| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Add NULL pointer check to trigger_data_free()
If trigger_data_alloc() fails and returns NULL, event_hist_trigger_parse()
jumps to the out_free error path. While kfree() safely handles a NULL
pointer, trigger_data_free() does not. This causes a NULL pointer
dereference in trigger_data_free() when evaluating
data->cmd_ops->set_filter.
Fix the problem by adding a NULL pointer check to trigger_data_free().
The problem was found by an experimental code review agent based on
gemini-3.1-pro while reviewing backports into v6.18.y. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pseries/papr-hvpipe: Fix null ptr deref in papr_hvpipe_dev_create_handle()
commit 6d3789d347a7 ("papr-hvpipe: convert papr_hvpipe_dev_create_handle() to FD_PREPARE()"),
changed the create handle to FD_PREPARE(), but it caused kernel
null-ptr-deref because after call to retain_and_null_ptr(src_info),
src_info is re-used for adding it to the global list.
Getting the following kernel panic in papr_hvpipe_dev_create_handle()
when trying to add src_info to the list.
Kernel attempted to write user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on write at 0x00000000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000001b44a0
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
...
Call Trace:
papr_hvpipe_dev_ioctl+0x1f4/0x48c (unreliable)
sys_ioctl+0x528/0x1064
system_call_exception+0x128/0x360
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
Now, the error handling with FD_PREPARE's file cleanup and __free(kfree) auto
cleanup is getting too convoluted. This is mainly because we need to
ensure only 1 user get the srcID handle. To simplify this, we allocate
prepare the src_info in the beginning and add it to the global list
under a spinlock after checking that no duplicates exist.
This simplify the error handling where if the FD_ADD fails, we can
simply remove the src_info from the list and consume any pending msg in
hvpipe to be cleared, after src_info became visible in the global list. |
| Function calls to WOSCommonUtil.dll!WOSSysInfoGetDeviceInterface() in various DLLs (i.e., WOSProfileMgrModule.dll, WOSWebDavModule.dll) can return a NULL pointer (i.e., when no user is logged into the Triofox Server Agent Management Console). The returned NULL pointer is not checked before being dereferenced. |
| When processing a request with a URL path starting with /status or /sysinfo, WOSHttpStatusModule.dll is to be loaded to handle such URL patterns. The WOSBin_LoadHttpModule function in the dll would be called to set up a "module" object for that module. However, WOSHttpStatusModule.dll is not present in the installation. As a result, a function pointer to WOSBin_LoadHttpModule (which would have been in the export table in WOSHttpStatusModule.dll) is set to NULL, resulting in calling a function at address 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Fix NULL pointer dereference in acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch()
Cover a missed execution path with a new check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: tcp - don't deref NULL sk_socket member after tcp_close()
When deleting a peer in case of keepalive expiration, the peer is
removed from the OpenVPN hashtable and is temporary inserted in a
"release list" for further processing.
This happens in:
ovpn_peer_keepalive_work()
unlock_ovpn(release_list)
This processing includes detaching from the socket being used to
talk to this peer, by restoring its original proto and socket
ops/callbacks.
In case of TCP it may happen that, while the peer is sitting in
the release list, userspace decides to close the socket.
This will result in a concurrent execution of:
tcp_close(sk)
__tcp_close(sk)
sock_orphan(sk)
sk_set_socket(sk, NULL)
The last function call will set sk->sk_socket to NULL.
When the releasing routine is resumed, ovpn_tcp_socket_detach()
will attempt to dereference sk->sk_socket to restore its original
ops member. This operation will crash due to sk->sk_socket being NULL.
Fix this race condition by testing-and-accessing
sk->sk_socket atomically under sk->sk_callback_lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: intel-ish-hid: fix NULL-ptr-deref in ishtp_bus_remove_all_clients
During a warm reset flow, the cl->device pointer may be NULL if the
reset occurs while clients are still being enumerated. Accessing
cl->device->reference_count without a NULL check leads to a kernel panic.
This issue was identified during multi-unit warm reboot stress clycles.
