| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A vulnerability was found in code-projects Task Management System 1.0. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /user/CommentSave.php. The manipulation of the argument comment/task_id/mineId/recId/myName/myImage results in cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in Handwriting-OCR handwriting-ocr-mcp-server 0.1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function fs.readFileSync of the file src/index.ts of the component upload_document. Performing a manipulation of the argument File results in path traversal. Attacking locally is a requirement. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| A vulnerability has been found in lmammino oidc-authorizer 0.4.0. This issue affects the function parse_token_from_header of the file src/parse_token_from_header.rs of the component Authorization Header Parsing. The manipulation of the argument authorization_token leads to denial of service. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| An Expected Behavior Violation [CWE-440] vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS may allow an attacker to bypass the Fireware OS boot time system integrity check and prevent the Firebox from shutting down in the event of a system integrity check failure. The on-demand system integrity check in the Fireware Web UI will correctly show a failed system integrity check message in the event of a failure. |
| An XPath Injection vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS may allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to retrieve sensitive information from the Firebox configuration through an exposed authentication or management web interface. This vulnerability only affects Firebox systems that have at least one authentication hotspot configured. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in MingSoft MCMS up to 3.0.6. Affected is an unknown function of the file /mdiy/form/get of the component ms-mdiy. The manipulation results in information disclosure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: fix io_thread race in rxrpc_wake_up_io_thread()
rxrpc_wake_up_io_thread() checks local->io_thread before waking it, but
then reloads the pointer for wake_up_process().
local->io_thread is cleared with WRITE_ONCE() when the I/O thread exits, so
the second load can see NULL even if the first load did not.
Take a READ_ONCE() snapshot and use it for both the NULL check and the
wake_up_process() call, as rxrpc_encap_rcv() already does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()
ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:
snaptrace = h + 1;
snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);
p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
...
case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
if (snaptrace_len) {
...
if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
false, &realm)) { ... }
ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps /
ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.
The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit
behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised
MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with
no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The
shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.
Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before
consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()
helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p,
guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe
for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where
p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the
rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines
below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit
path. |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS (Gateway Wireless Controller module) allows Stored XSS. |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS (Autotask Technology Integration module) allows Stored XSS. |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS (ConnectWise Technology Integration module) allows Stored XSS. |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS (Tigerpaw Technology Integration module) allows Stored XSS. |
| nanoid (Nano ID) before 5.1.6 contains an infinite loop in the customAlphabet and customRandom functions. When these functions are configured with a size of 0, the internal generation loop never satisfies its exit condition and spins indefinitely, hanging the calling thread. An application that passes an unvalidated, attacker-controlled size of 0 to these functions is exposed to a denial-of-service condition. |
| An Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS's CLI could allow an authenticated privileged user to execute arbitrary code via a specially crafted CLI command. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding
tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP
responses with TCP-AO options. The option length carries the actual MAC
length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a
four-byte boundary.
tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only. Thus, when the MAC length is not
four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left
uninitialized and may be transmitted. For the normal TCP-AO hashing
mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC.
Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before
hashing the header. Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path.
This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid
authenticated header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: serialize qdisc_rtab_list against concurrent get/put
qdisc_get_rtab() and qdisc_put_rtab() mutate the process-global singly
linked list qdisc_rtab_list and a plain non-atomic 'int refcnt' with no
lock. This was only safe because every caller historically held the RTNL
mutex, which serialized all rate-table lookups, inserts and frees.
That invariant no longer holds. cls_flower sets
TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED, so tc_new_tfilter() keeps rtnl_held == false
for it and sets TCA_ACT_FLAGS_NO_RTNL. That flag propagates through
tcf_exts_validate_ex() -> tcf_action_init() -> tcf_action_init_1() ->
tcf_police_init(), which calls qdisc_get_rtab()/qdisc_put_rtab() with the
RTNL mutex NOT held. Two RTM_NEWTFILTER requests on different CPUs, each
adding a flower filter with a police action carrying the same rate, then
race on qdisc_rtab_list and on the non-atomic refcnt, leading to a
use-after-free / double-free of the kmalloc-2k struct qdisc_rate_table.
qdisc_rtab_list is a single global (not per-netns), so the corrupted
object is shared system-wide.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160
qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160
tcf_police_init+0xda9/0x1590
tcf_action_init_1+0x460/0x6b0
tcf_action_init+0x439/0xa40
tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x42d/0x550
fl_change+0xddd/0x7da0
tc_new_tfilter+0xaa7/0x2420
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x95e/0xe90
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
Protect qdisc_rtab_list and the refcount with a dedicated spinlock. The
(sleeping, GFP_KERNEL) allocation in qdisc_get_rtab() is performed before
taking the lock; if a concurrent inserter added an identical table in the
meantime the freshly allocated one is freed under the lock, so no
duplicate is leaked. qdisc_put_rtab() now decrements the refcount and
unlinks under the same lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()
When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.
Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because:
- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.
- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It
just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free.
For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that.
(Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block
devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
amt: fix use-after-free in AMT delayed works
When an AMT device is removed, pending delayed works can still access
the freed amt_dev structure, which may result in kernel crashes or
memory corruption.
amt_dev_stop() cancels req_wq and discovery_wq with
cancel_delayed_work_sync(), but these works can be scheduled again
from event_wq after the cancellation. This allows delayed works to
access the freed amt_dev structure after the netdev has been released.
The following is a simple race scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
amt_dev_stop()
cancel_delayed_work_sync()
amt_event_work()
mod_delayed_work(req_wq)
free netdev
req_wq accesses freed amt_dev
Use disable_delayed_work_sync() in amt_dev_stop() to prevent req_wq and
discovery_wq from being queued again and wait for running work items
to complete.
The delayed works are disabled after initialization in
amt_newlink() and enabled only when the device is successfully opened.
This keeps the delayed work lifecycle synchronized with the lifetime
of the AMT device. |
| An Out-of-bounds Write vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS's CLI could allow an authenticated privileged user to execute arbitrary code via specially crafted IPSec configuration CLI commands. |
| A memory corruption vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS may allow an unauthenticated attacker to trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) condition in the Mobile User VPN with IKEv2 and the Branch Office VPN using IKEv2 when configured with a dynamic gateway peer. |
