| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix exchange-range reflink flag clearing issue with INO1_WRITTEN
When exchanging two full-file ranges, xmi_can_exchange_reflink_flags()
can move the reflink inode flag from the file that currently has it to
the other file, as long as exactly one side is marked. This assumes
that the file contents, and therefore all shared extents, are exchanged.
That assumption is not true when XFS_EXCHMAPS_INO1_WRITTEN is set.
xfs_exchmaps_can_skip_mapping() can skip hole and unwritten mappings
from file1, so an exchange can complete without moving every mapping
that the earlier flag-swap decision accounted for. In that case the
post-operation cleanup can clear the reflink flag from an inode that
still owns shared written extents. Later writes then take the
non-reflink write path and may update blocks that should still have
been protected by CoW, which shows up as data corruption between
reflink-related files.
Fix this by disabling the reflink flag exchange whenever
XFS_EXCHMAPS_INO1_WRITTEN is requested. The contents exchange can still
proceed; the conservative outcome is that both inodes keep the reflink
flag. The regular reflink flag cleanup path can drop the extra flag
later once the inode no longer has shared extents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: avoid fs reclaim while using current->journal_info
handle_reply() stores a `ceph_mds_request` pointer in
`current->journal_info` while filling the inode and dentry cache from
an MDS reply.
An allocation in this section can enter direct reclaim and prune
dentries from another filesystem. If this dirties an ext4 inode, ext4
starts a JBD2 transaction. JBD2 interprets the Ceph request in
`current->journal_info` as a journal handle and dereferences the
request's `r_tid` as `h_transaction`, causing a kernel crash, e.g.:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000000077b4818
[...]
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 2699135 Comm: kworker/6:3 Tainted: G W 6.18.38-i3 #1113 NONE
[...]
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn
pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : jbd2__journal_start+0x2c/0x208
lr : __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x100/0x178
[...]
Call trace:
jbd2__journal_start+0x2c/0x208 (P)
__ext4_journal_start_sb+0x100/0x178
ext4_dirty_inode+0x3c/0x90
__mark_inode_dirty+0x58/0x400
iput.part.0+0x2b0/0x370
iput+0x18/0x30
dentry_unlink_inode+0xc0/0x158
__dentry_kill+0x80/0x250
shrink_dentry_list+0x90/0x130
prune_dcache_sb+0x60/0x98
super_cache_scan+0xe8/0x190
do_shrink_slab+0x174/0x388
shrink_slab+0xd8/0x4c0
shrink_node+0x31c/0x908
do_try_to_free_pages+0xd0/0x508
try_to_free_pages+0x11c/0x238
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x4d0/0xdd0
__folio_alloc_noprof+0x18/0x70
__filemap_get_folio+0x248/0x440
ceph_readdir_prepopulate+0x570/0x9e8
mds_dispatch+0x1424/0x1ba0
ceph_con_process_message+0x74/0xa0
ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x3a0/0x1510
ceph_con_workfn+0x260/0x460
Enter a scoped NOFS allocation context and leave it after clearing
`journal_info`. This prevents filesystem reclaim from recursing into
another filesystem while the field contains Ceph-private data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted
A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no
longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the
capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`).
One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another
client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD`
from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`. If
the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS
after `cap->mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only
non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read
caps.
In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need <= mds_wanted` and
returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`. If the cap
update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS
after `cap->mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the
waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to
wake it up.
The ordering issue is that `cap->mds_wanted` is updated in
__prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually
queued for send. That makes one field serve two different meanings at
once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS
already knows it wants.
A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap
update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS.
However, simply moving the `cap->mds_wanted assignment` later would
not be sufficient: queueing the message in the messenger does not
guarantee that the MDS processed that specific wanted set, and
reconnect or message loss can still invalidate that assumption.
Fixing that properly would require a larger rework of the cap state
machine.
