_help() reallocates the head via pskb_expand_head(), leaving
prevhdr dangling. It is later dereferenced in ip6_frag_next(), causing a
use-after-free write.
Save prevhdr's offset before skb_checksum_help() and recompute it after,
like commit ef0efcd3bd3f ("ipv6: Fix dangling pointer when ipv6
fragment").
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip6_frag_next (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:857)
Write of size 1 at addr ffff888013ff5016 by task exploit/141
Call Trace:
...
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
ip6_frag_next (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:857)
br_ip6_fragment (net/ipv6/netfilter.c:212)
nf_ct_bridge_post (net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c:407)
nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
br_forward_finish (net/bridge/br_forward.c:66)
__br_forward (net/bridge/br_forward.c:115)
maybe_deliver (net/bridge/br_forward.c:191)
br_flood (net/bridge/br_forward.c:245)
br_handle_frame_finish (net/bridge/br_input.c:229)
br_handle_frame (net/bridge/br_input.c:442)
...
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114)
...
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec
perf_event_remove_on_exec() removes events by calling
perf_event_exit_event(). For top-level events, this removes the event from
the context with DETACH_EXIT only.
This can leave inconsistent group state when a removed event is a group
leader and the group contains siblings without remove_on_exec. If the group
was active, the surviving siblings can remain active and attached to the
removed leader's sibling list, but are no longer represented by a valid
group leader on the PMU context active lists.
A later close of the removed leader uses DETACH_GROUP and can promote the
still-active siblings from this stale group state. The next schedule-in can
then add an already-linked active_list entry again, corrupting the PMU
context active list.
With DEBUG_LIST enabled, this is caught as a list_add double-add in
merge_sched_in().
Fix this by detaching group relationships when remove_on_exec removes an
event. This preserves the existing task-exit and revoke behavior, while
ensuring surviving siblings are ungrouped before the removed event leaves
the context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb()
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() returned l2cap_pi(sk)->chan after
release_sock(parent). Once the parent lock is dropped the newly
enqueued child socket sk is reachable via the accept queue, so another
task can accept and free it before the callback dereferences sk,
resulting in a use-after-free.
Rework the ->new_connection() op so the core, rather than the callback,
owns the child channel's lifetime. The op now receives a pre-allocated
new_chan and returns an errno instead of allocating and returning a
channel. l2cap_new_connection() allocates the child channel and links
it into the conn list via __l2cap_chan_add() before invoking the
callback, so the conn-list reference keeps the channel alive once
release_sock(parent) exposes the socket to other tasks.
Channel configuration that was duplicated in l2cap_sock_init() and the
various new_connection callbacks is consolidated into
l2cap_chan_set_defaults(), which now inherits from the parent channel
when one is supplied. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
posix-cpu-timers: Prevent UAF caused by non-leader exec() race
Wongi and Jungwoo decoded and reported a non-leader exec() related race
which can result in an UAF:
sys_timer_delete() exec()
posix_cpu_timer_del()
// Observes old leader
p = pid_task(pid, pid_type); de_thread()
switch_leader();
release_task(old_leader)
__exit_signal(old_leader)
sighand = lock(old_leader, sighand);
posix_cpu_timers*_exit();
sighand = lock_task_sighand(p) unhash_task(old_leader);
sh = lock(p, sighand) old_leader->sighand = NULL;
unlock(sighand);
(p->sighand == NULL)
unlock(sh)
return NULL;
// Returns without action
if(!sighand)
return 0;
free_posix_timer();
This is "harmless" unless the deleted timer was armed and enqueued in
p->signal because on exec() a TGID targeted timer is inherited.
As sys_timer_delete() freed the underlying posix timer object
run_posix_cpu_timers() or any timerqueue related add/delete operations on
other timers will access the freed object's timerqueue node, which results
in an UAF.
There is a similar problem vs. posix_cpu_timer_set(). For regular posix
timers it just transiently returns -ESRCH to user space, but for the use
case in do_cpu_nanosleep() it's the same UAF just that the k_itimer is
allocated on the stack.
Also posix_cpu_timer_rearm() fails to rearm the timer, which means it stops
to expire.
While debating solutions Frederic pointed out another problem:
posix_cpu_timer_del(tmr)
__exit_signal(p)
posix_cpu_timers*_exit(p);
unhash_task(p);
p->sighand = NULL;
sh = lock_task_sighand(p)
sighand = p->sighand;
if (!sighand)
return NULL;
lock(sighand);
if (!sh)
WARN_ON_ONCE(timer_queued(tmr));
On weakly ordered architectures it is not guaranteed that
posix_cpu_timer_del() will observe the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit()
when p->sighand is observed as NULL, which means the WARN() can be a false
positive.
Solve these issues by:
1) Changing the store in __exit_signal() to smp_store_release().
2) Adding a smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() into the !sighand path
of lock_task_sighand().
3) Creating a helper function for looking up the task and locking sighand
which does not return when sighand == NULL. Instead it retries the
task lookup and only if that fails it gives up.
4) Using that helper in the three affected functions.
#1/#2 ensures that the reader side which observes sighand == NULL also
observes all preceeding stores, i.e. the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit()
and the ones in unhash_task().