Add a defensive NULL check for cl->device to ensure stability under
such intensive testing conditions.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0000000000000000-0000000000000007]
Workqueue: ish_fw_update_wq fw_reset_work_fn
Call Trace:
ishtp_bus_remove_all_clients+0xbe/0x130 [intel_ishtp]
ishtp_reset_handler+0x85/0x1a0 [intel_ishtp]
fw_reset_work_fn+0x8a/0xc0 [intel_ish_ipc] |
| Invalid pointer in the Audio/Video: Playback component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 150 and Thunderbird 150. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: csiostor: Fix dereference of null pointer rn
The error exit path when rn is NULL ends up deferencing the null pointer rn
via the use of the macro CSIO_INC_STATS. Fix this by adding a new error
return path label after the use of the macro to avoid the deference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: freescale: imx8qm-hsio: fix NULL pointer dereference
During the probe the refclk_pad pointer is set to NULL if the
'fsl,refclk-pad-mode' property is not defined in the devicetree node. But
in imx_hsio_configure_clk_pad() this pointer is unconditionally used which
could result in a NULL pointer dereference. So check the pointer before to
use it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix NULL sock in aa_sock_file_perm
Deal with the potential that sock and sock-sk can be NULL during
socket setup or teardown. This could lead to an oops. The fix for NULL
pointer dereference in __unix_needs_revalidation shows this is at
least possible for af_unix sockets. While the fix for af_unix sockets
applies for newer mediation this is still the fall back path for older
af_unix mediation and other sockets, so ensure it is covered. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference in context cleanup
aie_destroy_context() is invoked during error handling in
aie2_create_context(). However, aie_destroy_context() assumes that the
context's mailbox channel pointer is non-NULL. If mailbox channel
creation fails, the pointer remains NULL and calling aie_destroy_context()
can lead to a NULL pointer dereference.
In aie2_create_context(), replace aie_destroy_context() with a function
which request firmware to remove the context created previously. |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. In versions 1.21.2 and prior, a malformed HEIF sequence file can trigger an out-of-bounds read in core sequence parsing logic, causing DoS. A malformed file can have stco.entry_count == 0 (creating no chunks) while still passing validation because saio.entry_count == 0 matches, but with saiz.sample_count > 0 the SampleAuxInfoReader constructor still enters its loop. This leads to an out-of-bounds dereference on the empty chunks[0] in chunked mode. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: taprio: fix NULL pointer dereference in class dump
When a TAPRIO child qdisc is deleted via RTM_DELQDISC, taprio_graft()
is called with new == NULL and stores NULL into q->qdiscs[cl - 1].
Subsequent RTM_GETTCLASS dump operations walk all classes via
taprio_walk() and call taprio_dump_class(), which calls taprio_leaf()
returning the NULL pointer, then dereferences it to read child->handle,
causing a kernel NULL pointer dereference.
The bug is reachable with namespace-scoped CAP_NET_ADMIN on any kernel
with CONFIG_NET_SCH_TAPRIO enabled. On systems with unprivileged user
namespaces enabled, an unprivileged local user can trigger a kernel
panic by creating a taprio qdisc inside a new network namespace,
grafting an explicit child qdisc, deleting it, and requesting a class
dump. The RTM_GETTCLASS dump itself requires no capability.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000007: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000038-0x000000000000003f]
RIP: 0010:taprio_dump_class (net/sched/sch_taprio.c:2478)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tc_fill_tclass (net/sched/sch_api.c:1966)
qdisc_class_dump (net/sched/sch_api.c:2326)
taprio_walk (net/sched/sch_taprio.c:2514)
tc_dump_tclass_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:2352)
tc_dump_tclass_root (net/sched/sch_api.c:2370)
tc_dump_tclass (net/sched/sch_api.c:2431)
rtnl_dumpit (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6864)
netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6959)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
</TASK>
Fix this by substituting &noop_qdisc when new is NULL in
taprio_graft(), a common pattern used by other qdiscs (e.g.,
multiq_graft()) to ensure the q->qdiscs[] slots are never NULL.
This makes control-plane dump paths safe without requiring individual
NULL checks.
Since the data-plane paths (taprio_enqueue and taprio_dequeue_from_txq)
previously had explicit NULL guards that would drop/skip the packet
cleanly, update those checks to test for &noop_qdisc instead. Without
this, packets would reach taprio_enqueue_one() which increments the root
qdisc's qlen and backlog before calling the child's enqueue; noop_qdisc
drops the packet but those counters are never rolled back, permanently
inflating the root qdisc's statistics.
After this change *old can be a valid qdisc, NULL, or &noop_qdisc.
Only call qdisc_put(*old) in the first case to avoid decreasing
noop_qdisc's refcount, which was never increased. |
| IEC 60870-5-104 used in bidirectional mode in RTU500 is vulnerable
for a NULL pointer dereferencing, if a specially crafted
sequence of messages is sent for a certain time, causing
Denial of Service impact.
