| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out of bounds read in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.46 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Tenda CP3 V3.0 firmware V31.1.9.91 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in the RTSP service. The device fails to validate the length of the clock= value in the Range header field when processing a PLAY request. An unauthenticated remote attacker who has completed a standard RTSP session handshake can send a PLAY request with an excessively long clock= value to cause the RTSP service to crash. |
| Buffer Overflow vulnerability in aMULE-Project aMule v.2.3.3 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the OP_SERVERMESSAGE Handler. |
| An Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Response Splitting') vulnerability [CWE-113] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiOS 7.6.0 through 7.6.4, FortiOS 7.4 all versions, FortiOS 7.2 all versions, FortiProxy 7.6.0 through 7.6.4, FortiProxy 7.4 all versions, FortiProxy 7.2 all versions may allow an attacker in possession of a valid web filter override token to inject arbitrary headers via tricking a user into clicking on a crafted link. |
| An Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Response Splitting') vulnerability [CWE-113] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiOS 7.6.0 through 7.6.4, FortiOS 7.4 all versions, FortiOS 7.2 all versions, FortiProxy 7.6.0 through 7.6.4, FortiProxy 7.4 all versions, FortiProxy 7.2 all versions may allow an attacker able to intercept and modify a user's captive portal authentication request to inject arbitrary headers via crafted HTTP requests. |
| Jan through 0.8.4, fixed in commit 3e1c1e7, contains a CORS misconfiguration vulnerability in its local API server that allows network-adjacent attackers to bypass trusted host restrictions by exploiting the server's replacement of user-configured trusted hosts with a wildcard that reflects arbitrary origins with credentials. Attackers on the local network or using DNS rebinding can reach the unauthenticated OpenAI-compatible API to perform inference, enumerate models, invoke MCP tools, and read cross-origin responses. |
| Heap buffer overflow in libyuv in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 150.0.7871.125 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted video file. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the image codec module. Impact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Bound iscsi_encode_text_output() appends to rsp_buf
iscsi_encode_text_output() concatenates "key=value\0" records into
login->rsp_buf, an 8192-byte kzalloc(MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) buffer
allocated in iscsit_alloc_login_setup_buffer(). The three sprintf() call
sites in this function (lines 1398, 1411, 1424 in v7.1-rc2) never check
the remaining buffer capacity:
*length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s", er->key, er->value);
*length += 1;
output_buf = textbuf + *length;
The 8192-byte ceiling at iscsi_target_check_login_request() bounds the
*input* Login PDU payload, but a single PDU can carry up to 2048 minimal
four-byte "a=b\0" pairs, each unknown key expanding to a 16-byte
"a=NotUnderstood\0" output record via iscsi_add_notunderstood_response().
2048 * 16 = 32 KiB of output into an 8 KiB buffer, producing a ~24 KiB
heap overrun in the kmalloc-8k slab.
The fix introduces a static iscsi_encode_text_record() helper that uses
snprintf() with a per-call bounds check against the remaining buffer,
and threads a u32 textbuf_size parameter through
iscsi_encode_text_output(). Both call sites in
iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero() (PHASE_SECURITY) and
iscsi_target_handle_csg_one() (PHASE_OPERATIONAL) pass
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS. On overflow the encoder logs the condition, calls
iscsi_release_extra_responses() to drop queued records, and returns -1;
both caller sites now emit ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR /
ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR via iscsit_tx_login_rsp() before returning,
so the initiator sees an explicit failed-login response rather than a
silent connection drop. (Prior to this patch only the PHASE_OPERATIONAL
caller did that; the PHASE_SECURITY caller is converted to the same
shape.) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress()
ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() computes:
outhdr->hdrlen = (((n + 1) * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) >> 3);
hdrlen is __u8. For n >= 127 the result exceeds 255 and silently
truncates. With n=127 (cmpri=15, cmpre=15, pad=0, hdrlen=16):
(128 * 16) >> 3 = 256, truncated to 0 as __u8
The caller in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() then places the compressed header
at buf + ((ohdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3). With hdrlen=0 this is buf + 8,
but the decompressed region occupies buf[0..2055] (8-byte header
plus 128 full addresses). The compressed header overlaps the
decompressed data, and ipv6_rpl_srh_compress() writes into this
overlap, corrupting the routing header of the forwarded packet.
The existing guard at exthdrs.c:546 checks (n + 1) > 255, which
prevents n+1 from overflowing unsigned char (the segments_left
field), but does not prevent the computed hdrlen from overflowing
__u8. n=127 passes because 128 <= 255, yet hdrlen=256 does not
fit.
Tighten the bound to (n + 1) > 127. This caps n at 126, giving
hdrlen = (127 * 16) >> 3 = 254, which fits in __u8. The compressed
header then lands at buf + ((254 + 1) << 3) = buf + 2040, exactly
past the decompressed region (buf[0..2039]). No overlap. 127
segments is well beyond any realistic RPL deployment. |
| The Tenda TX9 V22.03.02.05 firmware has a stack overflow vulnerability in the sub_4418CC function of the file /goform/SetNetControlList. |
| Out-of-bounds Write, Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound) vulnerability in Apache NimBLE BASS service.
Improper validation when parsing BASS service "Add Source" and "Modify Source" operation PDU could results in stack buffer overflow or arbitrary out-of-bound read.
This can be triggered by nearby devices over Bluetooth connection, however pairing is required prior to accessing BASS service, which depending on device configuration may or may not require user action.
This issue affects Apache NimBLE: through 1.9.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.10.0, which fixes the issue. |
| Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') vulnerability in Apache NimBLE.
The HCI socket transport did not check whether a received HCI event would fit the configured event pool before copying it, allowing a buffer overflow. Severity is low: exploitation requires either a misconfigured pool size or a malicious/compromised controller on the other end of the HCI socket link, not over-the-air Bluetooth access.
