| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| No description is available for this CVE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
When the xfrm device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field
of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then,
slab-use-after-free may occur when the xfrm device sends IPv6 packets.
The stack information is as follows:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881111458ef by task swapper/3/0
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.4.0-next-20230707 #409
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0
kasan_report+0x11d/0x130
decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890
__xfrm_decode_session+0x54/0xb0
xfrmi_xmit+0x173/0x1ca0
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x187/0x700
sch_direct_xmit+0x1a3/0xc30
__qdisc_run+0x510/0x17a0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2215/0x3b10
neigh_connected_output+0x3c2/0x550
ip6_finish_output2+0x55a/0x1550
ip6_finish_output+0x6b9/0x1270
ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540
ndisc_send_skb+0xa63/0x1890
ndisc_send_rs+0x132/0x6f0
addrconf_rs_timer+0x3f1/0x870
call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x580
expire_timers+0x29b/0x4b0
run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910
__do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905
irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:intel_idle_hlt+0x23/0x30
Code: 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 00 2d c4 9f ab 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 fb f4 <fa> 44 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000197d78 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 00000000000a83c3 RBX: ffffe8ffffd09c50 RCX: ffffffff8a22d8e5
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8d3f8080 RDI: ffffe8ffffd09c50
RBP: ffffffff8d3f8080 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1026ba6d9d
R10: ffff888135d36ceb R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffffffff8d3f8100 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
cpuidle_enter_state+0xd3/0x6f0
cpuidle_enter+0x4e/0xa0
do_idle+0x2fe/0x3c0
cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20
start_secondary+0x200/0x290
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x167/0x16b
</TASK>
Allocated by task 939:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x7f/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1cd/0x410
kmalloc_reserve+0x165/0x270
__alloc_skb+0x129/0x330
inet6_ifa_notify+0x118/0x230
__ipv6_ifa_notify+0x177/0xbe0
addrconf_dad_completed+0x133/0xe00
addrconf_dad_work+0x764/0x1390
process_one_work+0xa32/0x16f0
worker_thread+0x67d/0x10c0
kthread+0x344/0x440
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111145800
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 640
The buggy address is located 239 bytes inside of
freed 640-byte region [ffff888111145800, ffff888111145a80)
As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in
_decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended
only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during
transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before
sending packets. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: Fix error unwinding of XDP initialization
When initializing XDP in virtnet_open(), some rq xdp initialization
may hit an error causing net device open failed. However, previous
rqs have already initialized XDP and enabled NAPI, which is not the
expected behavior. Need to roll back the previous rq initialization
to avoid leaks in error unwinding of init code.
Also extract helper functions of disable and enable queue pairs.
Use newly introduced disable helper function in error unwinding and
virtnet_close. Use enable helper function in virtnet_open. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: tighten bounds checking in decode_message()
Copy the bounds checking from encode_message() to decode_message().
This patch addresses the following concerns. Ensure that there is
enough space for at least one header so that we don't have a negative
size later.
if (msg_hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr))
Ensure that we have enough space to read the next header from the
msg->data.
if (msg_len > msg_hdr_len - sizeof(*trans_hdr))
return -EINVAL;
Check that the trans_hdr->len is not below the minimum size:
if (hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr))
This minimum check ensures that we don't corrupt memory in
decode_passthrough() when we do.
memcpy(out_trans->data, in_trans->data, len - sizeof(in_trans->hdr));
And finally, use size_add() to prevent an integer overflow:
if (size_add(msg_len, hdr_len) > msg_hdr_len) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in
gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using
it.
Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute
unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary
stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to
boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail()
then panic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix disconnect vs accept race
Despite commit 0ad529d9fd2b ("mptcp: fix possible divide by zero in
recvmsg()"), the mptcp protocol is still prone to a race between
disconnect() (or shutdown) and accept.
The root cause is that the mentioned commit checks the msk-level
flag, but mptcp_stream_accept() does acquire the msk-level lock,
as it can rely directly on the first subflow lock.
