| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: au0828: fix use-after-free in bulk_timeout timer on disconnect
start_urb_transfer() arms dev->bulk_timeout, whose callback
au0828_bulk_timeout() queues dev->restart_streaming; that work in turn
calls start_urb_transfer() and re-arms the timer.
au0828_dvb_unregister() cancels restart_streaming on disconnect but does
not sync bulk_timeout. au0828_usb_release() then frees dev with kfree(),
so a timer still armed or pending at that point can fire after the free
and dereference dev through timer_container_of().
Sync the timer with timer_shutdown_sync() before cancel_work_sync(). The
timer callback queues the work, so the timer must be stopped first; the
shutdown variant is needed because the work re-arms the timer through
start_urb_transfer(). The dvb->frontend == NULL early return guards the
register-failure path where the timer was never set up.
This bug was found by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
landlock: Fix superblock use-after-free in release_inode()
Without this fix, release_inode() (task 1) can race with a umount
operation in hook_sb_delete() (task 2). The order of operations in
which the race occurs is:
* task 2: hook_sb_delete() arrives at the end of the function, waiting
for landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs to become zero.
* task 1: release_inode(): does atomic_long_dec_and_test(), decrementing
inode_refs to zero.
* task 2: gets woken up through some other means, sees that inode_refs
is zero and returns. The caller is the unmount operation and proceeds
to release the superblock.
* task 1: Runs wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs),
*dereferencing the sb_security on the freed-up superblock*.
Notably, wake_up_var() does not dereference the pointer passed to it,
and only uses it to determine an overapproximated set of tasks to wake
up. So while it's potentially possible for an attacker to provide a
different value for that pointer, this only results in the wrong set of
tasks getting woken up, and in this scenario, no further tasks are
actually waiting.
Nevertheless, KASAN detects it as a slab-use-after-free read on
sb->s_security:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in release_inode+0x196/0x290
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888103b6c0a8 by task repro/217
release_inode+0x196/0x290
landlock_put_object+0x71/0x90
landlock_free_rules+0x38/0xc0
landlock_put_ruleset+0x47/0x130
fop_ruleset_release+0x33/0x40
__fput+0x305/0x780
Freed by task 54:
kfree+0x11c/0x390
process_scheduled_works+0x766/0xe50
worker_thread+0x7bc/0xb20
The fix is to determine &landlock_superblock(inode->i_sb)->inode_refs only once
earlier in release_inode(), and later use that precalculated address for the
wake_up_var() call, without having to dereference through the superblock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Fix event queue release use-after-free
iommufd_eventq_fops_release() drops the file's users reference before
reading eventq->ictx. Once that reference is dropped, IOMMU_DESTROY in
another thread can remove and free the event queue, so the later load
accesses freed memory.
Read ictx while the users reference still pins the event queue, then
drop the reference and put the saved context. The context reference
taken by iommufd_eventq_init() keeps ictx valid until the put. Fault and
vEVENTQ file descriptors share this release path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: fix use-after-free of the old registrant in nvmet_pr_preempt()
nvmet_pr_preempt() handles a preempt sent by the reservation holder by
changing the reservation type with nvmet_pr_update_reg_attr(), unless
the reservation is of an All Registrants type. For the holder that
helper does not modify the registrant in place: it puts a copy on the
registrant list, points pr->holder to the copy and passes the old
registrant to kfree_rcu().
If the reservation type changed, nvmet_pr_preempt() then hands
®->hostid of that old registrant to nvmet_pr_resv_released(). Unless
the reservation released notification is masked, that function takes
subsys->lock and compares the host id against every controller of the
subsystem. The caller only holds pr->pr_sem and is not in an RCU
read-side critical section, so nothing keeps the old registrant alive
while it is read.
The result is a read of 16 freed bytes that decides which controllers
get the notification. Found by code inspection. kfree_rcu() defers
the free, so it usually happens after the read; when the pending free
is forced to run before the read, KASAN reports the host id as freed
memory.
Pass the host id of the controller that sent the command instead. The
registrant was looked up by that host id, and the controller outlives
the request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: asus-wmi: fix use-after-free unregistering kbd_led led
kbd_led_update_all() registers asus->kbd_led with
devm_led_classdev_register() on the platform device, but kbd_led is
embedded in struct asus_wmi, which asus_wmi_remove() frees at its end.