To allow simpler backports to stable kernels, this patch implements a
simpler workaround:
- stop waiting forever in __ceph_get_caps(); after a bounded wait,
fall back to the renew path
- make ceph_renew_caps() issue a synchronous `OPEN` request whenever
the inode still does not actually hold the wanted caps, instead of
only calling ceph_check_caps()
The extra issued-vs-wanted check in ceph_renew_caps() is necessary
because the previous test only checked whether the inode still had any
real caps at all. That is not enough after revocation: the client can
still hold something like `pLs` and yet be missing `FILE_RD`
completely. In that case, falling back to ceph_check_caps() is not
sufficient, because it still trusts `cap->mds_wanted` and may resend
nothing. By requiring `(issued & wanted) == wanted` before taking the
asynchronous path, the code only uses ceph_check_caps() when the
`wanted caps` are already actually issued. Otherwise, it sends the
synchronous `OPEN` renew.
This preserves the existing asynchronous fast path when the wanted
caps are already issued, avoids changing cap-state semantics, and
fixes the hang by guaranteeing that a stalled waiter eventually
retries through a path that does not rely on the stale `mds_wanted`
state.
[ idryomov: move CEPH_GET_CAPS_WAIT_TIMEOUT from libceph.h to
mds_client.h, formatting ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: tas2562: Validate values for volume writes
tas2562_volume_control_put() does not do any validation of the control
value written by userspace, it uses it to look up a value in a fixed
size array which can easily be overflowed and then writes whatever value
it gets back to the device. Add validation that we are loading a value
we have in the array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: spacemit: k3: set hdma clock as critical
HDMA clock is responsible for the internal TCM access path of X100 RISC-V
core, so set the clock flag as critical to prevent it from being shut off,
otherwise the Linux system will hang, for example in the case of a vector
instruction access generates a page fault. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: tegra - fix rctx->cryptlen calculation in tegra_gcm_do_one_req()
Perform rctx->cryptlen calculation in tegra_gcm_do_one_req() the same way
it is done in tegra_ccm_crypt_init(). The current formulae may lead to a
crash if a caller does not call tegra_gcm_setauthsize() and so ctx->authsize
remains zero. Then a decrypt operation with incorrect rctx->cryptlen will
lead to a write beyound rctx->dst_sg buffer.
As a follow-up cleanup delete struct tegra_aead_ctx->authsize field since
it appears to be completely unused. Also simplify tegra_ccm_setauthsize()
and tegra_gcm_setauthsize() functions respectively. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Unlink scc_entry in unix_del_edge().
Kyle Zeng reported that GC could free a dead SCC partially.
The scenario is as follows:
1) Create two SCCs:
X -. A <-> B
^--'
2) Run the following concurrently:
2-1) send() sk-B to sk-B from sk-X
2-2) close() both A and B
At 2-1), there is a small window where unix_add_edges()
publishes a new edge (B <-> B) to GC but its skb is not queued
by skb_queue_tail().
If 2-2) completes before skb_queue_tail() and GC is triggered,
it judges A <-> B as dead, but B is not freed because GC cannot
collect the not-yet-queued skb holding the B <-> B edge.
X -. A <-> B -. This edge is visible
^--' ^..' but skb is not
This itself is not a problem since the next GC run will judge
B as dead as well and free it finally.
X -. A <.> B -.
^--' ^--'
However, X's SCC forces the next GC to call unix_walk_scc_fast(),
and it iterates over A through B's scc_entry.
Let's unlink scc_entry before freeing the vertex in unix_del_edge(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: fix NULL dereference when killing missing key
ovpn_crypto_kill_key assumes both crypto slots are populated and
dereferences each slot before checking it. That is not guaranteed: a
peer can have only one installed key, and the kill path may be asked to
remove a key that is not present.
Read each slot once while holding the crypto state lock, check for NULL
before looking at key_id, and only replace the slot that actually
matches. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: finish crypto callback cleanup before peer release
Crypto completion callbacks hold both key-slot and peer references. The
peer reference pins the netdev, and dropping the last peer reference can
let netdev unregistration and module removal make progress.
Do not release that peer reference before the callback has finished its
own cleanup. If ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put runs after ovpn_peer_put, it can
schedule an RCU callback backed by module text after ovpn_cleanup
rcu_barrier has already run. The TX error path also freed the remaining
skb after ovpn_peer_put, leaving callback cleanup outside the peer/netdev
lifetime window.