As reported by Christoph than can lead to a race where an msk
socket is accepted after that mptcp_subflow_queue_clean() releases
the listener socket lock and just before it takes destructive
actions leading to the following splat:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012
PGD 5a4ca067 P4D 5a4ca067 PUD 37d4c067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 2 PID: 10955 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-gdc7b257ee5dd #37
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mptcp_stream_accept+0x1ee/0x2f0 include/net/inet_sock.h:330
Code: 0a 09 00 48 8b 1b 4c 39 e3 74 07 e8 bc 7c 7f fe eb a1 e8 b5 7c 7f fe 4c 8b 6c 24 08 eb 05 e8 a9 7c 7f fe 49 8b 85 d8 09 00 00 <0f> b6 40 12 88 44 24 07 0f b6 6c 24 07 bf 07 00 00 00 89 ee e8 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000d07dc0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888037e8d020 RCX: ffff88803b093300
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff833822c5 RDI: ffffffff8333896a
RBP: 0000607f82031520 R08: ffff88803b093300 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000003e83 R12: ffff888037e8d020
R13: ffff888037e8c680 R14: ffff888009af7900 R15: ffff888009af6880
FS: 00007fc26d708640(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 0000000066bc5001 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_accept+0x1ae/0x260 net/socket.c:1872
__sys_accept4+0x9b/0x110 net/socket.c:1913
__do_sys_accept4 net/socket.c:1954 [inline]
__se_sys_accept4 net/socket.c:1951 [inline]
__x64_sys_accept4+0x20/0x30 net/socket.c:1951
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x47/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
Address the issue by temporary removing the pending request socket
from the accept queue, so that racing accept() can't touch them.
After depleting the msk - the ssk still exists, as plain TCP sockets,
re-insert them into the accept queue, so that later inet_csk_listen_stop()
will complete the tcp socket disposal. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Enhance the attribute size check
This combines the overflow and boundary check so that all attribute size
will be properly examined while enumerating them.
[ 169.181521] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 169.183161] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880094b6240 by task mount/247
[ 169.184046]
[ 169.184925] CPU: 0 PID: 247 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7+ #3
[ 169.185908] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 169.187066] Call Trace:
[ 169.187492] <TASK>
[ 169.188049] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
[ 169.188495] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689
[ 169.188964] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 169.189331] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130
[ 169.189714] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 169.190079] __asan_load1+0x51/0x60
[ 169.190634] run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570
[ 169.191290] ? run_pack+0x840/0x840
[ 169.191569] ? run_lookup_entry+0xb3/0x1f0
[ 169.192443] ? mi_enum_attr+0x20a/0x230
[ 169.192886] run_unpack_ex+0xad/0x3e0
[ 169.193276] ? run_unpack+0x570/0x570
[ 169.193557] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80
[ 169.193889] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
[ 169.194236] ? mi_init+0x4a/0x70
[ 169.194496] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x166/0x1c0
[ 169.194851] ? attr_data_write_resident+0x250/0x250
[ 169.195188] mi_read+0x133/0x2c0
[ 169.195481] ntfs_iget5+0x277/0x1780
[ 169.196017] ? call_rcu+0x1c7/0x330
[ 169.196392] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70
[ 169.196708] ? evict+0x223/0x280
[ 169.197014] ? __kmalloc+0x33/0x540
[ 169.197305] ? wnd_init+0x15b/0x1b0
[ 169.197599] ntfs_fill_super+0x1026/0x1ba0
[ 169.197994] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 169.198299] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20
[ 169.198583] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0
[ 169.198930] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150
[ 169.199269] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370
[ 169.199750] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0
[ 169.200094] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20
[ 169.200431] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130
[ 169.200714] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0
[ 169.201067] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 169.201358] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 169.201965] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 169.202445] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440
[ 169.203075] ? putname+0x80/0xa0
[ 169.203414] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0
[ 169.203719] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0
