| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| PostgreSQL Anonymizer contains a vulnerability in the anon.anonymize_database_parallel() function that allows the owner of a table to run arbitrary code with superuser privilege. The issue is fixed in PostgreSQL Anonymizer 3.2.0 and later versions |
| Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in John Darrel Hide My WP Ghost allows Server Side Request Forgery.
This issue affects Hide My WP Ghost: from n/a through 7.0.09. |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Easy Appointments allows DOM-Based XSS.
This issue affects Easy Appointments: from n/a through 4.0.2.1. |
| Due to a missing authorization check in Application Server ABAP of SAP NetWeaver and ABAP Platform, an authenticated attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive system configuration information. Successful exploitation could result in exposure of security relevant settings and internal system details, resulting in low impact on confidentiality while integrity and availability remain unaffected. |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Automattic WooCommerce allows HTTP DoS.
This issue affects WooCommerce: from n/a before 11.1.0. |
| PostgreSQL Anonymizer contains a SQL injection vulnerability in two import functions. A user can create a malicious JSON document containing specially crafted object names. If a superuser subsequently calls anon.import_database_rules() or anon.import_roles_rules(), the malicious code is executed with superuser privileges. The issue is fixed in PostgreSQL Anonymizer 3.1.4 and later |
| PostgreSQL Anonymizer contains a vulnerability that allows unprivileged masked users to execute arbitrary code by abusing operators, domain casts, or view subqueries that carry untrusted expressions. When these objects are evaluated in the context of the extension’s masking mechanisms, the malicious code can run with elevated privileges. The issue is fixed in PostgreSQL Anonymizer 3.1.4 and later versions |
| PocketMine-MP 3.x (before 3.27.0) does not implement Minecraft Bedrock protocol encryption, so the server cannot verify that a connecting client possesses the private key corresponding to its login token. An attacker who captures a valid login from another player's session (for example by tricking the player into connecting to an attacker-controlled server) can replay that login to impersonate the victim and pass XBOX Live authentication until the JWT token expires (typically 2-3 days). This affects servers directly reachable over the internet that are not behind a proxy with encryption enabled. Fixed in 4.0.0 and backported to 3.27.0. |
| PocketMine-MP before 3.26.5 and 4.0.x before 4.0.5 does not limit book page text length, page count, or author/title length. A player who obtains a writable book can create oversized NBT ('book bombs'), causing excess bandwidth consumption and server crashes (exceeding the 1 MB chunk size limit when saving region-based worlds in PM3, or exceeding the 32 KiB TAG_String limit in PM4). |
| Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Arbitrary account takeover in miniOrange OAuth Client < 3.2.0, OAuth Single Sign-On – OIDC SSO < 1.2.2, Login with Keycloak OAuth Single Sign-On (SSO) < 1.2.2, Single Sign-On for Educational Institutes < 1.2.2 - The manipulation of a cookie value allows actors to login as arbitrary accounts, including admins. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
posix-cpu-timers: Prevent UAF caused by non-leader exec() race
Wongi and Jungwoo decoded and reported a non-leader exec() related race
which can result in an UAF:
sys_timer_delete() exec()
posix_cpu_timer_del()
// Observes old leader
p = pid_task(pid, pid_type); de_thread()
switch_leader();
release_task(old_leader)
__exit_signal(old_leader)
sighand = lock(old_leader, sighand);
posix_cpu_timers*_exit();
sighand = lock_task_sighand(p) unhash_task(old_leader);
sh = lock(p, sighand) old_leader->sighand = NULL;
unlock(sighand);
(p->sighand == NULL)
unlock(sh)
return NULL;
// Returns without action
if(!sighand)
return 0;
free_posix_timer();
This is "harmless" unless the deleted timer was armed and enqueued in
p->signal because on exec() a TGID targeted timer is inherited.
As sys_timer_delete() freed the underlying posix timer object
run_posix_cpu_timers() or any timerqueue related add/delete operations on
other timers will access the freed object's timerqueue node, which results
in an UAF.
There is a similar problem vs. posix_cpu_timer_set(). For regular posix
timers it just transiently returns -ESRCH to user space, but for the use
case in do_cpu_nanosleep() it's the same UAF just that the k_itimer is
allocated on the stack.
Also posix_cpu_timer_rearm() fails to rearm the timer, which means it stops
to expire.