Release the key slot and free any remaining skb first, then drop the peer
reference as the last callback action. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Reject exited events as group leaders
perf_event_remove_on_exec() sets remove-on-exec events to the EXIT state
and detaches their group relationships. The event's file descriptor can
remain open, however, and perf_event_open() currently accepts that event
as a group leader because its early validation rejects only REVOKED and
DEAD events.
A new sibling can consequently be linked to the detached leader. When
the leader is closed, perf_group_detach() observes that its
PERF_ATTACH_GROUP bit is already clear and skips the new sibling. The
sibling then retains a group_leader pointer to the freed event.
Reject group leaders in the EXIT state. Perform the check while holding
the shared context mutex so that an exec in the target task cannot detach
the leader between validation and group attachment.
[peterz: make the earlier test fully consistent] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate cookie AUTH state before use
When cookie authentication is disabled, COOKIE_ECHO restores fixed-size
AUTH fields directly from peer-controlled cookie bytes. A forged RANDOM
length, HMAC list, or CHUNKS list can then reach association consumers
with lengths or identifiers that were never validated against the local
backing arrays.
A forged RANDOM length can cause out-of-bounds reads during key-vector
construction. A forged HMAC identifier also caused a 32-byte write past
a zero-length AUTH chunk, providing a primitive for a local privilege
escalation chain.
Validate the cookie's RANDOM, HMACS, and CHUNKS parameters at the cookie
trust boundary before copying them into the association. Reject invalid
types, malformed lengths, unsupported HMAC identifiers, HMAC lists
without SHA1, and forbidden chunk ids. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: lib: Fix ZBB strnlen reading past count boundary
The ZBB-optimized strnlen loop loads one word ahead before checking the
aligned boundary:
REG_L t1, SZREG(t0) // load next word
addi t0, t0, SZREG // advance
orc.b t1, t1
bgeu t0, t4, 4f // boundary check AFTER load
where t4 = (s + count) & -SZREG. When s is aligned and count is a
multiple of SZREG, t4 equals s + count and the loop loads a full word
starting at exactly s + count. If s + count falls on a page boundary
with the next page unmapped, this faults.
Fix by computing the aligned boundary from the last valid byte
(s + count - 1) instead of s + count. This makes the loop stop at the
word containing the last valid byte rather than potentially loading the
word after it. The count == 0 case is already handled by the beqz
early exit.
Also add a pre-loop guard (bgeu t0, t4) for the case where all valid
bytes fit within the first word. With the adjusted boundary, t4 can
equal t0, and entering the loop with stale register state from the
first-word processing would produce incorrect results.
The final minu clamp ensures the result is still correct when the last
loaded word extends past s + count - 1 within the same aligned word. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: defer key slot crypto freeing to workqueue
Key slots are released through a kref and the existing release path
frees the AEAD transforms from an RCU callback. That is not safe for all
crypto implementations: crypto_free_aead can sleep, for example when an
async or hardware implementation has teardown work to complete.
Use queue_rcu_work for key-slot release. This keeps the RCU grace period
needed by lockless key-slot readers, but runs the actual crypto teardown
from workqueue context where sleeping is allowed. Once the rcu_work
callback runs, pre-existing RCU readers are gone, and the final kref put
already proves that no transform user remains, so the worker can release
the AEAD transforms and free the slot directly.
The previous patch drains ovpn_wq during module exit, so queued key-slot
teardown work cannot outlive module text. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ipset: fix refcount race between list:set GC and swap
__ip_set_put_byindex() resolved the index to a set pointer under RCU,
then took ip_set_ref_lock in __ip_set_put() to decrement set->ref.
ip_set_swap() holds that same lock while swapping both the ip_set_list
slots and the two sets' ref counters, so it can interleave between the
dereference and the lock acquisition, leaving the caller to decrement a
set whose reference already moved to the other index and hit
BUG_ON(set->ref == 0). list_set_gc() reaches this from timer softirq,
which the nfnl mutex does not serialize against swap: an expiring
list:set member calls list_set_del() -> ip_set_put_byindex() while
IPSET_CMD_SWAP runs on the referenced sets.
