| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is a stack-based buffer overflow in this nfs_handler reply helper function: nfs_umountall_reply. |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is a stack-based buffer overflow in this nfs_handler reply helper function: nfs_mount_reply. |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is a stack-based buffer overflow in this nfs_handler reply helper function: nfs_readlink_reply. |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is a stack-based buffer overflow in this nfs_handler reply helper function: nfs_lookup_reply. |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is a stack-based buffer overflow in this nfs_handler reply helper function: rpc_lookup_reply. |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is an unbounded memcpy with a failed length check at nfs_read_reply when calling store_block in the NFSv3 case. |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is an unbounded memcpy with a failed length check at nfs_lookup_reply. |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is an unbounded memcpy with unvalidated length at nfs_readlink_reply in the "else" block after calculating the new path length. |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is an unbounded memcpy with a failed length check at nfs_read_reply when calling store_block in the NFSv2 case. |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is an unbounded memcpy with an unvalidated length at nfs_readlink_reply, in the "if" block after calculating the new path length. |
| An issue was discovered in Das U-Boot through 2019.07. There is an unbounded memcpy when parsing a UDP packet due to a net_process_received_packet integer underflow during an nc_input_packet call. |
| Das U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4 can memset() too much data while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem, which results in a stack buffer overflow and likely code execution. |
| In Das U-Boot versions 2016.11-rc1 through 2019.07-rc4, an underflow can cause memcpy() to overwrite a very large amount of data (including the whole stack) while reading a crafted ext4 filesystem. |
| A buffer overflow issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.7.7 and iPadOS 18.7.7, iOS 26.4 and iPadOS 26.4, macOS Sequoia 15.7.5, macOS Sonoma 14.8.5, macOS Tahoe 26.4, visionOS 26.4. Parsing a maliciously crafted file may lead to an unexpected app termination. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: ioam: fix heap buffer overflow in __ioam6_fill_trace_data()
On the receive path, __ioam6_fill_trace_data() uses trace->nodelen
to decide how much data to write for each node. It trusts this field
as-is from the incoming packet, with no consistency check against
trace->type (the 24-bit field that tells which data items are
present). A crafted packet can set nodelen=0 while setting type bits
0-21, causing the function to write ~100 bytes past the allocated
region (into skb_shared_info), which corrupts adjacent heap memory
and leads to a kernel panic.
Add a shared helper ioam6_trace_compute_nodelen() in ioam6.c to
derive the expected nodelen from the type field, and use it:
- in ioam6_iptunnel.c (send path, existing validation) to replace
the open-coded computation;
- in exthdrs.c (receive path, ipv6_hop_ioam) to drop packets whose
nodelen is inconsistent with the type field, before any data is
written.
Per RFC 9197, bits 12-21 are each short (4-octet) fields, so they
are included in IOAM6_MASK_SHORT_FIELDS (changed from 0xff100000 to
0xff1ffc00). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Fix memory corruption when FW resources change during ifdown
bnxt_set_dflt_rings() assumes that it is always called before any TC has
been created. So it doesn't take bp->num_tc into account and assumes
that it is always 0 or 1.
In the FW resource or capability change scenario, the FW will return
flags in bnxt_hwrm_if_change() that will cause the driver to
reinitialize and call bnxt_cancel_reservations(). This will lead to
bnxt_init_dflt_ring_mode() calling bnxt_set_dflt_rings() and bp->num_tc
may be greater than 1. This will cause bp->tx_ring[] to be sized too
small and cause memory corruption in bnxt_alloc_cp_rings().
Fix it by properly scaling the TX rings by bp->num_tc in the code
paths mentioned above. Add 2 helper functions to determine
bp->tx_nr_rings and bp->tx_nr_rings_per_tc. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: fix u8 overflow in SSID scan buffer size calculation
The variable valuesize is declared as u8 but accumulates the total
length of all SSIDs to scan. Each SSID contributes up to 33 bytes
(IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN + 1), and with WILC_MAX_NUM_PROBED_SSID (10)
SSIDs the total can reach 330, which wraps around to 74 when stored
in a u8.
This causes kmalloc to allocate only 75 bytes while the subsequent
memcpy writes up to 331 bytes into the buffer, resulting in a 256-byte
heap buffer overflow.
Widen valuesize from u8 to u32 to accommodate the full range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix stack buffer overflow in hci_le_big_create_sync
hci_le_big_create_sync() uses DEFINE_FLEX to allocate a
struct hci_cp_le_big_create_sync on the stack with room for 0x11 (17)
BIS entries. However, conn->num_bis can hold up to HCI_MAX_ISO_BIS (31)
entries — validated against ISO_MAX_NUM_BIS (0x1f) in the caller
hci_conn_big_create_sync(). When conn->num_bis is between 18 and 31,
the memcpy that copies conn->bis into cp->bis writes up to 14 bytes
past the stack buffer, corrupting adjacent stack memory.
This is trivially reproducible: binding an ISO socket with
bc_num_bis = ISO_MAX_NUM_BIS (31) and calling listen() will
eventually trigger hci_le_big_create_sync() from the HCI command
sync worker, causing a KASAN-detectable stack-out-of-bounds write:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in hci_le_big_create_sync+0x256/0x3b0
Write of size 31 at addr ffffc90000487b48 by task kworker/u9:0/71
Fix this by changing the DEFINE_FLEX count from the incorrect 0x11 to
HCI_MAX_ISO_BIS, which matches the maximum number of BIS entries that
conn->bis can actually carry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dpaa2-switch: validate num_ifs to prevent out-of-bounds write
The driver obtains sw_attr.num_ifs from firmware via dpsw_get_attributes()
but never validates it against DPSW_MAX_IF (64). This value controls
iteration in dpaa2_switch_fdb_get_flood_cfg(), which writes port indices
into the fixed-size cfg->if_id[DPSW_MAX_IF] array. When firmware reports
num_ifs >= 64, the loop can write past the array bounds.
Add a bound check for num_ifs in dpaa2_switch_init().
dpaa2_switch_fdb_get_flood_cfg() appends the control interface (port
num_ifs) after all matched ports. When num_ifs == DPSW_MAX_IF and all
ports match the flood filter, the loop fills all 64 slots and the control
interface write overflows by one entry.
The check uses >= because num_ifs == DPSW_MAX_IF is also functionally
broken.
build_if_id_bitmap() silently drops any ID >= 64:
if (id[i] < DPSW_MAX_IF)
bmap[id[i] / 64] |= ... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: do not pass flow_id to set_rps_cpu()
Blamed commit made the assumption that the RPS table for each receive
queue would have the same size, and that it would not change.
Compute flow_id in set_rps_cpu(), do not assume we can use the value
computed by get_rps_cpu(). Otherwise we risk out-of-bound access
and/or crashes. |
