| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in libssh. Incorrect AES-GCM finalization checks in builds using the OpenSSL backend can effectively remove integrity protection, allowing an in-path attacker to modify plaintext on the wire without detection. |
| HCL IEM was affected with X-Content-Type-Options Header Missing. It may enable attackers to perform SSL stripping or man-in-the-middle attacks and intercept sensitive data. |
| A heap out-of-bounds read flaw was found in libsoup. When parsing multipart HTTP messages, an integer type mismatch between the caller and soup_headers_parse() can cause the length parameter to be incorrectly truncated, leading to a heap buffer over-read. A remote attacker could use this flaw to crash an application using libsoup or potentially disclose heap memory contents. |
| libde265 is an open source implementation of the h.265 video codec. Prior to version 1.0.19, `decoder_context::decode_slice_unit_tiles` (libde265/decctx.cc:920) reads `pps.CtbAddrRStoTS[ctbAddrRS]` at line 966 where `ctbAddrRS = ctbY * ctbsWidth + ctbX` is computed from PPS-supplied `colBd[]`/`rowBd[]` arrays without validating the result against `CtbAddrRStoTS.size() == sps->PicSizeInCtbsY`. A malformed PPS that passes `set_derived_values` but encodes geometry inconsistent with the SPS produces a `ctbAddrRS` past the allocation, causing a 4-byte heap-buffer-overflow READ. Version 1.0.19 fixes the issue. |
| libde265 is an open source implementation of the h.265 video codec. Versions prior to 1.0.19 have a heap buffer overflow (out-of-bounds READ) exists in `decoder_context::decode_slice_unit_WPP()` in `libde265/decctx.cc`. When decoding a WPP (Wavefront Parallel Processing) HEVC slice, `ctbAddrRS` is computed as `ctbRow * ctbsWidth` inside the entry-point loop. If the PPS/SPS headers are crafted so that this value exceeds `pps.CtbAddrRStoTS.size()`, the subsequent array access `pps.CtbAddrRStoTS[ctbAddrRS]` reads past the end of the allocated vector, triggering a heap-buffer-overflow confirmed by AddressSanitizer. Version 1.0.19 patches the issue. |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. In versions 1.21.2 and prior, the inline mask parsing code in `libheif/region.cc` contains an integer overflow. Both `width` and `height` are `unsigned int` (32-bit) values parsed from the HEIF file. Their product can exceed `UINT32_MAX`, wrapping to a small value before the division by 8. This causes an undersized buffer allocation, leading to out-of-bounds memory access when the mask data is later interpreted as a `width x height` bitmap. Version 1.22.0 patches the issue. |
| Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through V1.03.51 contains a heap-based buffer overflow in the set_ap_param command handled by the /localcfg endpoint. An authenticated attacker can supply oversized input, resulting in denial of service and potentially arbitrary code execution. |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. The fix for CVE-2026-3949 (commit `b97c8b5`, PR #1712) introduced an integer overflow in the very security check it added. The check itself can be bypassed, allowing a crafted HEIF file with a VVC track to trigger the same out-of-bounds heap read that CVE-2026-3949 was meant to prevent. This is a separate, currently-unpatched vulnerability. Issue #1712 was closed as fixed without testing the edge case where `size` is near `UINT32_MAX`. Version 1.22.0 patches the issue. |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. Prior to version 1.22.0, `Track::init_sample_timing_table()` in `libheif/sequences/track.cc` stores an out-of-bounds chunk index (`m_chunks.size()`) into `m_presentation_timeline` when the number of chunks defined in the `stco` box is less than the number of samples in `stsz`. A subsequent call to `heif_track_get_next_raw_sequence_sample()` reads `m_chunks[chunk_idx]` with that OOB index, causing a heap-buffer-overflow. Version 1.22.0 fixes the issue. |
| Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through V1.03.51 exposes an accessible UART interface that permits interruption of the boot process and access to the U-Boot bootloader. An attacker with physical access can modify the boot configuration or file system to obtain operating system access. |
| Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through V1.03.51 permits unrestricted access to the NXP i.MX6 recovery mode through exposed hardware recovery pins. An attacker with physical access can boot attacker-controlled code in memory and modify or extract firmware and other sensitive data. |
| A signed integer overflow vulnerability was found in libarchive's ZIP writer. In the archive_write_zip_header function in archive_write_set_format_zip.c, when ZIP encryption is enabled and the entry file size is close to INT64_MAX, the addition of the encryption overhead to the entry size overflows int64_t, resulting in undefined behavior. This could lead to incorrect Zip64 extension decisions or potential memory corruption. |
| A flaw was found in the sbc library (BlueZ SBC codec). An off-by-one error in the SBC frame decoder allows a crafted audio payload to trigger a one-byte heap out-of-bounds read. This could allow an adjacent attacker streaming Bluetooth audio to read a single byte of adjacent heap memory. |
| There is a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in some Hikvision cameras, which may allow unauthenticated attackers to cause device malfunction by sending specially crafted packets. |
| Using expressions that generate large arrays it is possible to craft a query that creates very large intermediate objects in memory, causing the server to crash with OOM error. |
| Unauthenticated Unknown in Falcon – WordPress Optimizations & Tweaks <= 2.10.0 versions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read
ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with
kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup
packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of
how many bytes were actually received:
data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short
control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The
copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT
the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer --
uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS
daemon.
Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer
behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:
* dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT
(short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
* aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket.
* renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the
request.
* dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.
A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is
a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs
implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does
this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before
copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe
pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer.
The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in
real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon
(adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not
reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks
normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach
the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that
bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a
1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of
non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer.
Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to
userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length
The Belkin interrupt callback treats interrupt data as a four-byte
status report and reads LSR/MSR fields at offsets 2 and 3. The
interrupt-in buffer length is derived from endpoint wMaxPacketSize, and
short interrupt transfers may complete successfully with a smaller
actual_length.
Check the completed interrupt packet length before parsing status
fields so short interrupt endpoints and short successful packets are
ignored instead of causing out-of-bounds or stale status-byte reads.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in belkin_sa_read_int_callback()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
belkin_sa_read_int_callback() (drivers/usb/serial/belkin_sa.c:202)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb() (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1630)
dummy_timer() (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usbtmc: check URB actual_length for interrupt-IN notifications
USBTMC devices can use an optional interrupt endpoint for notification
messages. These typically contain two-byte headers indicating the
payload format, but the driver does not check if these headers are
present before accessing the data buffers. In cases where the URB
actual_length is not enough to fit these headers, the driver will either
cause an out-of-bounds read, or consume stale leftover data from a
previous notification.
Fix by checking if actual_data contains enough bytes for the headers,
otherwise resubmit URB to the interrupt endpoint. |
| Hulumi is an open-source toolkit that ships secure-by-default cloud and platform infrastructure components for Pulumi. Prior to version 1.4.0, consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded). This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0. |
