| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in Moodle's Blackboard question import format. Insufficient validation of file paths during the question import process allows an authenticated user with permissions to import questions into a question bank to read arbitrary files accessible to the web server process. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to view sensitive files, resulting in unauthorized information disclosure. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle's external database enrolment plugin. Insufficient sanitization of data passed to queries against the external database allows an authenticated user with course editing permissions to perform a Structured Query Language (SQL) injection attack. When this non-default plugin is enabled, an attacker can exploit this issue to view, modify, or delete sensitive records within the connected external database. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Due to insufficient validation when saving activity settings, an authenticated user with teacher privileges can modify activities in courses they are not authorized to access. This flaw allows unauthorized changes to course materials, compromising the integrity of course content. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Insufficient sanitization of objective identifiers in the SCORM (Sharable Content Object Reference Model) objectives report allows an authenticated user with content upload permissions to inject malicious scripts. When another user views the report, the injected script executes in their browser session, potentially allowing the attacker to access sensitive information or perform unauthorized actions on their behalf. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Due to insufficient permission checks and input validation in the quiz question bank callback, an authenticated user can access and view questions from question banks they do not have permission to access. Furthermore, this issue allows users to trigger arbitrary class instantiation (creating unintended application objects), potentially leading to further unauthorized actions. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Missing ownership verification in Feedback activity templates allows an authenticated teacher to view, use, or delete templates associated with courses other than their own. This can result in unauthorized access, modification, or deletion of course materials. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Due to missing ownership checks in badge alignments, an authenticated user with badge management privileges can view and modify alignments associated with badges they do not own. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized data disclosure and tampering with badge configurations. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. An improper authorization check when displaying individual glossary entries allows an authenticated user to view approved glossary items from courses they do not have permission to access. This vulnerability leads to unauthorized information disclosure of restricted educational materials. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Missing authorization checks in the forum discussion web services allow authenticated users to view discussion information in courses they do not have permission to access. In addition, users with teacher privileges may lock forum discussions in courses where they lack proper authorization. This issue can lead to unauthorized information disclosure and unauthorized discussion state modification. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Due to a missing authorization check when viewing and restoring wiki page versions, an authenticated user can access content from courses they are not permitted to view. This issue allows an attacker to inspect restricted course material and copy it into their own wiki pages, leading to unauthorized information disclosure. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Due to a missing authorization check when editing Lesson activity pages, authenticated users with teacher privileges can view and move lesson pages from courses they are not permitted to access into their own lessons. This issue can lead to unauthorized access and modification of restricted course content. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Insufficient authorization checks in the quiz editing functionality allow an authenticated user with teacher privileges to view slot details and modify sections of quizzes they do not have permission to manage. An attacker could exploit this flaw to alter quiz configurations or disclose quiz structure information without proper authorization. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle's single view grade report web service. A missing authorization check allows authenticated students to view the names of all grade items in a course, including those configured to be hidden. This vulnerability leads to unauthorized information disclosure. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Insufficient authorization checks in the quiz overrides web service allow an authenticated user with teacher privileges to modify user and group overrides for quizzes they do not have permission to manage. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to improperly alter exam access, deadlines, or testing conditions across unauthorized courses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/filemap: read mapping->a_ops->free_folio under i_lock
memory_failure() -> ... -> filemap_remove_folio() can read mapping->a_ops
after the inode has been freed. Once the folio is deleted from the
pagecache it no longer pins the mapping, so after i_lock is dropped
e.g., a concurrent final iput() can evict and free the inode before
filemap_free_folio() looks up mapping->a_ops->free_folio.
Most callers hold a reference on the inode, but not all.
Documentation/filesystems/vfs.rst explicitly states that ->free_folio()
must not assume the original address_space mapping still exists.
Fix it by loading ->free_folio while i_lock is still held, similar to
what folio_unmap_invalidate() does.
Inline filemap_free_folio() into its remaining caller such that
delete_from_page_cache_batch() also just loads the callback before
dropping the i_lock.
The bug was found by code inspection and has not been reproduced.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private.
[ david: get rid of filemap_free_folio() entirely; improve patch description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/truncate: look again if a folio left the mapping
invalidate_inode_pages2_range() skips a folio which no longer belongs to
the mapping by the time it has got the folio lock, on the assumption
that somebody else has removed it from the page cache. But the folio may
have been replaced, and then there is a new folio with the same data at
that index.
For most cases, like folio migration, that is impossible. However,
collapse_file() only checks the refcount of the old folios, under the
i_pages lock, and relies on their folio locks from there on. That works for
users which repeat the lookup when they find folio->mapping changed.
The following scenario is, however, possible:
CPU0 pwrite(O_DIRECT) CPU1 collapse_file()
kiocb_invalidate_pages()
read the folio (old data), lock it
refcount check
the write completes copy to new_folio
kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write()
find_get_entries() -> old folio
xas_store(new_folio)
folio->mapping = NULL
folio_unlock(folio)
folio_lock()
folio->mapping != mapping
-> continue
In that scenario, the collapsed folio with the data from before the write
stays in the page cache after the write has returned.