Product is only affected if IEC 60870-5-104 functionality in
bidirectional mode (BCI) is configured. |
| IBM HTTP Server 8.5, and 9.0 is vulnerable to denial of service via the optional module mod_ibm_upload. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in GPAC up to 2.4.0. Affected is the function MergeFragment of the file src/isomedia/isom_intern.c of the component MP4Box. The manipulation results in null pointer dereference. The attack needs to be approached locally. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The patch is identified as 525bf1af642c30af04e4df5345e6d798c0a4d8a1. It is advisable to implement a patch to correct this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc, perf: Check that current->mm is alive before getting user callchain
It may happen that mm is already released, which leads to kernel panic.
This adds the NULL check for current->mm, similarly to
commit 20afc60f892d ("x86, perf: Check that current->mm is alive before getting user callchain").
I was getting this panic when running a profiling BPF program
(profile.py from bcc-tools):
[26215.051935] Kernel attempted to read user page (588) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
[26215.051950] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000588
[26215.051952] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000020fac0
[26215.051957] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[...]
[26215.052049] Call Trace:
[26215.052050] [c000000061da6d30] [c00000000020fc10] perf_callchain_user_64+0x2d0/0x490 (unreliable)
[26215.052054] [c000000061da6dc0] [c00000000020f92c] perf_callchain_user+0x1c/0x30
[26215.052057] [c000000061da6de0] [c0000000005ab2a0] get_perf_callchain+0x100/0x360
[26215.052063] [c000000061da6e70] [c000000000573bc8] bpf_get_stackid+0x88/0xf0
[26215.052067] [c000000061da6ea0] [c008000000042258] bpf_prog_16d4ab9ab662f669_do_perf_event+0xf8/0x274
[...]
In addition, move storing the top-level stack entry to generic
perf_callchain_user to make sure the top-evel entry is always captured,
even if current->mm is NULL.
[Maddy: fixed message to avoid checkpatch format style error] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rose: fix NULL pointer dereference in rose_transmit_link on reconnect
syzkaller reported a bug [1], and the reproducer is available at [2].
ROSE sockets use four sk->sk_state values: TCP_CLOSE, TCP_LISTEN,
TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_ESTABLISHED. rose_connect() already rejects
calls for TCP_ESTABLISHED (-EISCONN) and TCP_CLOSE with SS_CONNECTING
(-ECONNREFUSED), but lacks a check for TCP_SYN_SENT.
When rose_connect() is called a second time while the first connection
attempt is still in progress (TCP_SYN_SENT), it overwrites
rose->neighbour via rose_get_neigh(). If that returns NULL, the socket
is left with rose->state == ROSE_STATE_1 but rose->neighbour == NULL.
When the socket is subsequently closed, rose_release() sees
ROSE_STATE_1 and calls rose_write_internal() ->
rose_transmit_link(skb, NULL), causing a NULL pointer dereference.
Per connect(2), a second connect() while a connection is already in
progress should return -EALREADY. Add this missing check for
TCP_SYN_SENT to complete the state validation in rose_connect().
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d00f90e0af54102fb271
[2] https://gist.github.com/mrpre/9e6779e0d13e2c66779b1653fef80516 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dmc: Fix an unlikely NULL pointer deference at probe
intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count() oopses when DMC hasn't been
initialized, and dmc is thus NULL.
That would be the case when the call path is
intel_power_domains_init_hw() -> {skl,bxt,icl}_display_core_init() ->
gen9_set_dc_state() -> intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count(), as
intel_power_domains_init_hw() is called *before* intel_dmc_init().
However, gen9_set_dc_state() calls intel_dmc_update_dc6_allowed_count()
conditionally, depending on the current and target DC states. At probe,
the target is disabled, but if DC6 is enabled, the function is called,
and an oops follows. Apparently it's quite unlikely that DC6 is enabled
at probe, as we haven't seen this failure mode before.
It is also strange to have DC6 enabled at boot, since that would require
the DMC firmware (loaded by BIOS); the BIOS loading the DMC firmware and
the driver stopping / reprogramming the firmware is a poorly specified
sequence and as such unlikely an intentional BIOS behaviour. It's more
likely that BIOS is leaving an unintentionally enabled DC6 HW state
behind (without actually loading the required DMC firmware for this).
The tracking of the DC6 allowed counter only works if starting /
stopping the counter depends on the _SW_ DC6 state vs. the current _HW_
DC6 state (since stopping the counter requires the DC5 counter captured
when the counter was started). Thus, using the HW DC6 state is incorrect
and it also leads to the above oops. Fix both issues by using the SW DC6
state for the tracking.
This is v2 of the fix originally sent by Jani, updated based on the
first Link: discussion below.
(cherry picked from commit 2344b93af8eb5da5d496b4e0529d35f0f559eaf0) |