[ 169.203977] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 169.204382] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110
[ 169.204711] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 169.205059] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 169.205571] RIP: 0033:0x7f67a80e948a
[ 169.206327] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008
[ 169.208296] RSP: 002b:00007ffddf020f58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 169.209253] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e2547a6060 RCX: 00007f67a80e948a
[ 169.209777] RDX: 000055e2547a6260 RSI: 000055e2547a62e0 RDI: 000055e2547aeaf0
[ 169.210342] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055e2547a6280 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 169.210843] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055e2547aeaf0
[ 169.211307] R13: 000055e2547a6260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[ 169.211913] </TASK>
[ 169.212304]
[ 169.212680] Allocated by task 0:
[ 169.212963] (stack is not available)
[ 169.213200]
[ 169.213472] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880094b5e00
[ 169.213472] which belongs to the cache UDP of size 1152
[ 169.214095] The buggy address is located 1088 bytes inside of
[ 169.214095] 1152-byte region [ffff8880094b5e00, ffff8880094b6280)
[ 169.214639]
[ 169.215004] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 169.215766] page:000000002e324c8c refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x94b4
[ 169.218412] head:000000002e324c8c order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 169.219078] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 169.220272] raw: 000fffffc0010200
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ubi: ubi_wl_put_peb: Fix infinite loop when wear-leveling work failed
Following process will trigger an infinite loop in ubi_wl_put_peb():
ubifs_bgt ubi_bgt
ubifs_leb_unmap
ubi_leb_unmap
ubi_eba_unmap_leb
ubi_wl_put_peb wear_leveling_worker
e1 = rb_entry(rb_first(&ubi->used)
e2 = get_peb_for_wl(ubi)
ubi_io_read_vid_hdr // return err (flash fault)
out_error:
ubi->move_from = ubi->move_to = NULL
wl_entry_destroy(ubi, e1)
ubi->lookuptbl[e->pnum] = NULL
retry:
e = ubi->lookuptbl[pnum]; // return NULL
if (e == ubi->move_from) { // NULL == NULL gets true
goto retry; // infinite loop !!!
$ top
PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEM COMMAND
7676 root 20 0 0 0 0 R 100.0 0.0 ubifs_bgt0_0
Fix it by:
1) Letting ubi_wl_put_peb() returns directly if wearl leveling entry has
been removed from 'ubi->lookuptbl'.
2) Using 'ubi->wl_lock' protecting wl entry deletion to preventing an
use-after-free problem for wl entry in ubi_wl_put_peb().
Fetch a reproducer in [Link]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/synthetic: Fix races on freeing last_cmd
Currently, the "last_cmd" variable can be accessed by multiple processes
asynchronously when multiple users manipulate synthetic_events node
at the same time, it could lead to use-after-free or double-free.
This patch add "lastcmd_mutex" to prevent "last_cmd" from being accessed
asynchronously.
================================================================
It's easy to reproduce in the KASAN environment by running the two
scripts below in different shells.
script 1:
while :
do
echo -n -e '\x88' > /sys/kernel/tracing/synthetic_events
done
script 2:
while :
do
echo -n -e '\xb0' > /sys/kernel/tracing/synthetic_events
done
================================================================
double-free scenario:
process A process B
------------------- ---------------
1.kstrdup last_cmd
2.free last_cmd
3.free last_cmd(double-free)
================================================================
use-after-free scenario:
process A process B
------------------- ---------------
1.kstrdup last_cmd
2.free last_cmd
3.tracing_log_err(use-after-free)
================================================================
Appendix 1. KASAN report double-free:
BUG: KASAN: double-free in kfree+0xdc/0x1d4
Free of addr ***** by task sh/4879
Call trace:
...
kfree+0xdc/0x1d4
create_or_delete_synth_event+0x60/0x1e8
trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8
synth_events_write+0x20/0x30
vfs_write+0x200/0x830
...
Allocated by task 4879:
...
kstrdup+0x5c/0x98
create_or_delete_synth_event+0x6c/0x1e8
trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8
synth_events_write+0x20/0x30
vfs_write+0x200/0x830
...
Freed by task 5464:
...
kfree+0xdc/0x1d4
create_or_delete_synth_event+0x60/0x1e8
trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8
synth_events_write+0x20/0x30
vfs_write+0x200/0x830
...
================================================================
Appendix 2. KASAN report use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strlen+0x5c/0x7c
Read of size 1 at addr ***** by task sh/5483
sh: CPU: 7 PID: 5483 Comm: sh
...
