| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: bq25890: Fix external_power_changed race
bq25890_charger_external_power_changed() dereferences bq->charger,
which gets sets in bq25890_power_supply_init() like this:
bq->charger = devm_power_supply_register(bq->dev, &bq->desc, &psy_cfg);
As soon as devm_power_supply_register() has called device_add()
the external_power_changed callback can get called. So there is a window
where bq25890_charger_external_power_changed() may get called while
bq->charger has not been set yet leading to a NULL pointer dereference.
This race hits during boot sometimes on a Lenovo Yoga Book 1 yb1-x90f
when the cht_wcove_pwrsrc (extcon) power_supply is done with detecting
the connected charger-type which happens to exactly hit the small window:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
<snip>
RIP: 0010:__power_supply_is_supplied_by+0xb/0xb0
<snip>
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__power_supply_get_supplier_property+0x19/0x50
class_for_each_device+0xb1/0xe0
power_supply_get_property_from_supplier+0x2e/0x50
bq25890_charger_external_power_changed+0x38/0x1b0 [bq25890_charger]
__power_supply_changed_work+0x30/0x40
class_for_each_device+0xb1/0xe0
power_supply_changed_work+0x5f/0xe0
<snip>
Fixing this is easy. The external_power_changed callback gets passed
the power_supply which will eventually get stored in bq->charger,
so bq25890_charger_external_power_changed() can simply directly use
the passed in psy argument which is always valid. |
| In JetBrains Hub before 2025.3.104432 information disclosure was possible via the Users API |
| In JetBrains Hub before 2025.3.104432 a race condition allowed bypass of the Agent-user limit |
| A flaw was found in the subsequent get_user_pages_fast in the Linux kernel’s interface for symmetric key cipher algorithms in the skcipher_recvmsg of crypto/algif_skcipher.c function. This flaw allows a local user to crash the system. |
| A race condition occurred between the functions lmLogClose and txEnd in JFS, in the Linux Kernel, executed in different threads. This flaw allows a local attacker with normal user privileges to crash the system or leak internal kernel information. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmalloc: fix data race in show_numa_info()
The following data-race was found in show_numa_info():
==================================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vmalloc_info_show / vmalloc_info_show
read to 0xffff88800971fe30 of 4 bytes by task 8289 on cpu 0:
show_numa_info mm/vmalloc.c:4936 [inline]
vmalloc_info_show+0x5a8/0x7e0 mm/vmalloc.c:5016
seq_read_iter+0x373/0xb40 fs/seq_file.c:230
proc_reg_read_iter+0x11e/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:299
....
write to 0xffff88800971fe30 of 4 bytes by task 8287 on cpu 1:
show_numa_info mm/vmalloc.c:4934 [inline]
vmalloc_info_show+0x38f/0x7e0 mm/vmalloc.c:5016
seq_read_iter+0x373/0xb40 fs/seq_file.c:230
proc_reg_read_iter+0x11e/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:299
....
value changed: 0x0000008f -> 0x00000000
==================================================================
According to this report,there is a read/write data-race because
m->private is accessible to multiple CPUs. To fix this, instead of
allocating the heap in proc_vmalloc_init() and passing the heap address to
m->private, vmalloc_info_show() should allocate the heap. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix race between cache write completion and ALL_QUEUED being set
When netfslib is issuing subrequests, the subrequests start processing
immediately and may complete before we reach the end of the issuing
function. At the end of the issuing function we set NETFS_RREQ_ALL_QUEUED
to indicate to the collector that we aren't going to issue any more subreqs
and that it can do the final notifications and cleanup.
Now, this isn't a problem if the request is synchronous
(NETFS_RREQ_OFFLOAD_COLLECTION is unset) as the result collection will be
done in-thread and we're guaranteed an opportunity to run the collector.
However, if the request is asynchronous, collection is primarily triggered
by the termination of subrequests queuing it on a workqueue. Now, a race
can occur here if the app thread sets ALL_QUEUED after the last subrequest
terminates.
