| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Keep dynamic inner array lookups nullable
An ARRAY_OF_MAPS can use an array created with BPF_F_INNER_MAP as its
inner map template. A concrete inner array with a different max_entries
value can then replace the template.
After a successful outer map lookup, the verifier represents the
resulting map pointer using the inner map template. Const-key lookup
nullness elision consequently uses the template max_entries even though
the runtime helper uses the concrete inner map max_entries.
Do not elide lookup result nullness for maps marked with BPF_F_INNER_MAP,
because the template max_entries does not prove that the key is in bounds
for the concrete runtime map. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix memory leak in xfs_dqinode_metadir_create()
If xfs_metadir_create() fails in xfs_dqinode_metadir_create(), the current
code returns directly, leaking the allocated update and transaction state.
If the subsequent commit fails, the caller-owned inode reference is left
behind.
Fix this memory leak by routing the create failure path through
xfs_metadir_cancel(). For both create and commit failures, finish and
release any inode returned to the caller, mirroring the unwind pattern in
xfs_metadir_mkdir().
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1.1.
An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. Runtime validation
used kprobe fault injection during `mount -o uquota` on a metadir XFS
image. Injecting xfs_metadir_create() reproduced the old active-update path
that left mount stuck later in mount setup; after this change, the same
injection reported cancel_hits=1 and irele_hits=1. Injecting
xfs_metadir_commit() exercised the old inode-reference leak path; after
this change, it reported irele_hits=1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mtk-jpeg: cancel workqueue on release for supported platforms only
Since a recent fix the mtk_jpeg_release function cancels any pending
or running work present in the driver workqueue using
cancel_work_sync function.
Currently, only the multicore based variants use this workqueue and they
have the jpeg_worker platform data field initialized with a workqueue
callback function. For the others, this field value remain NULL by
default.
The cancel_work_sync function is unconditionally called in
mtk_jpeg_release function, even for the variants that do not use the
workqueue. This call generates a WARN_ON print in __flush_work because
the workqueue callback function presence check fails in __flush_work
function (used by cancel_work_sync).
So, to avoid these warnings, call cancel_work_sync only if a workqueue
callback is defined in platform data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slab: do not limit zeroing to orig_size when only red zoning is enabled
When init (zeroing) on allocation is requested, for kmalloc() we
generally have to zero the full object size even if a smaller size is
requested, in order to provide krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO guarantees.
But if we track the requested size, krealloc() uses that information to
do the right thing, so we can zero only the requested size. With red
zoning also enabled, any extra size became part of the red zone, so it
must not be zeroed and thus we must zero only the requested size.
However the current check is imprecise, and will trigger also when only
SLAB_RED_ZONE is enabled without SLAB_STORE_USER (which enables tracking
the requested size). This means enabling red zoning alone can compromise
krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO contract.
Fix this by using slub_debug_orig_size() instead, which is the exact
check for whether the requested size is tracked. We don't need to care
if red zoning is also enabled or not. Also update and expand the
comment accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_open() replay
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its
response buffer. If SMB2_open_init() fails before the next send, cleanup
retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_flush() replay
SMB2_flush() keeps its response buffer bookkeeping across replay
attempts. If a replayable flush response is received and the retry then
fails before cifs_send_recv() stores a replacement response, flush_exit
will free the stale response pointer a second time.
Reinitialize resp_buftype and rsp_iov at the top of the replay loop so
cleanup only acts on response state produced by the current attempt.
This fixes a double-free without changing replay handling for successful
requests. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix query_info() replay double-free
A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its
response buffer. If SMB2_query_info_init() fails before the next send,
cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.
Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: fix chown/chgrp with SMB3 POSIX Extensions
Ownership (chown) and group (chgrp) modifications were being ignored when
mounting with SMB3 POSIX Extensions unless CIFS_MOUNT_CIFS_ACL or
CIFS_MOUNT_MODE_FROM_SID were also explicitly set.