Resolve the index and decrement under ip_set_ref_lock, as ip_set_swap()
already does, keeping the refcount tied to the index rather than to a
stale set pointer.
kernel BUG at net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:685!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ip_set_put_byindex (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:870)
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
list_set_del (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c:159)
set_cleanup_entries (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c:181)
list_set_gc (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c:578)
call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1748)
__run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1799 kernel/time/timer.c:2374)
run_timer_softirq (kernel/time/timer.c:2405)
</IRQ>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: revalidate ihl to prevent out-of-bounds access
While the outer IP header is already pulled into the skb head,
we must be careful and revalidate the embedded headers after
reading them from the skb frags to prevent out-of-bounds
access.
One such place reported by Sashiko is ip_vs_nat_icmp() where
local process can change the ihl field and after
skb_ensure_writable() we can see larger value which is a
problem for the ip_send_check(cih) calls.
Add check to drop the packet if the ihl field is changed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: publish GC-visible tuple last
nf_flow_table_iterate() only treats original-direction tuple nodes as
owning entries. Publishing the original node first lets GC observe and
free a flow while flow_offload_add() is still inserting the reply node.
Publish the reply node first and the original node last so GC never
sees a partially installed flow.
KASAN can trigger slab-use-after-free read and write reports in the
flowtable/rhashtable path (rht_deferred_worker, jhash, flow_offload_del,
flow_offload_lookup, etc.). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: bnxt: avoid deadlock when canceling IRQ affinity notifier
Unregistering IRQ affinity notifiers waits for the callback synchronously.
bnxt takes the netdev instance lock in the notifier (to restart the queue)
and cancels the work under the same lock. This may obviously deadlock.
Move the restart to the async service task. The queue restart isn't
super time sensitive. Store the new TPH tag, schedule the task.
Safely canceling the service task is already ironed out.
In bnxt_request_irq() the order of registering notifier, affinity and
initial TPH programming has to be inverted. I think it was racy
previously since user may trigger an update as soon as notifier
is installed.
There's a small known gap - if pcie_tph_get_cpu_st() fails at init
and the target tag is 0 we may miss programming the entry.
This does not seem worth fixing, the code has skip-on-failure
all over the place, anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
veth: fix queue index used to wake the peer txq in veth_poll
veth_poll() derives the index of the peer TX queue to wake from
rq->xdp_rxq.queue_index. That field is only initialized by
xdp_rxq_info_reg() in veth_enable_xdp_range(), which runs only when an
XDP program is attached. On the plain GRO/NAPI path
(veth_napi_enable_range()) xdp_rxq_info_reg() is never called, so
queue_index stays 0 for every queue, as priv->rq is zero-allocated.
So in a multi-queue setup with GRO enabled and no XDP program attached,
every NAPI instance looks at the peer's TX queue 0. If veth_xmit() stops
peer TX queue 1 because the ptr_ring is full (NETDEV_TX_BUSY), nothing
ever wakes it again: the poller draining queue 1 wakes queue 0 instead.
veth implements no ndo_tx_timeout, so the netdev watchdog does not kick
in either, and the queue stays stopped indefinitely.
Derive the index from the position of the rq within priv->rq instead,
which is correct regardless of whether XDP was ever enabled.
Scripts to reproduce the stall are available at
https://github.com/netoptimizer/veth-backpressure-performance-testing |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ngbe: fix NULL pointer dereference in non-MSI-X interrupt enabling
In non-MSI-X mode (such as legacy INTx or single MSI), wx->msix_entry is
not allocated or initialized. Calling NGBE_INTR_MISC(wx) dereferences
wx->msix_entry->entry, leading to a NULL pointer dereference crash.
This issue was introduced by fixing the IRQ vector when the number of
VFs is 7. Fix the issue by explicitly checking `pdev->msix_enabled` to
determine the correct vector index.
Additionally, as a side fix, set the interrupt mask to BIT(0) for the
non-MSI-X fallback. In MSI/INTx mode, the MISC and queue interrupts
share vector 0, and the WX_PX_MISC_IVAR register is only valid in the
MSI-X case. Thus, BIT(0) is the correct mask for the miscellaneous cause
when MSI-X is disabled. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority because it is Unused |