This can happen most easily with the copy2cache code (as used by Ceph)
where, in the collection routine of a read request, an asynchronous write
request is spawned to copy data to the cache. Folios are added to the
write request as they're unlocked, but there may be a delay before
ALL_QUEUED is set as the write subrequests may complete before we get
there.
If all the write subreqs have finished by the ALL_QUEUED point, no further
events happen and the collection never happens, leaving the request
hanging.
Fix this by queuing the collector after setting ALL_QUEUED. This is a bit
heavy-handed and it may be sufficient to do it only if there are no extant
subreqs.
Also add a tracepoint to cross-reference both requests in a copy-to-request
operation and add a trace to the netfs_rreq tracepoint to indicate the
setting of ALL_QUEUED. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ath11k: fix netdev open race
Make sure to allocate resources needed before registering the device.
This specifically avoids having a racing open() trigger a BUG_ON() in
mod_timer() when ath11k_mac_op_start() is called before the
mon_reap_timer as been set up.
I did not see this issue with next-20220310, but I hit it on every probe
with next-20220511. Perhaps some timing changed in between.
Here's the backtrace:
[ 51.346947] kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:990!
[ 51.346958] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
[ 51.578225] Call trace:
[ 51.583293] __mod_timer+0x298/0x390
[ 51.589518] mod_timer+0x14/0x20
[ 51.595368] ath11k_mac_op_start+0x41c/0x4a0 [ath11k]
[ 51.603165] drv_start+0x38/0x60 [mac80211]
[ 51.610110] ieee80211_do_open+0x29c/0x7d0 [mac80211]
[ 51.617945] ieee80211_open+0x60/0xb0 [mac80211]
[ 51.625311] __dev_open+0x100/0x1c0
[ 51.631420] __dev_change_flags+0x194/0x210
[ 51.638214] dev_change_flags+0x24/0x70
[ 51.644646] do_setlink+0x228/0xdb0
[ 51.650723] __rtnl_newlink+0x460/0x830
[ 51.657162] rtnl_newlink+0x4c/0x80
[ 51.663229] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x124/0x390
[ 51.669917] netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x130
[ 51.676314] rtnetlink_rcv+0x18/0x30
[ 51.682460] netlink_unicast+0x250/0x310
[ 51.688960] netlink_sendmsg+0x19c/0x3e0
[ 51.695458] ____sys_sendmsg+0x220/0x290
[ 51.701938] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xc0
[ 51.708148] __sys_sendmsg+0x68/0xd0
[ 51.714254] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x28/0x40
[ 51.720900] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x120
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix race between async reclaim worker and close_ctree()
Syzbot reported an assertion failure due to an attempt to add a delayed
iput after we have set BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DELAYED_IPUT in the fs_info
state:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 65 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:3420 btrfs_add_delayed_iput+0x2f8/0x370 fs/btrfs/inode.c:3420
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 6.15.0-next-20250530-syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper
RIP: 0010:btrfs_add_delayed_iput+0x2f8/0x370 fs/btrfs/inode.c:3420
Code: 4e ad 5d (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000213f780 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff83c635b7 RBX: ffff888058920000 RCX: ffff88801c769e00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000100 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff888058921b67 R09: 1ffff1100b12436c
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100b12436d R12: 0000000000000001
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88807d748000 R15: 0000000000000100
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888125c53000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00002000000bd038 CR3: 000000006a142000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_put_ordered_extent+0x19f/0x470 fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:635
btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x11d8/0x1b10 fs/btrfs/inode.c:3312
btrfs_work_helper+0x399/0xc20 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:312
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402
kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464
ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
This can happen due to a race with the async reclaim worker like this:
1) The async metadata reclaim worker enters shrink_delalloc(), which calls
btrfs_start_delalloc_roots() with an nr_pages argument that has a value
less than LONG_MAX, and that in turn enters start_delalloc_inodes(),
which sets the local variable 'full_flush' to false because
wbc->nr_to_write is less than LONG_MAX;
2) There it finds inode X in a root's delalloc list, grabs a reference for
inode X (with igrab()), and triggers writeback for it with
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc(), which creates an ordered extent for inode X;
3) The unmount sequence starts from another task, we enter close_ctree()
and we flush the workqueue fs_info->endio_write_workers, which waits
for the ordered extent for inode X to complete and when dropping the
last reference of the ordered extent, with btrfs_put_ordered_extent(),
when we call btrfs_add_delayed_iput() we don't add the inode to the
list of delayed iputs because it has a refcount of 2, so we decrement
it to 1 and return;
4) Shortly after at close_ctree() we call btrfs_run_delayed_iputs() which
runs all delayed iputs, and then we set BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DELAYED_IPUT
in the fs_info state;
5) The async reclaim worker, after calling filemap_fdatawrite_wbc(), now
calls btrfs_add_delayed_iput() for inode X and there we trigger an
assertion failure since the fs_info state has the flag
BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DELAYED_IPUT set.