This issue affects Apache NimBLE: through 1.9.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.10.0, which fixes the issue. |
| U-Boot before 2026.07-rc2 contains a buffer overflow vulnerability in nfs_readlink_reply() (net/nfs-common.c) when CONFIG_CMD_NFS is enabled, allowing a malicious or compromised NFS server to overflow the 2048-byte nfs_path_buff buffer by returning multiple relative symlink targets that are appended without cumulative length validation. Attackers can send two or more READLINK responses containing relative symlink targets of approximately 1100 bytes each to corrupt adjacent BSS variables including nfs_server_ip, nfs_server_mount_port, nfs_server_port, nfs_our_port, nfs_state, and rpc_id, potentially achieving memory corruption and control over the NFS client state machine. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Account allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg
sendmsg()/sendto() with MSG_FASTOPEN is a combination of connect(2) and
write(2): it opens the connection in the SYN. apparmor_socket_sendmsg()
only checks AA_MAY_SEND, so a profile that grants send but denies connect
lets a confined task open an outbound TCP/MPTCP connection that connect(2)
would have refused, bypassing connect mediation.
Mediate the implicit connect when MSG_FASTOPEN is set and a destination
is supplied. Add it to apparmor_socket_sendmsg() (not the shared
aa_sock_msg_perm() helper, which recvmsg also uses) and call aa_sk_perm()
directly, mirroring the selinux and tomoyo fixes. sk_is_tcp() does not
cover MPTCP fast open, so the SOCK_STREAM/IPPROTO_MPTCP arm is explicit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: validate orphan inode entry count
f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes() trusts the orphan block entry_count when
replaying orphan inodes from the checkpoint pack. A corrupted entry_count
larger than F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK makes the recovery loop read past the
ino[] array and interpret footer or following data as inode numbers.
On a crafted image, mounting an unpatched kernel can drive orphan recovery
into f2fs_bug_on() and panic the kernel. Validate entry_count before
consuming entries so corrupted checkpoint data fails the mount with
-EFSCORRUPTED and requests fsck instead.
Set ERROR_INCONSISTENT_ORPHAN as well, so the corruption reason can be
recorded in the superblock s_errors[] field. This gives fsck a persistent
hint even though mount-time orphan recovery failure may leave no chance to
persist SBI_NEED_FSCK through a checkpoint. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: bound i_inline_xattr_size for non-inline-xattr inodes
When the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled, do_read_inode() loads
the on-disk i_inline_xattr_size unconditionally:
if (f2fs_sb_has_flexible_inline_xattr(sbi))
fi->i_inline_xattr_size = le16_to_cpu(ri->i_inline_xattr_size);
but sanity_check_inode() only range-checks it when the inode also has the
FI_INLINE_XATTR flag set. An inode that carries an inline dentry or inline
data but not FI_INLINE_XATTR -- the normal layout for an inline
directory -- therefore keeps a fully attacker-controlled
i_inline_xattr_size from a crafted image.
get_inline_xattr_addrs() returns that value with no flag gating, so it
feeds the inode geometry:
MAX_INLINE_DATA() = 4 * (CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size - 1)
NR_INLINE_DENTRY() = MAX_INLINE_DATA() * BITS_PER_BYTE / (...)
addrs_per_page() = CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size
A large i_inline_xattr_size drives MAX_INLINE_DATA() and NR_INLINE_DENTRY()
negative, so make_dentry_ptr_inline() sets d->max (int) to a negative
value. The inline directory walk then compares an unsigned long bit_pos
against that negative d->max, which is promoted to a huge unsigned bound,
and reads far past the inline area:
while (bit_pos < d->max) /* fs/f2fs/dir.c */
... test_bit_le(bit_pos, d->bitmap) / d->dentry[bit_pos] ...
Mounting a crafted image and reading such a directory triggers an
out-of-bounds read in f2fs_fill_dentries(); the same underflow also
corrupts ADDRS_PER_INODE for regular files.
Validate i_inline_xattr_size against MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE whenever the
flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled -- i.e. whenever the value is
loaded from disk and consumed -- and keep the lower MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE
bound gated on inodes that actually carry an inline xattr, so legitimate
inodes with i_inline_xattr_size == 0 are still accepted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: fbcon: fix out-of-bounds read in err_out of fbcon_do_set_font()
When fbcon_do_set_font() fails (e.g., due to a memory allocation failure
inside vc_resize() under heavy memory pressure), it jumps to the `err_out`
label to roll back the console state. However, the current rollback logic
forgets to restore the `hi_font` state, leading to a severe state machine
corruption.
Earlier in the function, `set_vc_hi_font()` might be called to change
`vc->vc_hi_font_mask` and mutate the screen buffer. If `vc_resize()`
subsequently fails, the `err_out` path restores `vc_font.charcount`
but entirely skips rolling back the `vc_hi_font_mask` and the screen
buffer.
This mismatch leaves the terminal in a desynchronized state. Because
`vc_hi_font_mask` remains set, the VT subsystem will still accept
character indices greater than 255 from userspace and write them to the
screen buffer. Subsequent rendering calls (e.g., `fbcon_putcs()`) will
then use these inflated indices to access the reverted, 256-character
font array, leading to a deterministic out-of-bounds read and potential
kernel memory disclosure.
Fix this by adding the missing rollback logic for the `hi_font` mask
and screen buffer in the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl()
The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE
header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it
never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain
num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them.
CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the
sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header,
so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero
sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for
i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local
comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid()
result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls
the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID
base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read.
A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of
the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up
to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd
allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr()
into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in
ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The
malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL
is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and
the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this
reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs.
Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the
identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and
smb_inherit_dacl(). |