Fix this by checking for posix_extensions in cifs_setattr_nounix() when
updating UID and GID, ensuring that id_mode_to_cifs_acl() is called to map
and set the ownership/group information on the server. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: add a WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER check to SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY
commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a
permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE") added a fp->daccess gate to
fsctl_set_sparse and noted that "similar handle-level checks exist in other
functions but are missing here." The SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY arm is one of
the missing ones, and the most security-relevant: smb2_set_info_sec() calls
set_info_sec() with no per-handle access check.
set_info_sec() (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c) re-permissions the file: it
rewrites owner/group/mode via notify_change(), rewrites the POSIX ACL via
set_posix_acl(), and on KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_ACL_XATTR shares removes and
rewrites the Windows security descriptor via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr().
Every other persistent-mutation arm of the sibling handler
smb2_set_info_file() checks fp->daccess first (FILE_WRITE_DATA /
FILE_DELETE / FILE_WRITE_EA / FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES); the SECURITY arm —
which mutates the access control itself — is the only one with no gate.
A client can therefore open a handle with FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES only (no
FILE_WRITE_DAC / FILE_WRITE_OWNER) and use SMB2_SET_INFO with InfoType
SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY to rewrite the file's DACL and owner, granting itself
access the handle's daccess never carried. Unlike the FSCTL data arms this
is a metadata/xattr operation, so there is no FMODE_WRITE VFS backstop —
the missing fp->daccess check is the entire gate.
Setting a security descriptor is the WRITE_DAC / WRITE_OWNER operation, so
require at least one of those on the handle before re-permissioning the
file. -EACCES is mapped to STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED by smb2_set_info(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: fix UAF in bt_accept_dequeue()
bt_accept_get() takes a temporary reference before dropping the accept
queue lock. bt_accept_dequeue() currently drops that reference before
bt_accept_unlink(), leaving only the queue reference.
bt_accept_unlink() drops the queue reference. The subsequent
sock_hold() therefore accesses freed memory if it was the final
reference, as observed by KASAN during listening L2CAP socket cleanup.
Retain the temporary queue-walk reference through unlink and hand it to
the caller on success. Drop it explicitly on the closed and
not-yet-connected paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: handle unreadable frags
sashiko reports:
When an skb with unreadable fragments (such as from devmem TCP, where
skb_frags_readable(skb) returns false) is processed by the u32 module,
skb_copy_bits() will safely return a negative error code [..]
xt_u32: bail out with hotdrop in this case.
gather_frags: return -1, just as if we had no fragment header.
nfnetlink_queue: restrict to the linear part.
nfnetlink_log: restrict to the linear part.
v2:
- skb_zerocopy helpers don't copy readable flag, i.e. nfnetlink_queue
is broken too
xt_u32 shouldn't return true if hotdrop was set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: bound TCP reordering sysctl writes and MTU probe sizes
Reject invalid `net.ipv4.tcp_reordering` values before they reach TCP
socket state. The sysctl is stored as an `int` but copied into the
`u32` `tp->reordering` field for new sockets, so negative writes wrap
to large values.
With `tcp_mtu_probing=2`, the wrapped value can overflow the
`tcp_mtu_probe()` size calculation and drive the MTU probing path into
an out-of-bounds read. Route `tcp_reordering` writes through
`proc_dointvec_minmax()` and require it to be at least 1. Also require
`tcp_max_reordering` to be at least 1 so the configured maximum cannot
become negative either.
When registering the table for a non-init network namespace, relocate
`extra2` pointers that refer into `init_net.ipv4` so the
`tcp_reordering` upper bound follows that namespace's
`tcp_max_reordering`.
Harden `tcp_mtu_probe()` itself by computing `size_needed` as `u64`.
This keeps the send queue and window checks from being bypassed through
signed integer overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/nop: fix file reference leak with IOSQE_FIXED_FILE
NOP file-acquisition support choses between a fixed (registered) file and
a normal fget()'d file based on its own IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE flag in
sqe->nop_flags. However, a request's REQ_F_FIXED_FILE is set
independently from the generic IOSQE_FIXED_FILE sqe flag during request
init, before the issue handler runs.