The driver core calls .remove() before devres_release_all(), so the
deferred devres release runs led_classdev_unregister() on memory that
has already been freed. Whether that faults depends on whether the
slab has been reused in between, which makes the crash on module
unload intermittent and silently corrupts the led classdev state in
the remaining runs.
Unregister the led classdev explicitly in asus_wmi_led_exit(), after
the led workqueue has been destroyed: kbd_led_work can then neither
run nor be queued anymore, since asus_ref.asus is NULL too, so
kbd_led_registered is stable and the classdev can be released while
the memory embedding it is still alive. devm_led_classdev_unregister()
also drops the devres entry, leaving nothing to run at unbind cleanup
time; it warns when no devres entry exists, hence the
kbd_led_registered check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM: EM: Fix use-after-free of perf domain in netlink doit handlers
The doit handlers dropped em_pd_list_mutex before dereferencing the
perf domain, so a concurrent device unregister could free it while the
reply was being built.
Encode the reply from em_perf_domain_for_id() callbacks, which run
under the mutex, and allocate the skb outside of it, like the dumpit
path already does.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pps: generators: fix use-after-free when closing a removed device
The cdev of a PPS generator is embedded in struct pps_gen_device, but
nothing ties the lifetime of that structure to the cdev: pps_gen is
freed by the release function of its device, and an open file holds a
device reference only until pps_gen_cdev_release() drops it.
When the generator is unregistered while /dev/pps-genN is open, that
put_device() drops the last reference and frees pps_gen, and __fput()
then calls cdev_put() on the freed cdev:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cdev_put+0x53/0x60
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801383e138 by task ppsgen64/149
Call Trace:
cdev_put+0x53/0x60
__fput+0x745/0xad0
fput_close_sync+0xd9/0x1b0
__x64_sys_close+0x86/0xf0
...
Freed by task 149:
kfree+0x25a/0x6d0
device_release+0xca/0x3c0
kobject_put+0x169/0x320
pps_gen_cdev_release+0x51/0x80
__fput+0x36a/0xad0
pps.c had the same bug, fixed in commit c79a39dc8d06 ("pps: Fix a
use-after-free").
Fix it the usual way: embed the struct device in pps_gen_device and
register both with cdev_device_add(). This makes the device the parent
of the cdev, so the cdev holds a device reference until the last file
is closed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rapidio: mport_cdev: fix use-after-free in mport_mm_close()
A use-after-free vulnerability was identified in mport_mm_close() in
drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c, identical to the pattern
previously addressed in dma_req_free().
This is observable from userspace when an application creates an mmap
mapping via the RapidIO character device and subsequently unmaps it (or
terminates, triggering exit_mmap()). During munmap, mport_mm_close() is
invoked and drops the mapping reference via kref_put().
If kref_put() drops the last reference, mport_release_mapping() is called,
which frees the underlying rio_mport_mapping structure. The subsequent
mutex_unlock() then dereferences map->md to unlock buf_mutex, leading to a
use-after-free:
mport_mm_close()
-> mutex_lock(&map->md->buf_mutex);
...
-> kref_put(&map->ref, mport_release_mapping); /* map is freed */
-> mutex_unlock(&map->md->buf_mutex); /* UAF: map used */
Fix this by caching map->md before kref_put() and using the cached pointer
for mutex unlocking, ensuring that freed memory is not accessed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: avoid use-after-free in icrdma_remove
icrdma_remove() dereferences iwdev after calling
irdma_ib_unregister_device():
irdma_ib_unregister_device(iwdev)
-> ib_unregister_device(&iwdev->ibdev)
-> __ib_unregister_device()
-> ib_dealloc_device()
irdma registers irdma_ib_dealloc_device() as the dealloc_driver
callback in its ib_device_ops. The RDMA core explicitly documents
ib_unregister_device() that when ops.dealloc_driver is used, ib_dev
will be freed upon return from the function.
The ib_device is embedded in struct irdma_device and iwdev itself was
allocated by ib_alloc_device(irdma_device, ibdev). Consequently, once
irdma_ib_unregister_device() returns, iwdev must no longer be
dereferenced.
However, icrdma_remove() currently accesses iwdev->rf afterwards when
deinitializing interrupts, destroying ah_tbl_lock, and freeing rf.