This used to be impossible, as khugepaged only collapsed files that nobody
had open for writing.
Restart the lookup at that index, like shmem_undo_range() does. The same
problem seems to exist in truncate_inode_pages_range() as well when
truncate_inode_folio() fails, so handle it there as well, but slightly
differently: simply check once more through find_get_entries(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file's inode
shmem_file() only checks if file->f_mapping is a shmem mapping. This
mapping can belong to another file, however, as with a Coda file backed
by a tmpfs container after mmap().
So it does not guarantee that the file inode is an actual shmem inode.
Seal handling and memfd preservation use this check before accessing
shmem inode state, so they can access an inode of the wrong type.
Let's make shmem_file() check the inode's file operations instead, to
identify shmem inodes reliably. This will identify regular shmem inodes,
including memfds and ordinary tmpfs files, independently of wrapper file
operations.
Use shmem_mapping() in collapse_file() instead to not change the behavior
of collapse_file(): it operates on the page cache and uses mapping->host
for shmem inode operations. Focusing on the file does not seem relevant. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: fix truncate hang in large swap entry
Truncating a tmpfs file or memfd to a page-aligned size inside a large
swap entry can loop indefinitely in shmem_undo_range(). The task holds
the inode lock and cannot be killed.
A large swap entry represents a whole swapped-out folio. For example,
truncate a file whose pages 0-7 share one swap entry to four pages:
[ 0 1 2 3 | 4 5 6 7 ]
keep | discard
^
new EOF, start = 4
i_size has already been updated when boundary handling asks
shmem_get_partial_folio() for page 4. Since it is swapped out, the helper
calls shmem_get_folio() with SGP_READ. That rejects page 4 with -EINVAL
because its starting offset equals i_size. Nothing is read back.
The final scan cannot free the entry without losing pages 0-3. It skips
it, restarts from start = 4, and finds it again indefinitely. An unaligned
truncate avoids this particular failure because the requested page starts
below i_size. Folios already in the page-cache cannot trigger it as the
direct lookup will return them beyond EOF.
Fix it by letting shmem_get_partial_folio() call shmem_swapin_folio()
directly for swap entries. This bypasses the read path's i_size check,
allowing the existing boundary handling to zero and split the folio. If
swap-in returns a smaller folio, it also splits the swap entry so the
final scan can free the entries beyond EOF. Retry the lookup if the entry
changes during swap-in.
Handling swap-in allocation failures remains broken and is unchanged by
this commit. Even when shmem_swapin_folio() correctly returns -ENOMEM
instead of -EEXIST, shmem_get_partial_folio() returns NULL and
shmem_undo_range() skips boundary handling. If the large swap entry
remains intact, truncation can still loop in the final scan, while hole
punching can return without zeroing the boundary.
This may read an entire large folio back from swap while holding
i_rwsem, only to discard part of it. Avoiding that I/O would require
splitting both the swap entry and any large folio still in the swap
cache. That, however, is much bigger work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tmpfs: keep the quota soft limits of an unused id
When the last reference to a dquot goes away, shmem_release_dquot()
stores its limits in the rb tree of the mount, unless
shmem_is_empty_dquot() says that there is nothing worth storing. That
function looks at the usage and at the two hard limits only.
So if the administrator sets nothing but soft limits for an id that owns
no file yet, the entry is thrown away as soon as the dquot that
Q_SETQUOTA used is released, and the id never gets to see a limit.
To fix it, compare the soft limits as well: an entry can be empty only if
both soft limits are zero as well, which is exactly what
shmem_acquire_dquot() sets for a new entry.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Josef Bacik in private.
[ david: slightly adjusted description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mempolicy: charge shared policy nodes
Any local user can bypass memory.max with mbind() on a tmpfs file, and
allocate unbounded kernel memory.
mbind() sets a NUMA memory policy for a range of a mapping. If the
mapping is of a shmem and friends, the kernel also stores the policy on
the inode, in a tree with one entry per range of the file.
Each mbind() on a single page of a mapping can add one shared policy node
(struct sp_node) and one struct mempolicy to that tree. They outlive the
mapping and stay around until the inode is destroyed. The tree is not
bounded by the file size, so the file can be empty.
Memory that user space can allocate must be charged to a memory cgroup. A
slab cache does that for all of its objects if it is created with
SLAB_ACCOUNT. numa_policy_init() creates the slab caches for both
structs without SLAB_ACCOUNT, so they are not charged to any cgroup.
Reproduced with mbind() on single pages of an empty tmpfs file, from a
cgroup with memory.max=8M: the global OOM killer killed tasks owned by
root, and the machine panicked.
Fix this by creating both caches with SLAB_ACCOUNT. This change implies
that mbind() can now fail when running into memcg limits. Further,
the policy_cache also serves task and VMA policies, so they are
similarly accounted now.
Note that per-file limits are not really helpful, as the user could
simply use many files; having limits per user is tricky as well.
Fix generated by an LLM and submitted by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: smaller description tweaks ] |