If a NOP is submitted with IOSQE_FIXED_FILE set (so REQ_F_FIXED_FILE is
set) but without IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE, io_nop() takes the normal path
and grabs a real reference via io_file_get_normal(). On completion,
io_put_file() only drops the reference when REQ_F_FIXED_FILE is clear,
so the fget()'d file is never released and leaks:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88800f42c240 (size 176):
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x358/0x440
alloc_empty_file+0x57/0x180
path_openat+0x44/0x1e50
do_file_open+0x121/0x200
do_sys_openat2+0xa7/0x150
__x64_sys_openat+0x82/0xf0
Decide between fixed and normal file acquisition from REQ_F_FIXED_FILE,
the same way io_assign_file() does for every other opcode, and fold
IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE into REQ_F_FIXED_FILE at prep time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: sch: use raw_spinlock_t in the irq startup path
sch_irq_unmask() enables the GPIO IRQ and then updates the controller
state through sch_irq_mask_unmask(), which takes sch->lock with
spin_lock_irqsave(). The callback can be reached from irq_startup()
while setting up a requested IRQ. That path is not sleepable, but on
PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t becomes a sleeping lock.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually
reviewed against the current tree.
The grounded PoC kept the request_threaded_irq() -> __setup_irq() ->
irq_startup() -> sch_irq_unmask() -> sch_irq_mask_unmask() carrier and
used the original spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock) edge. Lockdep reported:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context
hardirqs last disabled at ... __setup_irq.constprop.0 ... [vuln_msv]
sch_rt_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x30 [vuln_msv]
sch_irq_mask_unmask.constprop.0+0x31/0x70 [vuln_msv]
__setup_irq.constprop.0+0xd/0x30 [vuln_msv]
Convert the SCH controller lock to raw_spinlock_t. The same lock is
also used by the GPIO direction and value callbacks, but those critical
sections only update MMIO-backed GPIO registers and do not contain
sleepable operations. Keeping this register lock non-sleeping is
therefore appropriate for the irqchip callbacks and does not change the
GPIO-side locking contract. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NTB: epf: Avoid calling pci_irq_vector() from hardirq context
ntb_epf_vec_isr() calls pci_irq_vector() in hardirq context to derive
the vector number. pci_irq_vector() calls msi_get_virq() that takes a
mutex and can therefore trigger "scheduling while atomic" splats:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u33:0/55/0x00010001
...
Call trace:
...
schedule+0x38/0x110
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x28/0x50
__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x848/0x908
__mutex_lock_slowpath+0x18/0x30
mutex_lock+0x4c/0x60
msi_domain_get_virq+0xe8/0x138
pci_irq_vector+0x2c/0x60
ntb_epf_vec_isr+0x28/0x120 [ntb_hw_epf]
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x3a8
handle_irq_event+0x48/0x100
handle_edge_irq+0x100/0x1c8
...
Cache the Linux IRQ number for vector 0 when vectors are allocated and
use it as a base in the ISR. Running the ISR in a threaded IRQ handler
would also avoid the problem, but that would be unnecessary here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: avoid calling post_write_mst_fixup() for invalid index_block
ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write() calls post_write_mst_fixup() when ntfs_ib_write()
returns an error, intending to restore the buffer after a failed write.
However, ntfs_ib_write() returns an error immediately if
pre_write_mst_fixup() validation fails. The caller,
ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write(), interprets any error as a write failure
requiring rollback. It does not differentiate between I/O errors and
validation failures, and calls post_write_mst_fixup() anyway.
Since post_write_mst_fixup() assumes that the index_block contents is
correct, it doesn't perform the boundary checks, which results in
out-of-bounds memory access.
An attacker can craft a malicious NTFS image with:
- large index_block.usa_ofs offset, pointing outside the ntfs_record
- index_block.usa_count = 0, causing integer underflow
- or index_block.usa_count larger than actual number of sectors in the
ntfs_record, causing out-of-bounds access
KASAN reports describing the memory corruption:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c9018 by task p/9428
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190
print_report+0x139/0x4ad
? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500
? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0
kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0
? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0
post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0
ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220
ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080
__ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480
ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0
Write of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c91fe by task p/9428
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190
print_report+0x139/0x4ad
? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500
? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0
kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0
? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0
post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0
ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220
ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080
__ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480
ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0
==================================================================
Let's move the post_write_mst_fixup() call to ntfs_ib_write().