While debating solutions Frederic pointed out another problem:
posix_cpu_timer_del(tmr)
__exit_signal(p)
posix_cpu_timers*_exit(p);
unhash_task(p);
p->sighand = NULL;
sh = lock_task_sighand(p)
sighand = p->sighand;
if (!sighand)
return NULL;
lock(sighand);
if (!sh)
WARN_ON_ONCE(timer_queued(tmr));
On weakly ordered architectures it is not guaranteed that
posix_cpu_timer_del() will observe the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit()
when p->sighand is observed as NULL, which means the WARN() can be a false
positive.
Solve these issues by:
1) Changing the store in __exit_signal() to smp_store_release().
2) Adding a smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() into the !sighand path
of lock_task_sighand().
3) Creating a helper function for looking up the task and locking sighand
which does not return when sighand == NULL. Instead it retries the
task lookup and only if that fails it gives up.
4) Using that helper in the three affected functions.
#1/#2 ensures that the reader side which observes sighand == NULL also
observes all preceeding stores, i.e. the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit()
and the ones in unhash_task().
#3 ensures that the above described non-leader exec() situation is handled
gracefully. When the task lookup returns the old leader, but sighand ==
NULL then it retries. In the non-leader exec() case the subsequent task
lookup will observe the new leader due to #1/#2. In normal exit() scenarios
the subsequent lookup fails.
When the task lookup fails, the function also checks whether the timer is
still enqueued and issues a warning if that's the case. Unfortunately there
is nothing which can be done about it, but as the task is already not
longer visible the timer should not be accessed anymore. This check also
requires memory ordering, which is not provided when the first lookup
fails. To achieve that the check is preceeded by a smp_rmb() which pairs
with the smp_wmb() in write_seqlock() in __exit_signal(). That ensures that
the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() are visible.
The history of the non-leader exec() issue goes back to the early days of
posix CPU timers, which stored a pointer to the group leader task in the
timer. That obviously fails when a non-leader exec() switches the leader.
commit e0a70217107e ("posix-cpu-timers: workaround to suppress the problems
with mt exec") added a temporary workaround for that in 2010 which surv
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big()
receive_big() bounds the device-announced length by
(big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE. That is still too loose:
add_recvbuf_big() sets sg[1] to start at offset
sizeof(struct padded_vnet_hdr) into the first page, so the chain
actually carries hdr_len + (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(padded_vnet_hdr)) +
big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE bytes -- 20 bytes less than the
check allows for the common hdr_len == 12 case.
A malicious virtio backend can announce a len in that gap. page_to_skb()
then walks one frag past the page chain, storing a NULL page->private
into skb_shinfo()->frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS], which is both an out-of-bounds
write past the static frag array and a NULL frag handed up the rx path.
Bound len by the size add_recvbuf_big() actually advertised. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net, bpf: check master for NULL in xdp_master_redirect()
xdp_master_redirect() dereferences the result of
netdev_master_upper_dev_get_rcu() without a NULL check, but that helper
returns NULL when the receiving device has no upper-master adjacency.
The reach guard only checks netif_is_bond_slave(). On bond slave release
bond_upper_dev_unlink() drops the upper-master adjacency before clearing
IFF_SLAVE, so an XDP_TX reaching xdp_master_redirect() in that window
still passes netif_is_bond_slave() while master is already NULL, and
faults on master->flags at offset 0xb0:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b0
RIP: 0010:xdp_master_redirect (net/core/filter.c:4432)
Call Trace:
xdp_master_redirect (net/core/filter.c:4432)
bpf_prog_run_generic_xdp (include/net/xdp.h:700)
do_xdp_generic (net/core/dev.c:5608)
__netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6204)
process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6319)
__napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7729)
net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7792)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622)
__dev_queue_xmit (include/linux/bottom_half.h:33)
packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3082)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2252)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
The missing check dates back to the original code; commit 1921f91298d1
("net, bpf: fix null-ptr-deref in xdp_master_redirect() for down master")
later added the master->flags read where the fault now lands but kept the
unconditional deref. Check master for NULL before use; a NULL master is
treated the same as one that is not up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix null-ptr-deref in fib6_nh_mtu_change().
fib6_nh_mtu_change() re-fetches idev via __in6_dev_get(arg->dev) and
dereferences idev->cnf.mtu6 without a NULL check. addrconf_ifdown()
clears dev->ip6_ptr with RCU_INIT_POINTER() after rt6_disable_ip() has
released tb6_lock, so the RA-driven MTU walk can observe a NULL idev and
oops. The caller rt6_mtu_change_route() guards its own __in6_dev_get(),
but this re-fetch is unguarded; nexthop-backed routes survive
addrconf_ifdown()'s flush, so the walk still reaches it after ip6_ptr is
nulled.