Fix this by setting BTRFS_FS_STATE_NO_DELAYED_IPUT only after we wait for
the async reclaim workers to finish, after we call cancel_work_sync() for
them at close_ctree(), and by running delayed iputs after wait for the
reclaim workers to finish and before setting the bit.
This race was recently introduced by commit 19e60b2a95f5 ("btrfs: add
extra warning if delayed iput is added when it's not allowed"). Without
the new validation at btrfs_add_delayed_iput(),
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_alloc: fix race condition in unaccepted memory handling
The page allocator tracks the number of zones that have unaccepted memory
using static_branch_enc/dec() and uses that static branch in hot paths to
determine if it needs to deal with unaccepted memory.
Borislav and Thomas pointed out that the tracking is racy: operations on
static_branch are not serialized against adding/removing unaccepted pages
to/from the zone.
Sanity checks inside static_branch machinery detects it:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10 at kernel/jump_label.c:276 __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked+0x8e/0xa0
The comment around the WARN() explains the problem:
/*
* Warn about the '-1' case though; since that means a
* decrement is concurrent with a first (0->1) increment. IOW
* people are trying to disable something that wasn't yet fully
* enabled. This suggests an ordering problem on the user side.
*/
The effect of this static_branch optimization is only visible on
microbenchmark.
Instead of adding more complexity around it, remove it altogether. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/gup: fix FOLL_FORCE COW security issue and remove FOLL_COW
Ever since the Dirty COW (CVE-2016-5195) security issue happened, we know
that FOLL_FORCE can be possibly dangerous, especially if there are races
that can be exploited by user space.
Right now, it would be sufficient to have some code that sets a PTE of a
R/O-mapped shared page dirty, in order for it to erroneously become
writable by FOLL_FORCE. The implications of setting a write-protected PTE
dirty might not be immediately obvious to everyone.
And in fact ever since commit 9ae0f87d009c ("mm/shmem: unconditionally set
pte dirty in mfill_atomic_install_pte"), we can use UFFDIO_CONTINUE to map
a shmem page R/O while marking the pte dirty. This can be used by
unprivileged user space to modify tmpfs/shmem file content even if the
user does not have write permissions to the file, and to bypass memfd
write sealing -- Dirty COW restricted to tmpfs/shmem (CVE-2022-2590).
To fix such security issues for good, the insight is that we really only
need that fancy retry logic (FOLL_COW) for COW mappings that are not
writable (!VM_WRITE). And in a COW mapping, we really only broke COW if
we have an exclusive anonymous page mapped. If we have something else
mapped, or the mapped anonymous page might be shared (!PageAnonExclusive),
we have to trigger a write fault to break COW. If we don't find an
exclusive anonymous page when we retry, we have to trigger COW breaking
once again because something intervened.
Let's move away from this mandatory-retry + dirty handling and rely on our
PageAnonExclusive() flag for making a similar decision, to use the same
COW logic as in other kernel parts here as well. In case we stumble over
a PTE in a COW mapping that does not map an exclusive anonymous page, COW
was not properly broken and we have to trigger a fake write-fault to break
COW.