#3 ensures that the above described non-leader exec() situation is handled
gracefully. When the task lookup returns the old leader, but sighand ==
NULL then it retries. In the non-leader exec() case the subsequent task
lookup will observe the new leader due to #1/#2. In normal exit() scenarios
the subsequent lookup fails.
When the task lookup fails, the function also checks whether the timer is
still enqueued and issues a warning if that's the case. Unfortunately there
is nothing which can be done about it, but as the task is already not
longer visible the timer should not be accessed anymore. This check also
requires memory ordering, which is not provided when the first lookup
fails. To achieve that the check is preceeded by a smp_rmb() which pairs
with the smp_wmb() in write_seqlock() in __exit_signal(). That ensures that
the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() are visible.
The history of the non-leader exec() issue goes back to the early days of
posix CPU timers, which stored a pointer to the group leader task in the
timer. That obviously fails when a non-leader exec() switches the leader.
commit e0a70217107e ("posix-cpu-timers: workaround to suppress the problems
with mt exec") added a temporary workaround for that in 2010 which surv
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Check for invalid/obsolete root *after* making MMU pages available
Check for a "stale" page fault, i.e. for an invalid and/or obsolete root,
after making MMU pages available for the shadow MMU. If reclaiming shadow
pages zaps an in-use root, i.e. marks it invalid, then KVM will attempt to
map memory into an invalid root. On its own, populating an invalid root is
"fine", but because child shadow pages inherit their parent's role, any
children created during the map/fetch will be created as invalid pages,
thus violating KVM's invariant that invalid pages are never on the list of
active MMU pages.
Note, the underlying flaw has existed since KVM first started tracking
invalid roots in 2008 (commit 2e53d63acba7, "KVM: MMU: ignore zapped root
pagetables"), but the true badness only came along in 2020 (Linux 5.9)
with the invariant that invalid shadow pages can't be on the list of
active pages.
Note #2, inheriting role.invalid when creating child shadow pages is also
far from ideal; that flaw will be addressed separately. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nVMX: Hide shadow VMCS right after VMCLEAR
free_nested() frees the shadow VMCS while vmcs01 still points to it. But
because it is asynchronous with respect to loaded_vmcs_clear(), the vCPU
might migrate before the pointer is cleared and __loaded_vmcs_clear()
may then execute VMCLEAR.
The VMCS needs to stay attached until its explicit VMCLEAR completes, but
then it can be hidden and the page safely freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rhashtable: clear stale iter->p on table restart
rhashtable_walk_start_check() has two restart paths when resuming a walk.
When iter->walker.tbl is valid, it re-validates iter->p against the table
and sets iter->p = NULL if the object is gone. When iter->walker.tbl is
NULL (table was freed during resize), it resets slot and skip but forgets
to clear iter->p.
rhashtable_walk_next() then dereferences the stale iter->p, reading
freed memory. This is a use-after-free.
Any caller that does multi-fragment rhashtable walks across
walk_stop/walk_start boundaries is affected. Concrete cases include
netlink_diag (__netlink_diag_dump in net/netlink/diag.c) and TIPC
(tipc_nl_sk_walk in net/tipc/socket.c).
Crash stack (netlink_diag):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rhashtable_walk_next+0x365/0x3c0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801a9d2438 (freed kmalloc-2k, offset 1080)
Call Trace:
rhashtable_walk_next+0x365/0x3c0 (lib/rhashtable.c:1016)
__netlink_diag_dump+0x160/0x760 (net/netlink/diag.c:122)
netlink_diag_dump+0xc2/0x240
netlink_dump+0x5bc/0x1270
netlink_recvmsg+0x7a3/0x980
sock_recvmsg+0x1bc/0x200
__sys_recvfrom+0x1d4/0x2c0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: reject unhashed sockets during established lookups
TCP established ehash lookups are lockless. The socket caches involved
use SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so memory can be reused before an RCU reader
that retained its old address has finished.
After a tuple match, __inet_lookup_established() and
__inet6_lookup_established() acquire a reference and repeat the tuple
check. They do not check whether the new object is hashed. If the
address is reused for a socket with the same tuple, the lookup can
acquire a reference to the new object and return it while its nulls node
is unhashed.
A PoC that drives reuse with a SYN cookie request socket reproduced the
crash. The new request socket is unhashed and has a NULL rsk_listener.
A lookup that had loaded the address of the old request socket acquired
the reference published by tcp_get_cookie_sock() and returned the new
object. tcp_v4_rcv() then read sk_state through the NULL listener.
The resulting crash was:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
...
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 7.3.0-00591-g0e135910deec #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
...
RIP: 0010:tcp_v4_rcv+0x44e/0x1280
...
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000024ca8c0 R12: 0000000000000000
...
CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 0000000103d50004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? raw_local_deliver+0xae/0x240
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2d/0x180
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x84/0x100
ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x5f/0x70
ip_sublist_rcv+0x12a/0x1d0
ip_list_rcv+0xfd/0x130
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x223/0x250
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d2/0x2c0
? try_fill_recv+0x39/0x7b0
napi_complete_done+0x74/0x170
virtnet_poll+0x445/0x600
__napi_poll+0x27/0x1e0
net_rx_action+0x2fe/0x3b0
handle_softirqs+0xc2/0x2c0
__irq_exit_rcu+0x74/0xd0
common_interrupt+0x7f/0x90
</IRQ>
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
After taking a reference, check whether the nulls node is unhashed in
both IPv4 and IPv6 established lookups. If it is unhashed or the tuple
no longer matches, drop the reference and restart the lookup.
Lookups racing with the TIME_WAIT hashdance, or with a request being
replaced by its child, now restart and find the new socket instead of
returning the old one.
Request sockets that were never inserted into ehash can have a nonzero
refcount, and a stale lookup can hold a transient reference. Therefore,
when SYN cookie, Fast Open, and request migration paths fail after
setting a nonzero refcount, release the references held by those paths
with reqsk_put() instead of freeing the request directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen-blkback: Avoid UAF when reading I/O statistics
Reading I/O statistics via sysfs concurrently with tearing down a
frontend device might result in UAF or a NULL dereference, as the
reading of the statistics data is not synchronized with freeing the
data.
Use a rwlock for synchronizing.
This is XSA-528 / CVE-2026-100082 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen-netback: defer xenvif_mcast_addr_list_free()
In order for the function to legitimately avoid locking/RCU, it needs to
run after all TX/RX processing has finished/stopped: Lookups happen from
xenvif_start_xmit(), while adds/removes happen from xenvif_tx_action()
(called out of xenvif_poll()).
Move the call out of xenvif_disconnect_data() (the call to the function
from connect()'s error path doesn't require any cleaning up there), and
put it past the synchronization point in backend_disconnect().
This is XSA-527 / CVE-2026-100081. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen-netback: Fix UAF when reading statistics data
The network statistic data in the driver is protected by RCU.
Unfortunately when tearing down the queues after an error during
connecting to the frontend (e.g. due to illegal Xenstore data filled
in by the guest), the statistic data is being freed without
synchronizing the RCU state. In case the data is being read via sysfs
in this phase, access to already freed memory or memory being in new
use is possible.
Fix that by calling synchronize_net() before freeing the queue data.
This is XSA-526 / CVE-2026-100080 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: reject oversized nested action attrs
Open vSwitch stores generated flow actions as nlattrs, whose nla_len
field is u16. Commit a1e64addf3ff ("net: openvswitch: remove
misbehaving actions length check") allowed the total sw_flow_actions
stream to grow beyond 64 KiB, which is valid, but also removed the last
guard preventing a generated nested action attribute from exceeding
U16_MAX.
An oversized generated container can thus be closed with a truncated
nla_len. A later dump or teardown then walks a structurally different
stream than the one that was validated. In particular, an oversized
nested CLONE/CT action may cause subsequent bytes in the generated
stream to be interpreted as independent actions.
Keep the larger total-action-stream behavior, but make nested action
close reject generated containers that do not fit in nla_len, and return
the error through all callers. For recursive SAMPLE, CLONE, DEC_TTL, and
CHECK_PKT_LEN builders, trim resource-owning action-list tails in reverse
construction order before discarding failed wrappers, so resources copied
into the rejected tails are released before the wrappers are removed.
Most failed outer wrappers are discarded by truncating actions_len after
child resources have been released. CHECK_PKT_LEN also trims its parent
after branch resources are gone. SET/TUNNEL close failures unwind their
known tun_dst ownership directly, and SET_TO_MASKED has no external
ownership and truncates on close failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/hyperv: validate resolution_count and fix WIN8 fallback
A SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE with resolution_count > 64 walks past
the supported_resolution[SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT] array in the
parse loop. Bound resolution_count against the array size, folded
into the existing zero-check.
When the WIN10 resolution probe fails, the caller in
hyperv_connect_vsp() left hv->screen_*_max / preferred_* unpopulated,
which sets mode_config.max_width / max_height to 0 and makes
drm_internal_framebuffer_create() reject every userspace framebuffer
with -EINVAL. The pre-WIN10 branch had the same gap for
preferred_width / preferred_height. Use a single post-probe fallback
guarded by screen_width_max == 0 so both paths converge on the WIN8
defaults. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit
handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing
req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between
handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file().
The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps
struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when
the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears
the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.
Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an
explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit().
handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the
reference on the completion-bit-winning path.
The submit error path must also release the file reference, but
after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can
discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path
cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction
-- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same
serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel()
already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit
error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown
handles final destruction.
The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change
comes in the next patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix eswitch mode block underflow on IPsec acquire SA
mlx5e_xfrm_add_state() handles acquire-flow temporary SAs by allocating
software state and skipping hardware offload setup.
That path jumps to the common success label before taking the eswitch mode
block. After tunnel-mode validation was moved earlier, the common success
label unconditionally calls mlx5_eswitch_unblock_mode(). For acquire SAs,
this decrements esw->offloads.num_block_mode without a matching increment.
Return directly after installing the acquire SA offload handle, so only the
paths that successfully called mlx5_eswitch_block_mode() call the matching
unblock. |