Although the final ib_device storage is released with kfree_rcu(), the
object lifetime has already ended and callers must not rely on the RCU
grace period to continue dereferencing iwdev.
Save iwdev->rf before unregistering the RDMA device and use the saved
pointer for the remaining cleanup.
This issue was found by manual code inspection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/uverbs: Fix DMABUF use-after-free during ufile cleanup
The DMABUF release can race with ufile cleanup. When the cleanup holds
hw_destroy_rwsem for write, uverbs_uobject_release() fails its trylock
and leaves the uobject on the ufile list, but the dma_buf is freed as
soon as the release returns. The cleanup then destroys the uobject and
uses the freed dma_buf:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in uverbs_dmabuf_fd_destroy_uobj+0x46/0x200
Read of size 8 at addr ff11000109cf14b0 by task repro/435
Call Trace:
uverbs_dmabuf_fd_destroy_uobj+0x46/0x200
destroy_hw_fd_uobject+0x3f/0x50
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0xc5/0x380
__uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0x1a8/0x260
uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x54/0x160
ib_uverbs_close+0x34/0x110
Allocated by task 435:
dma_buf_export+0x1b5/0x530
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_DMABUF_ALLOC+0x223/0x3f0
Freed by task 436:
kfree+0x301/0x530
dentry_kill+0x14c/0x560
__fput+0x23a/0x4a0
rdma_user_mmap_entry_remove() dereferences the same pointer.
Protect the stored dma_buf pointer with a mutex and clear it before
release returns. Use a shared revoke helper so uobject destruction and
mmap entry removal both skip a cleared pointer. Hold a temporary uobject
reference across uverbs_uobject_release() and the pointer update.
Use a separate mutex because uobject destruction can free the mmap entry
before release finishes. Map and unmap use attachment->dmabuf directly,
so they do not need to take the new mutex while holding the reservation
lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Fix use-after-free of a local reenq node left on an inactive cpu
A local DSQ reenq is queued on the rq through a per-sched node and run from
deferred work. When the reenq is requested from dispatch, the work is a
balance callback queued once dispatch is done. A cpu going down installs
balance push early in its teardown, and queue_balance_callback() refuses new
callbacks from then on. ops.dispatch() keeps running on that cpu until the
rq goes offline after an RCU grace period, so a reenq it requests in that
window may never run. The IMMED handling in dispatch_one() requests one the
same way.
A reenq requested from elsewhere for a cpu that is already offline goes
through irq_work_queue_on(), which warns, and its work doesn't run until the
cpu comes back.
Either way the node stays on the rq's list. When the scheduler is freed,
scx_sched_free_rcu_work() warns and frees the pcpu with the node still
linked, and the list is walked again once the cpu comes back.
An inactive cpu's local DSQ holds only tasks that are bound to it or are
being moved off, so the reenq is pointless. Ignore reenqs of an inactive
cpu's local DSQ.
The test is lockless. The hotplug thread of a cpu going down runs on that
cpu, and it marks the cpu inactive before it installs balance push. A
dispatch on the cpu runs to completion before that thread can run there, so
a dispatch that saw the cpu active has queued its callback by then. Requests
from outside dispatch run from the wakeup path or through irq_work, which
balance push doesn't affect. The grace period after the cpu goes inactive
waits for any requester that saw it active, so that irq_work is queued while
the cpu is online. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-after-free in cifs_ses_add_channel()
The error path of cifs_ses_add_channel() calls cifs_put_tcp_session()
before cifs_chan_clear_need_reconnect(). The latter reaches
cifs_ses_get_chan_index(), which dereferences server->terminate; if
the put was the final reference, TCP_Server_Info is already freed and
this is a use-after-free. Same put-then-use pattern as the recently
fixed sibling in commit 717e0a25036b ("cifs: Fix server use-after-free
in cifs_chan_skip_or_disable()").
Move the put last, but do not read chan->server after dropping
chan_lock: chan points into ses->chans[], and once chan_count is
decremented a concurrent add_channel can reuse the slot and overwrite
the pointer, so the put would act on the new channel's server. Cache
the pointer under chan_lock, clear the reconnect bit and decrement
chan_count while still holding the reference, and release it after
the unlock.