Just like we do in can_change_pte_writable() added via commit 64fe24a3e05e
("mm/mprotect: try avoiding write faults for exclusive anonymous pages
when changing protection") and commit 76aefad628aa ("mm/mprotect: fix
soft-dirty check in can_change_pte_writable()"), take care of softdirty
and uffd-wp manually.
For example, a write() via /proc/self/mem to a uffd-wp-protected range has
to fail instead of silently granting write access and bypassing the
userspace fault handler. Note that FOLL_FORCE is not only used for debug
access, but also triggered by applications without debug intentions, for
example, when pinning pages via RDMA.
This fixes CVE-2022-2590. Note that only x86_64 and aarch64 are
affected, because only those support CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR.
Fortunately, FOLL_COW is no longer required to handle FOLL_FORCE. So
let's just get rid of it.
Thanks to Nadav Amit for pointing out that the pte_dirty() check in
FOLL_FORCE code is problematic and might be exploitable.
Note 1: We don't check for the PTE being dirty because it doesn't matter
for making a "was COWed" decision anymore, and whoever modifies the
page has to set the page dirty either way.
Note 2: Kernels before extended uffd-wp support and before
PageAnonExclusive (< 5.19) can simply revert the problematic
commit instead and be safe regarding UFFDIO_CONTINUE. A backport to
v5.19 requires minor adjustments due to lack of
vma_soft_dirty_enabled(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix a data-race around bpf_jit_limit.
While reading bpf_jit_limit, it can be changed concurrently via sysctl,
WRITE_ONCE() in __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(). The size of bpf_jit_limit
is long, so we need to add a paired READ_ONCE() to avoid load-tearing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154/adf7242: defer destroy_workqueue call
There is a possible race condition (use-after-free) like below
(FREE) | (USE)
adf7242_remove | adf7242_channel
cancel_delayed_work_sync |
destroy_workqueue (1) | adf7242_cmd_rx
| mod_delayed_work (2)
|
The root cause for this race is that the upper layer (ieee802154) is
unaware of this detaching event and the function adf7242_channel can
be called without any checks.
To fix this, we can add a flag write at the beginning of adf7242_remove
and add flag check in adf7242_channel. Or we can just defer the
destructive operation like other commit 3e0588c291d6 ("hamradio: defer
ax25 kfree after unregister_netdev") which let the
ieee802154_unregister_hw() to handle the synchronization. This patch
takes the second option.
runs") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: start MHI channel after endpoit creation
MHI channel may generates event/interrupt right after enabling.
It may leads to 2 race conditions issues.
1)
Such event may be dropped by qcom_mhi_qrtr_dl_callback() at check:
if (!qdev || mhi_res->transaction_status)
return;
Because dev_set_drvdata(&mhi_dev->dev, qdev) may be not performed at
this moment. In this situation qrtr-ns will be unable to enumerate
services in device.
---------------------------------------------------------------
2)
Such event may come at the moment after dev_set_drvdata() and
before qrtr_endpoint_register(). In this case kernel will panic with
accessing wrong pointer at qcom_mhi_qrtr_dl_callback():
rc = qrtr_endpoint_post(&qdev->ep, mhi_res->buf_addr,
mhi_res->bytes_xferd);
Because endpoint is not created yet.
--------------------------------------------------------------
So move mhi_prepare_for_transfer_autoqueue after endpoint creation
to fix it. |
| Race in Storage in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 142.0.7444.59 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: serial: fsl_lpuart: fix race on RX DMA shutdown
From time to time DMA completion can come in the middle of DMA shutdown:
<process ctx>: <IRQ>:
lpuart32_shutdown()
lpuart_dma_shutdown()
del_timer_sync()
lpuart_dma_rx_complete()
lpuart_copy_rx_to_tty()
mod_timer()
lpuart_dma_rx_free()
When the timer fires a bit later, sport->dma_rx_desc is NULL:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000004
pc : lpuart_copy_rx_to_tty+0xcc/0x5bc
lr : lpuart_timer_func+0x1c/0x2c
Call trace:
lpuart_copy_rx_to_tty
lpuart_timer_func
call_timer_fn
__run_timers.part.0
run_timer_softirq
__do_softirq
__irq_exit_rcu
irq_exit
handle_domain_irq
gic_handle_irq
call_on_irq_stack
do_interrupt_handler
...