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x34/0x44
strlen+0x5c/0x7c
tracing_log_err+0x60/0x444
create_or_delete_synth_event+0xc4/0x204
trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8
synth_events_write+0x20/0x30
vfs_write+0x200/0x830
...
Allocated by task 5483:
...
kstrdup+0x5c/0x98
create_or_delete_synth_event+0x80/0x204
trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8
synth_events_write+0x20/0x30
vfs_write+0x200/0x830
...
Freed by task 5480:
...
kfree+0xdc/0x1d4
create_or_delete_synth_event+0x74/0x204
trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8
synth_events_write+0x20/0x30
vfs_write+0x200/0x830
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/MCE/AMD: Use an u64 for bank_map
Thee maximum number of MCA banks is 64 (MAX_NR_BANKS), see
a0bc32b3cacf ("x86/mce: Increase maximum number of banks to 64").
However, the bank_map which contains a bitfield of which banks to
initialize is of type unsigned int and that overflows when those bit
numbers are >= 32, leading to UBSAN complaining correctly:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c:1365:38
shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
Change the bank_map to a u64 and use the proper BIT_ULL() macro when
modifying bits in there.
[ bp: Rewrite commit message. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soundwire: qcom: fix storing port config out-of-bounds
The 'qcom_swrm_ctrl->pconfig' has size of QCOM_SDW_MAX_PORTS (14),
however we index it starting from 1, not 0, to match real port numbers.
This can lead to writing port config past 'pconfig' bounds and
overwriting next member of 'qcom_swrm_ctrl' struct. Reported also by
smatch:
drivers/soundwire/qcom.c:1269 qcom_swrm_get_port_config() error: buffer overflow 'ctrl->pconfig' 14 <= 14 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmvnic: Do not reset dql stats on NON_FATAL err
All ibmvnic resets, make a call to netdev_tx_reset_queue() when
re-opening the device. netdev_tx_reset_queue() resets the num_queued
and num_completed byte counters. These stats are used in Byte Queue
Limit (BQL) algorithms. The difference between these two stats tracks
the number of bytes currently sitting on the physical NIC. ibmvnic
increases the number of queued bytes though calls to
netdev_tx_sent_queue() in the drivers xmit function. When, VIOS reports
that it is done transmitting bytes, the ibmvnic device increases the
number of completed bytes through calls to netdev_tx_completed_queue().
It is important to note that the driver batches its transmit calls and
num_queued is increased every time that an skb is added to the next
batch, not necessarily when the batch is sent to VIOS for transmission.
Unlike other reset types, a NON FATAL reset will not flush the sub crq
tx buffers. Therefore, it is possible for the batched skb array to be
partially full. So if there is call to netdev_tx_reset_queue() when
re-opening the device, the value of num_queued (0) would not account
for the skb's that are currently batched. Eventually, when the batch
is sent to VIOS, the call to netdev_tx_completed_queue() would increase
num_completed to a value greater than the num_queued. This causes a
BUG_ON crash:
ibmvnic 30000002: Firmware reports error, cause: adapter problem.
Starting recovery...
ibmvnic 30000002: tx error 600
ibmvnic 30000002: tx error 600
ibmvnic 30000002: tx error 600
ibmvnic 30000002: tx error 600
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:27!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5
[....]
NIP dql_completed+0x28/0x1c0
LR ibmvnic_complete_tx.isra.0+0x23c/0x420 [ibmvnic]
Call Trace:
ibmvnic_complete_tx.isra.0+0x3f8/0x420 [ibmvnic] (unreliable)
ibmvnic_interrupt_tx+0x40/0x70 [ibmvnic]
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x98/0x270
---[ end trace ]---
Therefore, do not reset the dql stats when performing a NON_FATAL reset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hsr: Fix uninit-value access in fill_frame_info()
Syzbot reports the following uninit-value access problem.