This issue was discovered by Tencent CodeBuddy Security. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: caiaq: free the EP4 URB when input setup fails
The three controllers that use the EP4 input URB allocate it before
checking the endpoint type and before registering the input device. On
failure they jump to exit_free_idev, which clears cdev->input_dev but
leaves cdev->ep4_in_urb set. The card teardown then calls
snd_usb_caiaq_input_free(), which returns early because input_dev is
NULL, so the URB is never freed.
Release the URB before dropping the input device on the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/userfaultfd: write-lock the VMA before waking waiters when unregistering
userfaultfd_unregister() wakes pending missing faults before clearing the
VMA's userfaultfd registration. With per-VMA fault locking, holding
mmap_lock for write does not prevent another fault from queuing after
the wakeup but before userfaultfd_clear_vma() write-locks the VMA. That
waiter can then remain asleep indefinitely.
Call vma_start_write() before waking waiters. Existing fault handlers
queue themselves before dropping the VMA read lock, and new readers are
excluded until mmap_write_unlock(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_blk: use synchronous quiesce in virtblk_freeze_priv()
blk_mq_run_work_fn() can call blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests() through
blk_mq_run_dispatch_ops(). The dispatcher checks QUEUE_FLAG_QUIESCED
while the flag is clear. It can then be preempted before it gets a
request. At that time, it has no queue usage reference, so
blk_mq_freeze_queue() does not wait for it.
virtblk_freeze_priv() then calls blk_mq_quiesce_queue_nowait() and
blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(). A new request can enter the queue. The old
dispatcher can run again, use its old flag check, get the new request,
and call virtio_queue_rq(). At the same time, virtblk_freeze_priv() can
reset the device, delete the virtqueues, and free vblk->vqs. The old
dispatcher can then use a deleted virtqueue or a NULL vblk->vqs, and the
kernel can crash.
Fix this by using blk_mq_quiesce_queue(), which waits for dispatch code
that was already running. Keep the existing freeze and unfreeze order.
The queue remains quiesced until virtblk_restore_priv() calls
blk_mq_unquiesce_queue(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vduse: fix VA/PA confusion in the coherent page fault path
vduse_domain_get_coherent_page() assumes that iotlb entries above
bounce_size were installed by vduse_domain_alloc_coherent(), so it
treats map->addr as a physical address. But vduse registers with
use_va = true, and when the device is bound to vhost_vdpa,
vhost_vdpa_va_map() stores a userspace virtual address in map->addr,
which vduse_domain_set_map() then copies into the same iotlb. A
process holding the domain file descriptor across a rebind can
therefore fault in an arbitrary physical page with read/write
access, ignoring the entry permissions.
Additionally, since the domain file mmap lacks VM_IO, the domain
file itself can be mapped and passed to vhost_vdpa_va_map(),
producing self-referential entries that bypass the coherent path
check.
To fix, only translate entries whose backing file is the domain
file itself in vduse_domain_get_coherent_page(), reject such
entries in vduse_domain_set_map() since only external mappings
should be imported, and set VM_IO on the domain file mmap so
vhost_vdpa_va_map() refuses to map it in the first place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-after-free infoleak via the readdir resume name
CIFSFindNext() copies the resume name that cifs_save_resume_key()
recorded from the last entry of the previous response into its request;
psrch_inf->presume_name points into the response buffer that entry came
from, and nothing ever clears it. find_cifs_entry() records a new
name only from a response with a usable last entry, and cifs_readdir()
only from an entry it walks to, so a response that carries no entries
and leaves last_entry NULL, because CIFSFindFirst() or CIFSFindNext()
rejected LastNameOffset, refreshes neither and presume_name keeps
pointing into the previous response. That buffer has already been
released: by CIFSFindNext() before it installs the new response, or by
find_cifs_entry() when it rewinds the search, which does not drop the
name either and can then fail in initiate_cifs_search() before a new
response replaces it. The next CIFSFindNext() then copies up to
PATH_MAX - 1 bytes of the resume name out of the released buffer into
its request and sends them to the server: a use-after-free read
that leaks kernel memory to a malicious or compromised server, which
can provoke it with a single FindNext response that carries no entries
and a LastNameOffset above CIFSMaxBufSize, which is all the existing
check rejects.
