Export limit exceeded: 370915 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Search
Search Results (370915 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-47407 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | N/A |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource's own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL's `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace's resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role="member"` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47408 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 6.5 Medium |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The `GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` and dispatches to `ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id)`, which executes `SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id` with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47409 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 8.1 High |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47410 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 9.8 Critical |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `"dev-secret-change-me"` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != "dev"`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `"dev"`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47411 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 6.5 Medium |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can rewrite the workspace's `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object — depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47412 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 8.1 High |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47413 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 9.6 Critical |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have aprivilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`) and forwards the request body's `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47414 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 7.6 High |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. Five label endpoints — `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `DELETE .../labels/{label_id}`, `POST .../issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `DELETE .../issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `GET .../issues/{issue_id}/labels` — gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only and pass URL-supplied `label_id` and `issue_id` straight through to `LabelService` without verifying either belongs to the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47415 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 8.3 High |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The issue CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `issue_id` through `IssueService.get(issue_id)` which is a primary-key lookup with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, or delete issues that belong to a different workspace `W2`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47416 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 9.6 Critical |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 are vulnerable to vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role="member"` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member's role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller's own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47417 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 8.1 High |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The comment endpoints (`POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/comments` and `GET .../comments`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then call `CommentService.create(issue_id=issue_id, ...)` and `CommentService.list_for_issue(issue_id)` without verifying that `issue_id` belongs to `workspace_id`. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read every comment on, and post new comments to, any issue in any other workspace `W2`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47418 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 8.1 High |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47419 | 1 Mervinpraison | 1 Praisonai | 2026-07-27 | 8.3 High |
| PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an* Insecure Direct Object Reference. The agent CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `agent_id` through `AgentService.get(agent_id)` which is a primary-key lookup with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, or delete agents that belong to a different workspace `W2` by guessing or harvesting an agent UUID and calling `…/workspaces/W1/agents/<W2-agent-id>`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64877 | 1 Tenable | 1 Security Center | 2026-07-27 | 8.4 High |
| An authenticated non-admin user can exploit a SQL injection flaw in the ticketing REST API to access sensitive data stored in the appliance database. | ||||
| CVE-2026-12547 | 2 Libsoup, Redhat | 2 Libsoup, Enterprise Linux | 2026-07-27 | 3.4 Low |
| SoupAuthManager caches proxy authentication credentials without scoping them to the proxy authority (host:port). When the proxy configuration changes (e.g., via system settings or WPAD), cached Proxy-Authorization headers from the previous proxy are sent to the new proxy, leaking credentials. | ||||
| CVE-2026-12548 | 2 Libsoup, Redhat | 2 Libsoup, Enterprise Linux | 2026-07-27 | 4.2 Medium |
| A heap out-of-bounds read flaw was found in libsoup. When parsing multipart HTTP messages, an integer type mismatch between the caller and soup_headers_parse() can cause the length parameter to be incorrectly truncated, leading to a heap buffer over-read. A remote attacker could use this flaw to crash an application using libsoup or potentially disclose heap memory contents. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64878 | 1 Tenable | 1 Security Center | 2026-07-27 | 9.9 Critical |
| Unvalidated input in asset filter parameters allows shell metacharacters to escape command argument handling, resulting in remote code execution as a low-privileged OS user via the Analysis REST endpoint. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64880 | 1 Tenable | 1 Security Center | 2026-07-27 | 7.1 High |
| Unsanitized user-supplied input in report filtering parameters is concatenated directly into SQL queries without proper escaping or parameterized queries, enabling blind SQL injection and unauthorized database read access. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65055 | 1 Taiga | 1 Taiga | 2026-07-27 | 5.3 Medium |
| Taiga 6.10.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to disclose the full member roster and internal workflow configuration of any private project by supplying a project ID to the filters_data API endpoints on UserStory, Task, Issue, and Epic viewsets. Attackers can send unauthenticated GET requests to the filters_data endpoints with sequential integer project IDs to enumerate private project membership details including user IDs, full names, and gravatar hashes, bypassing the access controls that correctly restrict other project API endpoints. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47695 | 1 Tweaked | 1 Cc-tweaked | 2026-07-27 | N/A |
| CC: Tweaked is a mod for Minecraft which adds programmable computers, turtles, and more to the game. Prior to version 1.119.0, CC-Tweaked's HTTP API (`http.request`, `http.websocket`) blocks requests to private network ranges to prevent server-side request forgery (SSRF). This protection can be bypassed on IPv6-capable servers using NAT64 well-known prefix addresses (`64:ff9b::/96`). An attacker who can execute Lua code can reach any internal IPv4 service that the filter is intended to block, by addressing it as `http://[64:ff9b::<ipv4-as-hex>]/` instead of its direct IPv4 address. This affects any CC-Tweaked deployment on a network with NAT64 routing — a configuration that is standard on AWS, GCP, and other cloud platforms when using IPv6-only subnets. Version 1.119.0 fixes the issue. | ||||