The ntfs_ib_write() function calls pre_write_mst_fixup() at the beginning.
If the index_block contents is invalid, pre_write_mst_fixup() fails and
ntfs_ib_write() returns early without calling post_write_mst_fixup() on
bad index_block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: validate Dirty Page Table capacity in log_replay copy_lcns
In the analysis pass of $LogFile journal replay, log_replay() copies
LCNs from each action log record into an existing Dirty Page Table
(DPT) entry without bounding the destination index. A crafted NTFS
image with DPT entry lcns_follow=1 and an action log record with
lcns_follow=2 produces a kernel slab out-of-bounds write at mount
time:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in log_replay+0x654c/0xdb60
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880095e1040 by task mount
Two attacker-controlled fields can drive j+i past the allocated
page_lcns[] array:
1. dp->lcns_follow (capacity) can be smaller than lrh->lcns_follow.
2. lrh->target_vcn may be smaller than dp->vcn, making the u64
subtraction wrap to a huge size_t.
Validate target VCN delta and per-record LCN count against the
DPT entry capacity, bail via the existing out: cleanup label with
-EINVAL.
This mirrors the bounds-check pattern added in commit b2bc7c44ed17
("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot")
and commit 0ca0485e4b2e ("fs/ntfs3: validate rec->used in
journal-replay file record check"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - fix VF2PF work teardown race in adf_disable_sriov()
The VF2PF interrupt handler queues PF-side response work that stores a
raw pointer to per-VF state (struct adf_accel_vf_info). Currently,
adf_disable_sriov() destroys per-VF mutexes and frees vf_info without
stopping new VF2PF work or waiting for in-flight workers to complete. A
concurrently scheduled or already queued worker can then dereference
freed memory.
This manifests as a use-after-free when KASAN is enabled:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0
Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000260 by task kworker/24:2/...
Workqueue: qat_pf2vf_resp_wq adf_iov_send_resp [intel_qat]
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0x119/0x140
mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0
adf_gen4_pfvf_send+0xd4/0x1f0 [intel_qat]
adf_recv_and_handle_vf2pf_msg+0x290/0x360 [intel_qat]
adf_iov_send_resp+0x8c/0xe0 [intel_qat]
process_one_work+0x6ac/0xfd0
worker_thread+0x4dd/0xd30
kthread+0x326/0x410
ret_from_fork+0x33b/0x670
Add a PF-local flag, vf2pf_disabled, that gates work queueing, worker
processing, and interrupt re-enabling during teardown. Set this flag
atomically with the hardware interrupt mask inside
adf_disable_all_vf2pf_interrupts(). After masking, synchronize the AE
cluster MSI-X interrupt and flush the PF response workqueue before
tearing down per-VF locks and state so all in-flight work completes
before vf_info is destroyed.
Introduce adf_enable_all_vf2pf_interrupts() to clear the flag and
unmask all VF2PF interrupts under the same lock when SR-IOV is
re-enabled. This ensures the software flag and hardware state transition
atomically on both the enable and disable paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()
HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into
HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct
HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air
802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can
set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into
adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info.
Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using
umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored
rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs
that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered
but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1
assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs
that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: chaoskey: Fix slab-use-after-free in chaoskey_release()
The chaoskey driver has a use-after-free bug in its release routine.
If the user closes the device file after the USB device has been
unplugged, a debugging log statement will try to access the
usb_interface structure after it has been deallocated:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888168e8a0b8 by task chaoskey_raw_re/10106
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406)
__dynamic_dev_dbg (lib/dynamic_debug.c:906)
chaoskey_release (drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c:323)
__fput (fs/file_table.c:510)
fput_close_sync (fs/file_table.c:615)
__x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1507 fs/open.c:1492 fs/open.c:1492)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
The driver's last reference to the interface structure is dropped in
the chaoskey_free() routine, so the code must not use the interface --
even in a debugging statement -- after that routine returns.
(Exception: If we know that another reference is held by someone else,
such as the device core while the disconnect routine runs, there's no
problem. Thanks to Johan Hovold for pointing this out.)
Since the bad access is part of an unimportant debugging statement,
we can fix the problem simply by removing the whole statement. |