To fix this fold del_timer_sync() into lpuart_dma_rx_free() after
dmaengine_terminate_sync() to make sure timer will not be re-started in
lpuart_copy_rx_to_tty() <= lpuart_dma_rx_complete(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tee: amdtee: fix race condition in amdtee_open_session
There is a potential race condition in amdtee_open_session that may
lead to use-after-free. For instance, in amdtee_open_session() after
sess->sess_mask is set, and before setting:
sess->session_info[i] = session_info;
if amdtee_close_session() closes this same session, then 'sess' data
structure will be released, causing kernel panic when 'sess' is
accessed within amdtee_open_session().
The solution is to set the bit sess->sess_mask as the last step in
amdtee_open_session(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix race condition in hci_cmd_sync_clear
There is a potential race condition in hci_cmd_sync_work and
hci_cmd_sync_clear, and could lead to use-after-free. For instance,
hci_cmd_sync_work is added to the 'req_workqueue' after cancel_work_sync
The entry of 'cmd_sync_work_list' may be freed in hci_cmd_sync_clear, and
causing kernel panic when it is used in 'hci_cmd_sync_work'.
Here's the call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63
print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5d3
? hci_cmd_sync_work+0x282/0x320
kasan_report+0xaa/0x120
? hci_cmd_sync_work+0x282/0x320
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x282/0x320
process_one_work+0x77b/0x11c0
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x8e/0xf0
worker_thread+0x544/0x1180
? poll_idle+0x1e0/0x1e0
kthread+0x285/0x320
? process_one_work+0x11c0/0x11c0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 266:
kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
__kasan_kmalloc+0xae/0xe0
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x191/0x350
hci_cmd_sync_queue+0x97/0x2b0
hci_update_passive_scan+0x176/0x1d0
le_conn_complete_evt+0x1b5/0x1a00
hci_le_conn_complete_evt+0x234/0x340
hci_le_meta_evt+0x231/0x4e0
hci_event_packet+0x4c5/0xf00
hci_rx_work+0x37d/0x880
process_one_work+0x77b/0x11c0
worker_thread+0x544/0x1180
kthread+0x285/0x320
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Freed by task 269:
kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x40
kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
____kasan_slab_free+0x176/0x1c0
__kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x95/0x1a0
kfree+0xba/0x2f0
hci_cmd_sync_clear+0x14c/0x210
hci_unregister_dev+0xff/0x440
vhci_release+0x7b/0xf0
__fput+0x1f3/0x970
____fput+0xe/0x20
task_work_run+0xd4/0x160
do_exit+0x8b0/0x22a0
do_group_exit+0xba/0x2a0
get_signal+0x1e4a/0x25b0
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x93/0x1f80
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xf5/0x1a0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x15/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Initialize gfn_to_pfn_cache locks in dedicated helper
Move the gfn_to_pfn_cache lock initialization to another helper and
call the new helper during VM/vCPU creation. There are race
conditions possible due to kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init()'s
ability to re-initialize the cache's locks.
For example: a race between ioctl(KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND) and
kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init() leads to a corrupted shinfo gpc lock.
(thread 1) | (thread 2)
|
kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast |
read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, ...) |
| kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init
| rwlock_init(&gpc->lock)
read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, ...) |
Rename "cache_init" and "cache_destroy" to activate+deactivate to
avoid implying that the cache really is destroyed/freed.
Note, there more races in the newly named kvm_gpc_activate() that will
be addressed separately.
[sean: call out that this is a bug fix] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix race where eprobes can be called before the event
The flag that tells the event to call its triggers after reading the event
is set for eprobes after the eprobe is enabled. This leads to a race where
the eprobe may be triggered at the beginning of the event where the record
information is NULL. The eprobe then dereferences the NULL record causing
a NULL kernel pointer bug.
Test for a NULL record to keep this from happening. |