With KASAN enabled, a server that answers a listing that way gives:
CIFS: VFS: ignoring corrupt resume name
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in CIFSFindNext+0x8ca/0x14c0
Read of size 4080 at addr ffff88807c823f98 by task ls/83
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: ls Tainted: G B 7.3.0-rc4-00457-gf14572c203d5 #69 PREEMPT(lazy)
Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kasan_report+0xdf/0x1a0
kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0
__asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
CIFSFindNext+0x8ca/0x14c0
cifs_readdir+0xf51/0x29c0
iterate_dir+0x1c0/0x570
__x64_sys_getdents64+0x133/0x270
do_syscall_64+0x109/0x5d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Allocated by task 83 on cpu 1 at 13.497119s:
cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x90
smb_init+0x4f/0x110
CIFSFindNext+0xf7/0x14c0
cifs_readdir+0xf51/0x29c0
Freed by task 83 on cpu 0 at 13.584018s:
cifs_buf_release+0x41/0x80
CIFSFindNext+0xfce/0x14c0
cifs_readdir+0xf51/0x29c0
The buggy address is located 16280 bytes inside of
freed 16588-byte region [ffff88807c820000, ffff88807c8240cc)
==================================================================
The same memcpy() first reads past the end of that object while it is
still live, a slab-out-of-bounds read that the following patches
bound; that is the taint the report above carries.
SMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an
explicit vers=1.0 mount.
Clear presume_name and resume_name_len whenever a new response is
installed and when the rewind path releases the search buffer, so that
the name never outlives the buffer it points into, and reset
resume_key with them, since it was taken from the same entry and would
otherwise be sent with an empty name. A response without a usable
last entry then continues the search with an empty resume name rather
than a stale one; CIFSFindNext() skips the copy of a zero-length name
so that it never runs on the NULL pointer.
The next patch in the series leaves last_entry NULL for a response
that carries no entries, and bounds LastNameOffset against the
received response rather than against CIFSMaxBufSize. Responses that
are given a last entry today then take the path fixed here, so that
patch must not be applied without this one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spmi: Fix potential use-after-free by grabbing of_node reference
As noticed by Sashiko during a review run of an unrelated patch,
in of_spmi_register_devices(), for_each_available_child_of_node()
is used to loop through children, and to also assign a node to a
newly created SPMI child device.
Problem is that the refcount is dropped at every iteration so, in
the specific case of DT overlays, a use-after-free may occur when
an overlay is dynamically unloaded!
To resolve this, increase the of_node refcount when assigning (in
function of_spmi_register_devices) and release the reference in
spmi_device_remove(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: b43: fix use-after-free in b43_bcma_remove()
b43_one_core_detach() frees the struct b43_wldev it is given the bus
device of. b43_bcma_remove() then reads wldev->dev again to free the bus
device, which is a read of freed memory.
b43_ssb_remove() does not have the problem: it takes a copy of wldev->dev
at the start. Do the same here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup: serialize migrations of newly forked processes
With favordynmods enabled, a cgroup.procs migration takes the target
threadgroup's cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem for writing. A process fork holds
the forking threadgroup's semaphore for reading. These are different
semaphores when fork creates a new process.
copy_process() publishes the child's PID before cgroup_post_fork() links
the child to its css_set. A writer can find the child in that interval,
take its uncontended semaphore, and migrate it while child->cgroups still
points to init_css_set and child->cg_list is empty. Migration links the
node into init_css_set.mg_tasks. cgroup_post_fork() then adds the same
node to the intended css_set as though it were unlinked, corrupting both
task lists and their css_set ownership.
This regresses the fork/migration race fixed by commit b12b533fa523
("cgroups: add lock for child->cgroups in cgroup_post_fork()") and
restored again in 2012 after the lock had been removed. The old task_lock
protection was later superseded by global css_set and cgroup threadgroup
locking. The change identified by the Fixes tag narrowed only the migration
side back to a per-threadgroup lock, recreating the different-process
exclusion failure.
Take the new threadgroup's semaphore for reading before the child becomes
visible and hold it through cgroup_post_fork(). Use a nested lock subclass
because fork already holds the parent's semaphore. CLONE_THREAD children
share the parent's signal_struct and remain covered by the existing lock.
Migrations of unrelated, fully initialized threadgroups remain concurrent.
An AI coding assistant was used to identify and reproduce the regression
and to develop and test this fix. |