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:601 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hsr_forward_skb+0x9bd/0x30f0 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:616
fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:601 [inline]
hsr_forward_skb+0x9bd/0x30f0 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:616
hsr_dev_xmit+0x192/0x330 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:223
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4889 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3544 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3560
__dev_queue_xmit+0x34d0/0x52a0 net/core/dev.c:4340
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3082 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x8b1d/0x9f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:753 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x781/0xa30 net/socket.c:2176
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2188 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2184 [inline]
__ia32_sys_sendto+0x11f/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2184
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:112 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xa2/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:178
do_fast_syscall_32+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:203
do_SYSENTER_32+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/common.c:246
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x70/0x82
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x12f/0xb70 mm/slab.h:767
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x577/0xa80 mm/slub.c:3523
kmalloc_reserve+0x148/0x470 net/core/skbuff.c:559
__alloc_skb+0x318/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:644
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbd0 net/core/skbuff.c:6299
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa80/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2794
packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2936 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3030 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x70e8/0x9f30 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:753 [inline]
__sys_sendto+0x781/0xa30 net/socket.c:2176
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2188 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2184 [inline]
__ia32_sys_sendto+0x11f/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2184
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:112 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xa2/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:178
do_fast_syscall_32+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:203
do_SYSENTER_32+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/common.c:246
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x70/0x82
It is because VLAN not yet supported in hsr driver. Return error
when protocol is ETH_P_8021Q in fill_frame_info() now to fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: multitouch: Correct devm device reference for hidinput input_dev name
Reference the HID device rather than the input device for the devm
allocation of the input_dev name. Referencing the input_dev would lead to a
use-after-free when the input_dev was unregistered and subsequently fires a
uevent that depends on the name. At the point of firing the uevent, the
name would be freed by devres management.
Use devm_kasprintf to simplify the logic for allocating memory and
formatting the input_dev name string. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: Fix a refcount bug in qrtr_recvmsg()
Syzbot reported a bug as following:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
...
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:25
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:199 [inline]
__refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:250 [inline]
refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:267 [inline]
kref_get include/linux/kref.h:45 [inline]
qrtr_node_acquire net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:202 [inline]
qrtr_node_lookup net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:398 [inline]
qrtr_send_resume_tx net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:1003 [inline]
qrtr_recvmsg+0x85f/0x990 net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:1070
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1017 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:1038
qrtr_ns_worker+0x170/0x1700 net/qrtr/ns.c:688
process_one_work+0x991/0x15c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2390
worker_thread+0x669/0x1090 kernel/workqueue.c:2537
It occurs in the concurrent scenario of qrtr_recvmsg() and
qrtr_endpoint_unregister() as following:
cpu0 cpu1
qrtr_recvmsg qrtr_endpoint_unregister
qrtr_send_resume_tx qrtr_node_release
qrtr_node_lookup mutex_lock(&qrtr_node_lock)
spin_lock_irqsave(&qrtr_nodes_lock, ) refcount_dec_and_test(&node->ref) [node->ref == 0]
radix_tree_lookup [node != NULL] __qrtr_node_release
qrtr_node_acquire spin_lock_irqsave(&qrtr_nodes_lock, )
kref_get(&node->ref) [WARNING] ...
mutex_unlock(&qrtr_node_lock)
Use qrtr_node_lock to protect qrtr_node_lookup() implementation, this
is actually improving the protection of node reference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix sysfs interface lifetime
The current nilfs2 sysfs support has issues with the timing of creation
and deletion of sysfs entries, potentially leading to null pointer
dereferences, use-after-free, and lockdep warnings.
Some of the sysfs attributes for nilfs2 per-filesystem instance refer to
metadata file "cpfile", "sufile", or "dat", but
nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group that creates those attributes is executed
before the inodes for these metadata files are loaded, and
nilfs_sysfs_delete_device_group which deletes these sysfs entries is
called after releasing their metadata file inodes.
Therefore, access to some of these sysfs attributes may occur outside of
the lifetime of these metadata files, resulting in inode NULL pointer
dereferences or use-after-free.
In addition, the call to nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group() is made during
the locking period of the semaphore "ns_sem" of nilfs object, so the
shrinker call caused by the memory allocation for the sysfs entries, may
derive lock dependencies "ns_sem" -> (shrinker) -> "locks acquired in
nilfs_evict_inode()".
Since nilfs2 may acquire "ns_sem" deep in the call stack holding other
locks via its error handler __nilfs_error(), this causes lockdep to report
circular locking. This is a false positive and no circular locking
actually occurs as no inodes exist yet when
nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group() is called. Fortunately, the lockdep
warnings can be resolved by simply moving the call to
nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group() out of "ns_sem".