Return 0 when idev is NULL, matching rt6_mtu_change_route() and the
fib6_mtu() fix in commit 5ad509c1fdad ("ipv6: Fix null-ptr-deref in
fib6_mtu().").
Oops: general protection fault, ... KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range
[0x00000000000002a8-0x00000000000002af]
RIP: 0010:fib6_nh_mtu_change+0x203/0x990
rt6_mtu_change_route+0x141/0x1d0
__fib6_clean_all+0xd0/0x160
rt6_mtu_change+0xb4/0x100
ndisc_router_discovery+0x24b5/0x2cb0
icmpv6_rcv+0x12e9/0x1710
ipv6_rcv+0x39b/0x410 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/io-wq: re-check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT for each linked work item
commit 10dc95939817 ("io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work
run loop") fixed the obvious case where io_worker_handle_work() took one
exit-bit snapshot before draining pending work, but the fix stops one
level too early.
io_worker_handle_work() now re-checks IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT in its outer work
run loop, yet it still snapshots that bit once before processing a whole
dependent linked-work chain. If io_wq_exit_start() sets IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
after the first linked item has started, the remaining linked items can
still reuse stale do_kill = false, skip IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL, and continue
running after exit has begun.
Move the check further inside, so it covers linked items too. Note: this
is a syzbot special as it loves setting up tons of slow linked work on
weird devices like msr that take forever to read, and immediately close
the ring. Exit then takes a long time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction
When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through
the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling
them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's
multicast hash table (mc_hash).
Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after
ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash
can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is
decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is
accessing it, a use-after-free occurs.
Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using
ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90
print_report+0x175/0x7c0
kasan_report+0x147/0x180
ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0
udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0
ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390
ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120
NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0
__netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340
process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00
__napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0
net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60
handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0
do_softirq+0x57/0x80
</IRQ>
Allocated by task 2239:
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
__kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40
__ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0
do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010
ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90
do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300
Freed by task 0:
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50
__kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60
__rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220
rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190
rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0
handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: bound TCP reordering sysctl writes and MTU probe sizes
Reject invalid `net.ipv4.tcp_reordering` values before they reach TCP
socket state. The sysctl is stored as an `int` but copied into the
`u32` `tp->reordering` field for new sockets, so negative writes wrap
to large values.
With `tcp_mtu_probing=2`, the wrapped value can overflow the
`tcp_mtu_probe()` size calculation and drive the MTU probing path into
an out-of-bounds read. Route `tcp_reordering` writes through
`proc_dointvec_minmax()` and require it to be at least 1. Also require
`tcp_max_reordering` to be at least 1 so the configured maximum cannot
become negative either.
When registering the table for a non-init network namespace, relocate
`extra2` pointers that refer into `init_net.ipv4` so the
`tcp_reordering` upper bound follows that namespace's
`tcp_max_reordering`.
Harden `tcp_mtu_probe()` itself by computing `size_needed` as `u64`.
This keeps the send queue and window checks from being bypassed through
signed integer overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebtables: zero chainstack array
sashiko reports:
looking at ebtables table
translation, could a sparse cpu_possible_mask lead to an uninitialized pointer
free?
If cpu_possible_mask is sparse (for example, CPU 0 and CPU 2 are possible,
but CPU 1 is not), the allocation loop skips CPU 1. If vmalloc_node() fails at
CPU 2, the cleanup loop will blindly decrement and call vfree() on
newinfo->chainstack[1].
Not a real-world bug, such allocation isn't expected to fail
in the first place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebtables: module names must be null-terminated
We need to explicitly check the length, else we may pass non-null
terminated string to request_module(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebtables: terminate table name before find_table_lock()
update_counters() and compat_update_counters() forward a user-supplied
32-byte table name to find_table_lock() without NUL-terminating it. On a
lookup miss, find_inlist_lock() calls try_then_request_module(..., "%s%s",
"ebtable_", name), and vsnprintf() reads past the name field and the
stack object until it hits a zero byte.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880119dfb20 by task exploit/147
Call Trace:
...
string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730)
vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945)
__request_module (kernel/module/kmod.c:150)
do_update_counters.isra.0 (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:371 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:380)
update_counters (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1440)
do_ebt_set_ctl (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2573)
nf_setsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101)
ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1424)
raw_setsockopt (net/ipv4/raw.c:847)
__sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393)
...
compat_do_replace() shares the same unterminated name via
compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(); terminate it there too so all
find_table_lock() callers behave alike. The other callers already
terminate the name after the copy. |