This fixes these sysfs issues by revising where the device's sysfs
interface is created/deleted and keeping its lifetime within the lifetime
of the metadata files above. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firewire: net: fix use after free in fwnet_finish_incoming_packet()
The netif_rx() function frees the skb so we can't dereference it to
save the skb->len. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ses: Handle enclosure with just a primary component gracefully
This reverts commit 3fe97ff3d949 ("scsi: ses: Don't attach if enclosure
has no components") and introduces proper handling of case where there are
no detected secondary components, but primary component (enumerated in
num_enclosures) does exist. That fix was originally proposed by Ding Hui
<dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>.
Completely ignoring devices that have one primary enclosure and no
secondary one results in ses_intf_add() bailing completely
scsi 2:0:0:254: enclosure has no enumerated components
scsi 2:0:0:254: Failed to bind enclosure -12ven in valid configurations such
even on valid configurations with 1 primary and 0 secondary enclosures as
below:
# sg_ses /dev/sg0
3PARdata SES 3321
Supported diagnostic pages:
Supported Diagnostic Pages [sdp] [0x0]
Configuration (SES) [cf] [0x1]
Short Enclosure Status (SES) [ses] [0x8]
# sg_ses -p cf /dev/sg0
3PARdata SES 3321
Configuration diagnostic page:
number of secondary subenclosures: 0
generation code: 0x0
enclosure descriptor list
Subenclosure identifier: 0 [primary]
relative ES process id: 0, number of ES processes: 1
number of type descriptor headers: 1
enclosure logical identifier (hex): 20000002ac02068d
enclosure vendor: 3PARdata product: VV rev: 3321
type descriptor header and text list
Element type: Unspecified, subenclosure id: 0
number of possible elements: 1
The changelog for the original fix follows
=====
We can get a crash when disconnecting the iSCSI session,
the call trace like this:
[ffff00002a00fb70] kfree at ffff00000830e224
[ffff00002a00fba0] ses_intf_remove at ffff000001f200e4
[ffff00002a00fbd0] device_del at ffff0000086b6a98
[ffff00002a00fc50] device_unregister at ffff0000086b6d58
[ffff00002a00fc70] __scsi_remove_device at ffff00000870608c
[ffff00002a00fca0] scsi_remove_device at ffff000008706134
[ffff00002a00fcc0] __scsi_remove_target at ffff0000087062e4
[ffff00002a00fd10] scsi_remove_target at ffff0000087064c0
[ffff00002a00fd70] __iscsi_unbind_session at ffff000001c872c4
[ffff00002a00fdb0] process_one_work at ffff00000810f35c
[ffff00002a00fe00] worker_thread at ffff00000810f648
[ffff00002a00fe70] kthread at ffff000008116e98
In ses_intf_add, components count could be 0, and kcalloc 0 size scomp,
but not saved in edev->component[i].scratch
In this situation, edev->component[0].scratch is an invalid pointer,
when kfree it in ses_intf_remove_enclosure, a crash like above would happen
The call trace also could be other random cases when kfree cannot catch
the invalid pointer
We should not use edev->component[] array when the components count is 0
We also need check index when use edev->component[] array in
ses_enclosure_data_process
===== |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: don't check PageError in __extent_writepage
__extent_writepage currenly sets PageError whenever any error happens,
and the also checks for PageError to decide if to call error handling.
This leads to very unclear responsibility for cleaning up on errors.
In the VM and generic writeback helpers the basic idea is that once
I/O is fired off all error handling responsibility is delegated to the
end I/O handler. But if that end I/O handler sets the PageError bit,
and the submitter checks it, the bit could in some cases leak into the
submission context for fast enough I/O.
Fix this by simply not checking PageError and just using the local
ret variable to check for submission errors. This also fundamentally
solves the long problem documented in a comment in __extent_writepage
by never leaking the error bit into the submission context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix NULL pointer dereference in smb2_get_info_filesystem()
If share is , share->path is NULL and it cause NULL pointer
dereference issue. |
